THE

Military Panorama,

OR

OFFICER'S COMPANION

FOR

February 1813.

EMBELLISHMENTS.

Portrait of Lieutenant-General Lord William Bentinck.
Two Plans of the Battles of Aspern or Wagram.

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TO CORRESPONDENTS.

WE have been prevented inserting several of our Correspondent's favors from the length of an important article on the Battle of Aspern, which demands the strict attention of all Military Men, and indeed of every person who can feel interest in an event of the most decisive consequence to the future prospects of a great nation.

The favors of G. C.—Lieutenant Scott—N. W. A.—J. N.—Diomedes—and those from other Correspondents, will appear in our following Number, or in a Supplement published on the 1st of that Month, containing many very valuable articles, and which will conclude the first Volume of this important Work.—If Diomedes will favor us with the Biographies he alludes to, we shall have much pleasure in attending to his communications.

The Gazette of Saturday the 16th, announces the Marquis of Wellington's appointment to the Colonelcy of the Blues, vice the Duke of Northumberland, who retires. Before entering into the causes which led to His Grace's resignation, we cannot avoid paying the unfeigned tribute of our respect and admiration to the conduct of the Prince Regent on this occasion, which must endear His Royal Highness to the whole army. Indeed, there can be but one sentiment on the subject of the illustrious Marquis's appointment to the command of this distinguished regiment.

Several incorrect statements of the causes which led to this vacancy having appeared in the public prints, we hasten to lay the following particulars before our Military Friends.

On the determination to send a part of the Blues to Portugal, two additional troops were added to the establishment. The Senior Lieutenant, an old and deserving officer, succeeded to one, and the Hon. Captain Murray, from the half-pay of the 28th Dragoons, on which he had remained nearly ten years, was appointed to the *junior* troop. The regiment consisted previously of eight troops, and the promotion had gone regularly in it. But the Colonel had neither the power to augment or diminish the establishment; it remained in the breast of a higher authority; and the illustrious Commander-in-Chief, to whom this authority was delegated, had the entire control over the new promotion. His Royal Highness never interfered in the promotion while the regiment consisted of the original eight troops. Lieutenant and Adjutant Taylor succeeded to the first troop, upon the augmentation as before stated, and the other being given out of the regiment, the Duke of Northumberland was pleased to remonstrate, not adverting to the circumstance of his own inability, as Colonel, to make any change in the establishment of the regiment.

Upon the augmentation of the Foot Guards, a great proportion of whom have been upon constant service for the last twenty years, while the Blues have remained in snug quarters since their return from Flanders; and recently, upon the addition of two troops to the Life Guards, the Duke of York's control over the new commissions was never once questioned, although the Colonels of these distinguished regiments are all of high rank and influence, and some of them nearly allied to the throne.

While we regret that the Duke of Northumberland should have entertained the erroneous idea, that the Blues were to be exempt from the jurisdiction of the Commander-in-Chief, which has ever been willingly acknowledged and submitted to by the household troops, which report direct to the sovereign, whereas the Blues can only approach the ear of His Majesty through the medium of the Commander-in-Chief,—we take this opportunity of congratulating the army upon the firmness manifested by His Royal Highness, and the executive Government, throughout the whole of the proceedings connected with this affair.

EDITOR.

33, ORCHARD-STREET, PORTMAN-SQUARE,
January 30, 1812.

Lieut. Genl. Lord W. C. Bentinck.

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THE

Military Panorama,

OR

OFFICER's COMPANION FOR FEBRUARY 1813.

MILITARY BIOGRAPHY.

LIEUT.-GEN. LORD WILLIAM CAVENDISH BENTINCK.

THE illustrious family of *Bentinck*, following the fortunes of their native prince—our *Third William*—accompanied him to England at a period the most remarkable, and, at the same time, the most glorious in our history, when a thorough, a salutary revolution, both in church and state, was happily effected by the consummate wisdom and prudence of our ancestors, without the effusion of a single drop of British blood. Blessed then be the memory of those sages who thus obtained for us a bloodless victory over an oppressive and intolerant government. Nurtured in the lap of superstition and of sophistry, all public acts, emanating from such a government, could not but be impure,—they necessarily partook of the nature of the feculent stream, whence they were derived. A dreadful, a calamitously inauspicious æra must that have been, when only the tyrant and his victim were seen,—when society, if it could be denominated such, consisted only of the hunter and his game, but away with these sombre tints, since the sun of reason has fortunately arisen, and, dispelling the circumambient gloom, once more reared order and speculative freedom on the ruins of anarchy, and of blind zeal in matters connected with the duty which we owe both to God and man, and let us rejoice at the change!

Lieutenant-General Lord William C. Bentinck, son to the late, and next brother of the present, *Duke of Portland*, was born 16th of September 1774. Like all gentlemen who devote themselves to their country, and prefer a military to any other life, his

lordship entered the army when he was very young; but as it was in a time of profound peace, neither could his promotion be rapid nor could he obtain much of *practical* knowledge in his profession; and with respect to *theory*, it may be said, with the solitary exception of *war*, that every trade, calling, or profession, has one which is peculiar to it; but events occur in warfare of such a nature, attended by such unlooked-for circumstances, bearing an aspect so different from whatever before appeared, and demanding of course such a versatility of talents, of which the most capacious mind of man is susceptible, or rather a concurrence of every talent which can dignify human nature,—that *theory* will be found absolutely inadequate to the host of difficulties opposed to it; nay, does not the most intelligent, the most consummate General, he who daily compels victory to become stationary on his standard, he whom the evidence of every hour evinces to be the greatest chief that ever led an army into the path of glory, does he not find that, even with his long and successful *practice*, he must pause a little before he acts? This assertion will be contradicted only by those who are so impenetrably dull, as to think that the individual who has not talents sufficient to fill the most humble department in life, is becomingly qualified for the army, in which mere negative talents prove a recommendation!

When the throne of a mighty dynasty was overthrown in a neighbouring country, and when the Regicides, who were dragging the reins of the state in the mud, threw down the gauntlet of defiance to all well-regulated governments, a favorable opportunity presented itself, and Lord William accompanied the son of his king into the field, and in the distinguished capacity of *Aid-de-Camp* to H. R. H. the Duke of York remained on the Continent until the fate of war rendered it necessary for the British troops to return home, after having performed prodigies of valour, and displayed every martial virtue which could extort commendation even from the unprincipled enemy with whom they had to contend.

An *Aide-de-Camp* is a most efficient officer in war-time, and the General, in selecting a gentleman duly qualified for that post, and in whom he can repose perfect, boundless confidence, may be said to be exerting one of his highest privileges; for, next to himself, the Aide-de-Camp can promote his views most essentially, in action by his activity, his well-timed observations, and the precision with

which he delivers his orders to the corps which are about to be dislocated, and sent to reinforce a weak point abruptly assailed by superior numbers. During the Campaigns of His Royal Highness in French and Austrian Flanders, Holland, Westphalia, &c. &c. Lord William evinced uncommon capability, and abundantly justified the prince in the choice he had made. On the day of battle he was seen as if flying in every direction, heedless of the shower of balls falling on all sides, displaying at once great presence of mind, much intellectual and superior penetration.

His Lordship was universally beloved and esteemed in the army; at head-quarters, where he was best known, and his amiable propensities most likely to be duly appreciated, he was idolized; affable and unassuming, urbane in his manners, great suavity of disposition, with an eager wish to forward the interests of those of his acquaintance who applied to him for a portion of his influence, were all admirable qualifications, and calculated to ensure respect, esteem, and affection.

It has been observed of the *Bentinck family*, that they possess more of the solid than of the brilliant in their nature,—that they have more of Saturn than of Mercury in their disposition, and that at the council-table their representations produce much more effect than the long speeches of others, delivered with classical purity, and clothed in all the pomp of ornamented language. The late Duke is said to have been endowed with the very peculiar talent of bringing over to his sentiment, by dint of sound logic, those members of the state, in council assembled, who piqued themselves most on their own mental powers, and Lord William, we are assured, is gifted with similar qualities, and admirably adapted for situations of the greatest importance in the diplomatic line.

We have already remarked that Lord William Bentinck made his first campaign in Flanders, where the variety of circumstances attending the progress of the British arms at that period, afforded this gallant officer an opportunity of acquiring a thorough knowledge of the profession he had chosen.

During the years 1799 and 1800 Lord William served with the Austrian army, severally commanded by General Suwarrow, General Melas, and General Count Bellegarde,—and had the good fortune to be an eye-witness of many important operations. His Lordship was, about this time, also employed in a diplomatic capacity, in

which he displayed a considerable talent for business, and an intimate acquaintance with the political views and relations of the Continental states.

From the theatre of war in Austria his Lordship proceeded to Egypt, being appointed to command the cavalry of the expedition under Lieutenant-General Sir Ralph Abercrombie, but, notwithstanding the utmost dispatch, that glorious campaign was terminated before his arrival.

In 1803, Lord William proceeded to India as Governor of Madras, and remained in that high situation until the month of October 1807, when he returned to Europe.

A wider field was now about to be opened for the display of his Lordship's political talents, and, when the burst of patriotism spread throughout the Peninsula, Lord William Bentinck was selected to proceed on an important mission to the Supreme Junta, where his firmness, under circumstances of peculiar difficulty, augmented by the convulsed state of the nation, and the reverses sustained by the Spanish arms, proved the high opinion entertained of his Lordship's abilities were not over-rated. Lord William, in the frequent conferences he had with Count Florida Blanca, urged the adoption of such energetic measures as he conceived would prove advantageous to the Spanish cause,—but he soon saw, with regret, the supineness with which the Junta beheld the gigantic efforts of Buonaparte to complete the subjugation of their country. Still there was a good disposition in the people, and a patriotism which only wanted a proper and vigorous direction. In a dispatch about the beginning of October, Lord William Bentinck observes, "I am more and more convinced, that a blind confidence in their own strength, and natural slowness, are the rocks upon which this good ship runs the risk of being wrecked." His Lordship's opinion, so emphatically expressed, has proved but too correct, as the events in the Peninsula have evinced the penetration and judgment with which he viewed the actions of the Spaniards. Lord William continued with the Junta, corresponding with his government and Sir John Moore, until the latter end of November, previous to which Mr. Frere had arrived at Aranjuez, as Minister Plenipotentiary of Great-Britian, and General Moore conceiving that his Lordship's services, now that he was superseded in his diplomatic character, would be useful to the army, was pleased to give him an order to join. The high sense enter-

tained of Lord William's military talents by that distinguished officer, is particularly expressed in his letter to Mr. Frere of the 19th of November 1809, from Salamanca.—On that very day Sir John Hope arrived in Madrid, at the pressing instance of his Lordship, in company with whom next morning he waited upon Don Thomas Morla, authorised by the Junta to converse with them upon the state of affairs.—Much desultory reasoning passed at this conference; and it was perfectly evident that the Spaniards were altogether without a plan as to their future military operations, either in the case of success or misfortune, and every branch seemed affected by the disjointed and inefficient construction of their government.—Don Thomas Morla gave it as his decided opinion, and stated it also as the wish of the Supreme Junta, that in case the British force was then prevented from forming a junction, for the purpose of advancing to undertake offensive operations, a junction of whatever part of that force it might be practicable to bring together, should take place in the centre of Spain.—Subsequent events having revealed Morla's treachery, there can be no doubt that the above advice was insidiously given.

Immediately after this conversation, Lord William Bentinck proceeded to the army, which he accompanied throughout their calamitous retreat.—At the battle of Coruña his Lordship had an opportunity of particularly distinguishing himself.—Owing to local circumstances the right wing of the British army was placed on very unfavorable ground, and it was of the utmost consequence that this point should be maintained to the last.—Lord William Bentinck's brigade, consisting of three incomparable regiments, the 4th, the 42d, and 50th, occupied this important point in the British position; the brigade of Guards were in their rear, and Sir John Moore directed the Honorable Major-General Paget to bring up the reserve to the right of Lord William Bentinck.

Sir David Baird, leading on his division, of which Lord William's brigade formed the right, had his arm shattered with a grape shot, and was obliged to leave the field.—The French artillery plunged from the heights, and the two hostile lines of infantry mutually advanced beneath a shower of balls.—They were still separated from each other by stone walls, and hedges, which intersected the ground; but as they closed, it was perceived that the French line extended beyond the right flank of the British, and a body of the enemy

were observed moving up the valley, to turn it. An order was instantly given, and the half of the 4th regiment, which formed this flank, fell back, refusing their right, and making an obtuse angle with the other half. In this position they commenced a heavy flanking fire, and the General, watching the manœuvre, called out to them, "That was exactly what I wanted to be done." He then, accompanied by Lord William Bentinck, rode up to the 50th regiment, which had got over an inclosure in their front, and charged the French in the most gallant style.—They succeeded in driving the enemy out of the village of Elvina, with great slaughter. In this conflict, Major Napier, advancing too far, was wounded severely, and taken prisoner; and Major Stanhope also, of the 50th, unfortunately received a mortal wound.

Sir John Moore then proceeded to the 42d regiment, forming the left battalion of Lord William Bentinck's brigade, and addressed them in these words, "Highlanders, remember Egypt."—They rushed on, driving the French before them, till they were stopped by a wall.—Sir John accompanied them in this charge, and told the soldiers he was well pleased with their conduct. He sent Captain Hardinge to order up a battalion of the Guards to the left flank of the Highlanders; upon which the officer commanding the light company conceived, that as their ammunition was nearly expended, they were to be relieved by the Guards, and began to fall back; but Sir John, discovering the mistake, said to them, "My brave 42d, join your comrades, ammunition is coming, and you have your bayonets."—They instantly obeyed, and all moved forward.—At this period, and just as he had directed the most able dispositions, Sir John Moore fell by a cannon shot.—The troops, although not unacquainted with the irreparable loss they had sustained, were not dismayed; and by the most determined bravery not only repelled every attempt of the enemy to gain ground, but actually forced him to retire, although he had brought up fresh troops in support of those originally engaged.

The enemy, finding himself foiled in every attempt to force the right of the position, endeavoured by numbers to turn it.—A judicious and well-timed movement, which was made by Major-General Paget with the reserve, upon the right of Lord William Bentinck's brigade, defeated this intention.—The Major-General having pushed forward the 95th, (rifle corps) and 1st battalion of

the 52d regiment, drove the enemy before him, and in his rapid and judicious advance, threatened the left of the French position.—This circumstance, with the position of Lieutenant-General Fraser's division, (calculated to give still further security to the right of the line) induced the enemy to relax his efforts in that quarter. The very able and gallant manner in which Lord William acquitted himself in the command of his brigade, on this trying and memorable occasion, obtained the approbation of Lieutenant-General Sir John Hope, and was particularly noticed in that officer's elegant and admirable dispatch of the battle of Coruña.

Major-General Lord William Bentinck was next appointed to command a division of Sir Arthur Wellesley's army, with the local rank of Lieutenant-General; but has been prevented acquiring fresh laurels in the Peninsula, government having selected his Lordship to fill the important situation of Minister at the Court of Sicily, and Commander-in-Chief of all his Majesty's forces in that island; a situation, which at the present political crisis, when Europe, nay, the world, is in a great measure unhinged, calls aloud for the union of good and sound heads and hearts, in order to effect the deliverance of all nations from thraldom, degeneration, and debasement.

The conduct of his Lordship on his first arrival in Sicily was such as to justify the British government having placed him in a situation of so much trust and delicacy.—Finding the Court of Palermo under the influence of Buonaparte, and that the inhabitants of Sicily deprecated the Queen as the adviser of measures which would have led to the invasion of the island from the opposite coast, Lord William Bentinck returned to England, preferring to make his representations in person, instead of entering into a detailed correspondence with ministers, as to the real state of affairs, and so much confidence was placed in his Lordship's judgment that full powers were granted him to adopt such a line of policy, as might appear best adapted to secure the independence of the island, and prevent the Queen's party from obtaining any ascendancy in the state.—Her Majesty did not submit to these arrangements without manifest reluctance, and great exertions to place matters on a different footing, but in vain; and Lord William Bentinck has released from their dungeons, those virtuous Nobles whom the Queen had confined, in consequence of their opposition

to her views.—By the firmness of his conduct on this trying occasion, his Lordship has secured the good opinion of the inhabitants, who entertain a high regard for their British allies, and so little is an invasion now to be apprehended, that a considerable part of the Sicilian army has been detached to the assistance of the Spaniards, and the landing effected by Lieutenant-General Maitland, at Alicanta, has already produced a beneficial effect upon the operations of the Marquis of Wellington, by diverting the French army under Souchet from making any movement towards the scene of the late events, which have shed such lustre on the British arms.

Under the auspices of a never-erring Providence, we trust Lord William Bentinck will prove himself the happy instrument of saving the important island of Sicily from the unnatural machinations of her own children; from the feuds that they have wickedly excited in her bosom; and from the infernal spirit of party, of which she has been long the victim.

In giving this short sketch of Lord William Bentinck's eminent services, we are actuated by the hope that the young nobility of these islands may seek to emulate the illustrious example displayed by his Lordship, and, discarding the frivolous pursuits of fashion, and the baneful influence of the gaming table, endeavour to acquire by a similar mode of conduct the love, the admiration, and the lasting gratitude of their country.

In the year 1802, his Lordship conducted the Honorable Mary Acheson, daughter of the late Earl of Gosford, to the hymeneal altar. Her Ladyship accompanied her husband to India, and has again braved the dangers of the ocean in her recent voyage to Sicily.

PLAN FOR RAISING AN ADDITIONAL FORCE, &c.

BY THE

Author of Observations on the Military Systems of the British Empire, &c.

IN my Observations on our present Military Systems, and those which have prevailed during the last few years, I have proved that the population of this country will most fully admit of the army being augmented fifty thousand men, without injury either to the agricultural or manufacturing interest, or in other words, that as the population of Great-Britain since 1801 has experienced an increase of one million six hundred thousand souls, of which num-

ber, eight hundred and sixty one thousand two hundred and fifty-six are males; and in 1804 we maintained one hundred and thirty-six thousand four hundred and eighty regulars; we may now, in 1813, with equal facility, spare from the avocations of agriculture, commerce or manufactures, two hundred and sixty-eight thousand nine hundred and forty-nine men for disposable service, which is fifty thousand above the force returned to parliament last session, viz. two hundred and eighteen thousand nine hundred and forty-nine.—The expense of such an additional force I have stated at one million five hundred thousand pounds, a calculation formed on the Army Estimates of last year, wherein appears the charge of two hundred and seventy-seven thousand pounds, for an increase of nine thousand two hundred and eighty-five men above the force maintained in 1811, which is thirty pounds and sixpence per man, consequently the support of fifty thousand men would be about one million five hundred thousand pounds*. I have further remarked, that the eighty thousand men now employed in the Regular Militia, might be constituted a disposable force; that the security of the country could be fully maintained by the Local Militia; and that the crisis we are arrived at demands such a step.—A plan is also given under which my recommendation might be adopted, and, lest any objections should be started to the same, I now furnish another for the like object, hoping, between the two, that the measure will be carried into execution.

Permit regiments to be raised under the denomination of *County Corps;* for instance, a Lancashire corps, Kentish corps, &c. each regiment to consist of one thousand men, and all disposable for foreign service. Allow every militia officer who shall bring with him for service in such corps a certain number of men, rank one degree inferior to that which he enjoyed in the militia.—The colonelcies of the corps I recommend should be given to patriotic gentlemen of fortune, and eminent respectability, on consideration of their clothing, for the first year, the whole of the men.—The lieutenant-colonelcies might be disposed of among half-pay active majors, on their paying the regulated difference of full and half-

* This statement is given for the purpose of more fully explaining the certain possibility that exists for raising the additional force of fifty thousand men, and also the charge which would be incurred thereby.

pay; or given to those majors on full pay, who may be thought particularly deserving of such promotion.—The rank of major in the army, and in these corps, to be held by lieutenant-colonels of the militia, on their bringing two hundred men: that of captain, by majors in the militia, on their bringing one hundred and fifty men: that of lieutenant, by captains in the militia, on their bringing eighty men: and the commissions for ensigncies to be disposed of in the usual manner as those for the present regular service.

The Honorable General William Stewart, in a pamphlet published in 1806, containing Observations on the Regular Army, remarks that, "if permanent rank, as high as captain, be, on this peculiar occasion, given to the officers of militia and volunteers, in proportion to a specified number of men which they may bring with them into the more regular forces, there is little doubt of the success of the measure." I have thought it necessary to notice this remark of General Willliam Stewart, as my plan may, in some respects, appear to follow his recommendation; but I think it also necessary to observe, that if the idea has a similarity to the Honorable General's, it must have arisen from the communication of an intelligent officer, who, in 1805, transmitted to Lord Castlereagh, then Secretary of State, a letter on the subject of raising a force by adding rank to officers of the militia who might engage therein, and produce a certain number of men; and which communication I received previous to reading General William Stewart's pamphlet.

The Honorable General's recommendation nearly approaches the idea of the officer I have before alluded to; but although I have in some cases profited from the communication, yet my plan of reducing the rank of militia officers, on their becoming regulars, one step, and by which the regular army will not be injured, differs both from the plan of General William Stewart, and, in this instance, the letter of the officer communicated to the Secretary of State.

According to my plan, government, instead of incurring expence in raising sixty thousand men, whose discipline would nearly be perfect, might avoid the charge of clothing for one year for that number, which, as before suggested, should be provided by the Colonel.—The differences between full and half-pay of lieu-

tenant-colonelcies, and the sums raised from the commissions of ensigncies, might go to the support of the regiments.

In proportion to the strength of each regiment of militia at the time that a plan of this nature might be adopted, the number of officers allowed to engage in the *County Corps* should be regulated, and the preference given to seniority in each rank.—The number of men liable to receive the officer's bounty to serve in these regiments, should also be proportioned; and likewise the number of men each rank of officers might draw from the stipulated quota.

In order that the officers of the regulars might not be injured in any degree by this measure, perhaps it would be advisable that those who obtain appointments in the County Corps should, if Field Officers and Captains, remain five years without further promotion; and the subalterns, two years, except in cases where such officers may have found opportunities of distinguishing themselves in a particular manner.

That high martial spirit, the characteristic of a brave and gallant nation, whose safety must depend equally on her military resources as her naval strength, will doubtless be widely disseminated under a plan of this nature.—In an inquiry into the system of national defence, by Macdiarmid, is a remark that, " a nation, in proportion to the quantity of its resources, both in wealth and population, will be every way less capable of defending itself against a foreign enemy, unless the great body of the people be warlike.—Hence it seems both expedient and necessary for the defence of a nation, that the people should, as far as possible, be rendered warlike." This argument is evidently just, and applicable to Great-Britain.—We behold the unceasing designs of Buonaparte to overwhelm this country; and his ambitious attempts must be considered as more capable of being realized, from the want of energy in our military resources, than from any other apparent cause.—Hence then is the evident necessity which calls for our attention to the important point of rendering Great-Britain an armed nation, and no longer continuing useless indisposable forces, equally expensive as those raised for service, and certainly they could not have that reliance placed in them, if our own shores became the seat of war, as troops inured to service, and who have been actively engaged. Moreover we aim at carrying on military operations on foreign shores, yet our efforts are so circumscribed, that no very grand object can fairly be ex-

pected to result from them.—On the contrary, a very expensive establishment is maintained, and the success which might have been expected from a well-combined and formidable force, equal to the strength, and worthy the character of the British nation, is overlooked, and the objection given to the full exercise of our powers, is the expence already incurred by the small force employed, which I admit to be excessive, as from it little can result, and a war of driblets gradually drains the resources of our treasury, and impoverishes the population. It is important for all ranks to be made fully acquainted with the real state of our military resources: thus for example, it is necessary that every circumstance which is pregnant with, or which is attended by danger, should be known in its whole extent, in order that a correct estimate may be formed of it; and that we may not tremble before imaginary danger or mistake, and undervalue that which is really formidable.—Without this kind of knowledge we shall never be able to form a just idea of things, the danger of which it might be possible to encounter and prevent.

In conclusion, I must observe, that the advocates for continuing the Regular Militia ought to be aware, that its establishment is solely valuable as the means of recruiting for the line, and I have already remarked, that militia officers cannot feel otherwise than disgusted in having their best men continually taken from them, and their situations rendered similar to those of drill-serjeants.—Indeed, if the militia recruiting system is to be persevered in, it would be very advisable to allow meritorious serjeants, ensigncies in the line, on their bringing a certain portion of men: they have often a greater influence over the privates than the officers: many of them are steady, well-informed persons, and acquainted with military duties; whereas, it is an admitted fact, that the militia now contains numerous bankrupt tradesmen, &c. who have obtained commissions from the very great difficulty Colonels find of procuring respectable young men of education, to fill the subaltern ranks.—A saving might also be effected by the abolition of ensigncies in the militia; they are totally superfluous and unnecessary: one subaltern per company is fully sufficient for the duties attached to that rank of officers; as is also one lieutenant-colonel, and *one* major per regiment.

London, January 2, 1813.

Plan for Providing General Officers with Incomes adequate to the support of their rank.

TO COLONEL TORRENS, &c. &c. &c.

Sir,

I AM induced to address myself to you, as the organ of the illustrious personage at the head of the British army, on a subject, which, if report speaks truth, has already engaged the serious attention of His Royal Highness. The knowledge which I, in common with all who have had occasion to approach you personally, possess of your polite and unassuming urbanity of manner, is a sure pledge that what I now offer to your notice will meet with a ready and impartial consideration.

In the second number of my work is a plan suggested for giving a suitable provision to General Officers at a trifling expence to the state. At no period of our history was economy in the public expenditure more desirable than at the present moment,—when, after a contest of nearly twenty years, the blessings of peace are still at an uncertain distance, and it is necessary to continue the most expensive war establishment, in order to preserve the independence and integrity of the British dominions. I will not pretend to say how far the suggestions in the plan I have alluded to might be found practicable, but I have now to submit a few more hints on the same subject.

By a reference to the army list I find there are 82 Generals, 177 Lieutenant-Generals, and 304 Major-Generals;—of that number 167 have regiments:—with every wish to provide for the remainder in a similar manner, it must be found totally impossible; something different, therefore, must be thought of,—and, in the first place, I would propose modelling anew, and in a trifling degree, the present military establishment. With the exception of the 2d, 13th, 16th, 17th, 19th, 20th, 22d, 29th, 33d, 37th, 46th, 49th, 51st, 54th, 55th, 64th, 65th, 68th, 70th, 74th, 75th, 76th, 77th, 80th, 85th, 86th, 93d and 94th, each regiment of infantry, to the 96th, inclusive, has two or more battalions. There is, however, at present only one Colonel to each regiment, the 60th and 95th regiments alone excepted: I therefore recommend that each battalion of infantry shall consist of twelve companies, of which number ten should be kept effective and dis-

posable for general service, the remaining two companies to form a depôt for recruiting, drill, &c. Each battalion, thus modelled, to have a separate Colonel; for it certainly appears invidious to see many Generals in the receipt of only the full or half-pay of a Field-Officer's commission, while others, of equal standing, enjoy the emoluments of one or more battalions. Should it, however, be considered either unjust or indelicate to deprive Colonels of the advantages they have hitherto derived,—this part of the plan might only commence operation as casualties occur amongst the Generals who have regiments, when those of more than one battalion might be split, as formerly, without the interest of any officer being thereby affected. But as it is clear that this plan, in its full extent, would not give a suitable provision to every General Officer, it follows something more must be adopted for that purpose.

I would, therefore, propose, secondly, that a fund should be created by the sale of all regimental commissions, whether full or half pay, held by General Officers, and from this source, I conceive, an adequate income might be assigned to each, until provided for by a regiment; making a deduction or not from this income where Generals are employed on the *home* Staff. It may be urged that by this measure an unnecessary number of Field-Officers, &c. is created, but I contend that while the military establishment is continued on the present extensive scale, those officers might be employed, with great benefit to the service, in the command of depôts for the instruction of recruits, until vacancies occurred by which they would become effective in their respective corps. Besides a number might be appointed to those battalions whose Field Officers are permitted the indulgence of holding Staff situations with their full pay.

The number of General Officers holding Regimental Commissions appears to be as follows:—

			Price of Commissions.
CAVALRY.			
11	Lieutenant-Generals	}	187,200
25	Major-Generals	}	
GUARDS.			
8	Lieutenant-Generals	} *Price of Companies.* }	94,500
19	Major-Generals		
INFANTRY.			
7	Lieutenant-Generals	}	241,500
62	Major-Generals	}	
			L. 523,200

Here then is a sum raised, exceeding half a million sterling, by a method, which, giving rapid promotion, would be peculiarly gratifying to the army.—But this is not all, a considerable further sum might be obtained by the sale of the half-pay commissions held by general officers—the purchasers, however, to pay the full value of these commissions, and come upon the strength of regiments according to their seniority: to this the officers of the army could have no objection, on account of the great promotion which would thereby ensue.—In addition to the above calculations, is to be taken the full and half-pay of regimental commissions at present drawn by general officers, who would cease to receive it on the adoption of the plan for giving them a suitable allowance, according to their respective ranks; and with reference to their having served in the cavalry, foot guards, or infantry of the line.

Having thus stated my sentiments on a subject of the utmost importance to deserving veterans, whose services give them a just claim upon the gratitude and liberality of their country, I am unwilling to intrude further, and now beg leave to subscribe myself, with sincere respect, Sir,

Your faithful and very obedient servant,

January 4th, 1813. THE EDITOR.

AUTHENTIC ACCOUNT OF THE

BATTLE OF WAGRAM OR ASPERN,

On the 5th and 6th of July, 1809,

Drawn up by an eye-witness, and edited by an Austrian Staff Officer.

As the Battle of Wagram in its result had a powerful influence on the continental policy of Europe, there is just reason to expect, that a Narrative of the real circumstances attending that great event, and what part of them is to be ascribed to genius, talent, and profound military calculation; or what part to inconsequence, weakness, and mere accident, will be of general interest to the British Army and the public at large. The following relation has been already circulated on the Continent, in German, and is now, with several manuscript notes, additions, and alterations, *translated expressly for the Military Panorama*.—It is only by knowing the real circumstances attending great events, that we can form an accurate opinion in regard to the conduct of those concerned in them, or deduce therefrom any practical results which may prove of general benefit to mankind.—The Editor of the original German relation states, that "it was drawn up by an eye-witness, who possessed not only sufficient ability, but desire to be a just and accurate observer.—Blinded neither by hatred nor prejudice, he was able

to see events which might otherwise have escaped his notice.—The clearness of his views, and the air of impartiality which pervades the whole narrative, will afford sufficient proof, to those who are competent judges, that he was well-qualified for the office he has undertaken."

The plans which accompany this account, have been taken from the Topographic Map of the Environs of Vienna, constructed by the Austrian Geographical Engineer, König.—In the first are contained the positions of the army on the 5th of July; in the second those of the 6th are exhibited, and the minute shades of the ground represented in a more definite manner, as in the map. A bare inspection will be sufficient to shew that two plans were necessary, to prevent one from being overcharged with positions.—In the Narrative itself no reference is made to the plans, that the reader might not be interrupted: for the same reason the observations are separated from the text.—The editor, however, flatters himself, that to those who attentively examine the whole and each part by itself, every thing will appear so clear, as to need no further explanation.—He hopes also, that no military man will regret the time he has employed in making himself thoroughly acquainted with the real circumstances of this important battle.

Throughout the translation an adherence to the original has been strictly observed, because an author, particularly in subjects where precision and accuracy are required, should be allowed to speak as nearly as possible in his own words.

EDITOR.

INTRODUCTION.

AFTER the Battle of Aspern and Eslingen, Europe conceived itself justified in forming great expectations.—The public ingenuity, however, soon began to be exhausted in conjectures upon the causes of the long cessation from hostilities, which afterwards took place; and every one inquired, whence is the cause that the Austrians do not follow up their victory? It is confidently asserted by persons who were present at this great battle, that it would have been attended with important results, had the Austrians renewed the contest, and made a serious attack upon the French after they were compelled to retreat, when, in consequence of the destruction of their bridges, they could have been blockaded for nearly two whole days in the island of Lobau, and when a part only of the corps, under Davoust, remained on the right bank of the Danube. —It is asserted also, with no less confidence, by some who were present on this occasion, that the enemy were not harassed in their retreat to the island of Lobau so much as they might have been by the left wing of the Austrian army.—This wing ought to have been strengthened by the reserve, on the afternoon of May 22d, instead of which, a most furious attempt was made by the grenadier corps, and though the enterprize was indeed impossible, often repeated, to

storm the crenelated garden wall and granary of Eslingen. This building, four stories high, and surrounded with very strong walls, was defended by 500 Frenchmen, who, being themselves sheltered, fired upon the advancing troops with as much ease as if they had been so many targets. They, however, lost some men by the fire of cannon-shot and howitzers; but as the granary contained nothing of an inflammable nature, it was either not set on fire by the shells, or if it was, the flames were soon extinguished, and the loss of the defenders bore no proportion to that of the assailants. Perhaps it may be allowed that the Austrians had suffered too much in the battles of the 21st and 22d of May, and were in too great want of ammunition, and other necessaries, to undertake any great offensive movement, especially as the army had only just returned from Bohemia, and in this campaign had been exposed to very heavy loss; in a word, a thousand causes may be supposed which might induce them to think a forced passage of the Danube not advisable on that occasion; yet there was reason to expect that they would have taken some measures, and made some exertions indicating a design to follow up with effect this important victory. It appeared, however, that the chiefs of the army were satisfied with the enjoyment of the negative advantages which they had obtained, and by these means lost their dearly-purchased claim to others of a positive nature. Days, and even weeks, were suffered to pass away amidst torpid inactivity, and they did not begin to make dispositions for an attack till the bridges from the island of Lobau were restored, and the emperor Napoleon had been joined by his Italian army: in a word, plans for further operations were not formed till the army of the enemy was sufficiently strong to render them all useless.

On the other hand, the French were exceedingly active in making every preparation to wrest from the Austrians the advantages they had obtained. They left no moment unemployed, and by the dispositions which they made at all those points where a passage of the river was practicable, they rivetted the attention of the enemy, and obliged him to confine himself entirely to the defensive.

The Austrians, however, had thrown up some entrenchments on the line from Aspern and Eslingen to the town of Enzersdorf: but this line, which ought to have been a line of circumvallation, was not extended in such a manner as to embrace the front of the island

of Lobau.—Had these works been continued down the course of the Danube, as far as Mühlleitern, the passage of the enemy from Lobau, if not prevented, might at any rate have been rendered exceedingly difficult and disastrous. The Austrians had established a tête-de-pont before Presburg, which was soon attacked with great vigour by the French, and though they were here always repulsed, it was impossible to prevent them from throwing up opposite to the tête-de-pont strong intrenchments, which being defended by a considerable body of troops, kept the Austrian works in check. At which time the French emperor neglected no means which might disguise his plans and his views.

After the Battle of Aspern and Eslingen, the grand Austrian army had taken up a position between Wagram and Neusiedel, the front of which was covered by the Russbach.—This small river, though not of great breadth, is in most parts deep, and its banks are almost every where steep.—It is fordable only at a very few places.—Behind it the land rises with a gentle acclivity, which extends from Wagram to Neusiedel, where it disappears, forming an angle to the left. Though this position was chosen, and marked out as a point of assembly for the army in the event of the French attempting to cross the Danube, and in case it should be found impossible, or thought inadvisable to oppose the passage; and though this defensive position had been selected for the final decision of this important contest, by a general battle, no attention had been shewn to the improvement of its natural strength by intrenchments.—This position, by the assistance of art, might, and ought to have been made impregnable.—It may be asked, in particular, why the Austrians did not strengthen by redoubts their left wing, which was entirely without appui? Why were not Baumersdorf and Neusiedel put in a state of defence, especially the former, which presented a tête-de-pont on the Russbach?

In the course of six weeks, during which time the Austrians had daily at their disposal 40,000 labourers, fortresses might have been constructed at these places.—The works could easily have been furnished with heavy cannon from the fortresses of Bohemia and Moravia, and even under the most unfortunate circumstances, the loss of their cannon would have been a trifling consideration, in comparison with the advantages which might have been produced by them. It was a singular occurrence, in the course of human

affairs, that an army, after gaining a battle, should, when the first favorable moment was passed, confine itself to a laborious system of defence; and to this may be ascribed, the want of decision, which was afterwards manifested: for admitting even that after the battle of the 21st and 22d of May, when the Austrians had conceived themselves too weak for offensive operations, it was still indispensable that they should direct all their attention to defensive measures, and should cause the enemy to weaken himself so much by repeated unsuccessful attacks, that offensive war might be again undertaken with every hope of success.—But let us proceed to the events of this celebrated battle.

Account of the Battle on the 5th and 6th of July, 1809.

The force under the Archduke Charles consisted of the first six corps of the Austrian army, commanded by Generals Bellegarde, Hohenzollern, Kollowrath, Rosenberg, and the Prince of Reuss and General Hiller. The van-guard was placed under the order of General Nordmann; and a reserve, consisting of 17 battalions of grenadiers, and another composed of 6 regiments of cuirassiers, 3 of dragoons, 1 of light horse, and 3 of hussars, two of which, however, were newly raised, and formed part of the Hungarian levy, was under the command of Prince John of Lichtenstein.—The whole number of this principal army amounted to between 110 and 115,000 men.—The cavalry, which are here included, did not exceed 12,000. The Austrian cavalry had been much weakened in this short, but active campaign, and, in general, had not been increased between that period and the reduction which took place in 1802. The infantry also, and particularly the independent corps, having no depôt-battalions, had been greatly thinned in the course of the campaign in Bavaria.—The rest of the Austrian troops were distributed as follows, in different detached bodies.—The Archduke John, after suffering a loss proportioned to the length and rapidity of his march, had evacuated Italy and Austria with 18,000 men, at most, in order to form a junction with the Hungarian levy, which were to be organized, and to assemble between Raab and Comorn. Towards the end of April, the remainder of this army, consisting of the 8th and 9th corps, was distributed to those of Generals Chasteler and Giulay. The former had quitted the Tyrol, where he left from 4 to 5,000 men, and

with 7,000, which remained, was marching through Hungary to Stuhlweissenburg, in order to unite himself again to the Archduke John. General Giulay, with from 8 to 9,000 men, had moved into Corinthia, towards Croatia, in order to observe General Marmont, who was proceeding from Dalmatia towards Laybach.—The Hungarian levy furnished from 18 to 20,000 raw troops, of which from 8 to 10,000 were cavalry not yet organized. In Poland, the Archduke Ferdinand, with the 7th corps, amounting to from 30 to 35,000 men, carried on an independent warfare on the Weichsel, from Thorn to Sandomir. In Bohemia, a corps of about 8,000 men, consisting of militia, 4 squadrons of cavalry, and 1,500 of the Duke of Brunswick Oels' troops, made some demonstrations, by way of diversion, towards Baireuth and Dresden. The rest of the Bohemian and Moravian militia was in the mean time organizing in the interior, or distributed in the different fortresses. The Austrian militia was partly dispersed throughout the country, and partly united to the Grand Army.—Any portion of it not thus employed, was under General Schusteck at Crems, or with General Sommaviva, opposite to Linz. The whole amount of this militia, without including the Bohemian and a part of the Moravian militia, might be about 70,000 men, collected in detached, and for the most part, insulated corps.

Towards the middle of June the Emperor Napoleon detached the Viceroy of Italy, with his army, towards Raab, with the double object of concealing his intention in regard to the point which he might choose for crossing the river; and of sounding the disposition of the Hungarians. The Archduke John had effected a junction with the Palatine of Hungary. The Hungarian levy, ineffective and scarcely formed, was now, for the first time, brought into fire; they made no stand, and after an action almost bloodless, retired in disorder towards Comorn and Ofen; and Raab, a place badly fortified, and of little importance, was obliged, after a few days resistance, to capitulate. (1) During this time, the commanders of the Austrian army were employed in re-establishing and strengthening the infantry; but they confined their attention to this arm alone. The additional strength given to the cavalry regiments was of very little importance: though their depôts of men and horses were sufficiently numerous, there was a great want of horse equipments. The horses belonging to the German cavalry were to be supplied

from Bohemia; but the men were at a great distance from them in Hungary. With the reserve squadrons of the light cavalry there were a great many horses; but as these, at the beginning of the war, had been furnished from the wild studs, they were not yet fit for service. The advantage which the Austrian cavalry derives from its excellent breed of horses, occasions, on the other hand, a considerable loss of time, namely, intervals in the remount, which are required in order to tame these wild animals.—Nor was the artillery during this period increased.—The whole amount of it in pieces of position with each corps of the army, was confined to 8 twelve-pounders and 4 ten-inch mortars—all the rest were six-pounders and seven-inch mortars. The soldiers were supplied with meat and with bread; but it cannot be said that plenty prevailed in the camp. Wine, for example, was scarce and dear; and gratuitous distributions were exceedingly scanty.—There was a total want of straw, and the soldiers therefore were obliged for six whole weeks to sleep on the bare ground, in wretched huts constructed with brushwood, which had already produced sickness.

Towards the end of June it was understood that the Emperor Napoleon was preparing to strike a great blow.—Permanent bridges, defended by têtes-de-pont, were, near Ebersdorff, thrown across to the island of Lobau.—The banks of that island were lined with batteries, mounted with heavy artillery; and the French army had concentrated itself near Vienna.—Every thing, therefore, seemed to announce an approaching passage.—In the meantime opinions were divided at the Austrian head-quarters (2) in regard to the point which the enemy would choose for that pnrpose.—Some thought that it would be effected at the same place as that of the 21st of May; and others fixed upon the point where it actually took place. The first opinion was that chiefly adopted, though the latter had the greatest probability in its favour. At this period the Austrian army was encamped in the following manner.—The 5th corps, which was the weakest, was stationed at Stammersdorf. Its posts extended along the Danube from Stokerau to the broken-down bridge on the Spitz at Jedlersdorf. It occupied also the island of Schwarze Lake.—This corps consisted of from 12 to 13,000 men, and had attached to it one regiment of Uhlans.—The 3d corps, under Kolowrath, was encamped on the heights of Bisamberg, at Hagenbrunn: it had attached to it one regiment of

cavalry. The reserve of grenadiers was encamped behind Gernsdorf. The 6th corps, under Hiller, and afterwards Klenau, was one of the strongest.—It consisted of nearly 25,000 men, distributed in several camps along the Danube from Hirschstetten to beyond Eslingen.—This corps occupied the posts on the Danube from Jedlesdorf on the Spitz, to Eslingen; and also the entrenchments between Aspern and the town of Enzersdorf. In the neighbourhood of this town, the van-guard of the principal corps was encamped under General Nordmann, whose weak advanced posts observed the Danube towards Markt Orth.—The town of Enzersdorf had not been put into a state of defence, and was furnished with no other works than two fleches constructed before the gates. About 500 paces beyond this town, towards Mühlleitern, a small redoubt had been thrown up, and mounted with two six-pounders. Further on, descending the Danube, not a single point was entrenched, except the small castle of Sachsengang, surrounded by water, which is situated at the distance of half-a-mile from the river, and which had a garrison of 100 men, with 2 three-pounders. The cavalry of the reserve was disposed in different camps at Aderkla, Raschdorf, Breitenlehe and Süssenbrunn.—They might amount to from 7 to 8,000 horses, of which more than 1000 were taken from the Hungarian levy. The cavalry distributed to the several corps of the army amounted to from 4 to 5,000 horses. The 1st, 2d, and 4th corps of the army, were encamped in two lines, between Wagram and Neusiedel. The division of Schusteck, at Crems, amounting to 6 or 7,000 men, occupied the Danube from Stockerau to beyond Crems, where commenced the posts of the division of Sommaviva, which was placed opposite to Linz.—To each of these divisions was attached a weak regiment of cavalry. The Archduke John, after the affair of Raab, had crossed the Danube at Comorn, and encamped, with 12,000 men, including two regiments of cavalry, near Presburg, where he guarded the tête-de-pont. (3) General Chasteler was on his march to Comorn; but he had not crossed the Danube: and General Giulay, employed in organizing the Croatian Levy, continued to follow with his corps the movements of General Marmont.

On the 30th of June the French resumed the appearance of offensive operations.—In order to divert the attention of the Austrians from the point chosen for crossing the river, and on the other hand

to cover the workmen, they occupied a part of the woody ground which forms an entering angle opposite to Lobau, and where the first passage was effected. A cross fire from about 20 pieces of cannon on this narrow space, commanded by the island, soon dislodged the Austrian advanced posts which were entirely uncovered. A bridge was thrown over the small arm of the Danube, and the division of Le Grand took possession of the whole wood, the front of which, opposite to the Austrian intrenchments, was covered by a morass, which the overflowing of the river had formed here. The posts of the 6th corps fell back, on this occasion, to the intrenchments between Aspern and Eslingen. From this movement no further doubt remained in regard to the views of the enemy, which became more evident, as it had been remarked from various points of observation, that the French army was concentrating itself on all sides, and assembling both in the camp at Ebersdorf and on the island of Lobau. (4)

In the afternoon of the 1st of July the whole Austrian army, that is to say the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th corps, under the supposition that the passage would be immediately effected, agreeably to the demonstrations made by the enemy on the preceding day, put itself in motion, and approached the Danube. The 3d, 1st, and 2d corps of the army encamped in the 2d line of the 6th corps, behind Aspern and Eslingen; the 4th corps encamped at Wittau, behind Mühlleitern, for the purpose of supporting General Nordmann; the reserves both of the grenadiers and cavalry remained at Raschdorf. The Archduke John retained his position at Presburg, as did Prince Reuss his at Stammersdorf. (5) The Austrian army continued in this situation on the 2d. On the morning of the 3d the disposition was changed, it not being thought advisable to give battle on the banks of the Danube, where the army, perhaps too much crowded, suffered from want of water, and on that account could not remain in *bivouac*. Recourse, therefore, was had to the old position; and the army returned to the camp which it had left on the 1st. The 6th corps, and the advanced guard under General Nordmann, were the only troops left on the banks of the Danube, for the defence of that river.

During the interval between the 1st and the 4th, there was an incessant cannonade from the island of Lobau against the Austrian intrenchments between Enzersdorf and Aspern, and on the other

hand against the island of Lobau and the workmen employed in throwing up intrenchments before the wood which had been occupied by the division of Le Grand since the 30th of June.

It is remarkable that little mischief was done by the French artillery, except by one small and very much advanced redoubt, mounted only with two six-pounders, especially as they swept the whole plain, between Enzersdorf and Eslingen, with pieces of a large calibre.

On the 4th the Austrians determined to open a serious fire on the island of Lobau during the night:—the whole French army seemed to be here collected,—and it was, therefore, considered to be exposed to much mischief. The Austrians, however, had too few heavy cannons, as the artillery of the 6th and of Nordmann's corps only was employed for this purpose, and the relative situation of the island of Lobau precluded the possibility of effecting the proposed object with six-pounders alone.

It was not until eleven o'clock on the night of the 4th that a courier was dispatched to the Archduke John with an order for him to form a junction with the left wing, and to take a share in the great event which was expected. At ten, on the evening of the 4th, the French embarked at Ebersdorf 1500 men, who proceeded down the Danube, and landed at the extremity of the small wood before Mühlleitern, where the island of Lobau is formed by the arm which unites with the Danube. This disembarkation was covered by ten gun boats;—these posts being weakly occupied by the Austrians with a company of Chasseurs and two three-pounders, were carried without much difficulty. At the same time all the batteries on the island of Lobau kept up an incessant fire on the town of Enzersdorf, in order to draw the attention of the Austrians to that point. This town was occupied by the corps of General Nordmann, but barely in sufficient strength to enable it to maintain these posts, still less to send to the points, already forced by the enemy, any detachments capable to recover them.

The French, as before stated, had made themselves masters of the wood before Mühlleitern, and, therefore, could easily cover the bridge thrown across the river at the distance of half a mile below Enzersdorf, over which the enemy passed as soon as it was completed. Though the projected Austrian cannonade was anticipated by that of the French, it nevertheless took place:—it began about

eleven o'clock, from the whole line of intrenchments, and continued till the break of day. In the mean time the enemy, by his passage of the river, had broken through General Nordmann's chain of posts. The regiment of Stipsier Hussars and some battalions of Chasseurs, of which they consisted, fell back partly towards Presburg and partly towards Enzersdorf, and some of them were obliged to make a long circuit in order to rejoin their corps; the rest were either taken prisoners or killed. The castle of Sachsengang surrendered after a short defence.

About day-break on the 5th, the French were already marching in considerable force upon Enzersdorf. General Nordmann, who was too weak to oppose them, retreated, his left wing being always threatened, and abandoned Enzersdorf as soon as he saw it turned. The French now rested their left wing on the town; and the passage of their whole force, as well as the deployment of their columns, was effected between ten and eleven o'clock. This being accomplished, their left wing, which had hitherto rested on Enzersdorf, advanced upon Eslingen.

Here the 6th corps became engaged:—this corps observing that of General Nordmann in full retreat towards the left wing of the main army, by which means its own left flank was uncovered, and its intrenchments between Aspern and Eslingen threatened in the rear, also retreated, but its direction was towards the right wing, with its right constantly appuyè to the Danube,—it inclined towards Aspern and Breitenlehe, that, agreeably to the orders received, it might retire to the heights of Stammersdorf without entering into any serious engagement. This corps effected its retreat in good order, and without any serious loss, through Breitenlehe; while General Nordmann, who was harder pressed, continued his towards Raschdorf, Pysdorf, and Groshoven:—he afterwards crossed the Russbach, in order to form a junction with the 4th corps at Neusiedel. His rear-guard was sharply engaged, and the Hussar Regiment of Hesse-Homburg alone lost seventeen officers, the greater part of whom suffered from the fire of the artillery. (7) The grand army confined its support to the retreat of these two advanced corps to detachments from the cavalry of reserve, and remained tranquil in its encampment till about two in the afternoon, when the 1st, 2d, and 4th corps stood to their arms. Some cavalry regiments had been previously ordered to reinforce

the corps of General Nordmann, and others moved towards Raschdorf to observe the manœuvres of the French in front of the position which was left uncovered by the diverging movement of the 6th, and of Nordmann's corps. These detachments of cavalry lost a great many men by the fire of the cannon; and various affairs in which they were engaged turned out to their disadvantage, because in every point they had to contend with superior numbers. The rear-guard of the 6th corps, consisting of the regiments of Lichtenstein and Kienmayer, amounting, at most, to 1000 horses, was frequently exposed, in the course of this day, to the danger of being overwhelmed by the enemy's cavalry, which were more than three times their number; but, fortunately, the latter did not charge them.

About two o'clock in the afternoon, when the 1st, 2d, and 4th, corps of the Austrian army had been ordered under arms, and taken up their ground behind the Russbach, they began to throw up redoubts upon the front of it; (8) but the workmen were soon dispersed by the heavy cannonade from the advancing French columns. These columns, having entirely disembarrassed themselves of the 6th corps and that of General Nordmann, deployed about six o'clock between Aderkla and Groshoven, and formed a flank from Aderkla towards Leopoldau. After a terrible cannonade on the whole line between Aderkla and Groshoven, which was continued about an hour, the French formed columns of attack on the centre of the position: these columns passed the Russbach in two points, between Baumersdorf and Wagram; took possession of that part of the village of Baumersdorf which lies on the right side of that rivulet, and began to ascend the steep bank on the other; by this attack, of which the momentary success was perhaps owing to its suddenness, the first line of the Austrians was broken; but good order was immediately restored,—and on this occasion the Archduke Charles displayed great personal bravery, as well as the most striking presence of mind. By the dispositions which he made, the enemy's columns were driven back across the Russbach in confusion, and with considerable loss. Night broke in upon these events; and it was only under its cover that the French, who had been thrown into great disorder, could have again formed,—which they did beyond the reach of the Austrian cannon. The Austrians secured the river by posts, and both parties passed the

night under arms. It is said that this bold attack on the centre was to have been supported by a movement of the Saxons on Wagram, whose attack, made at a later period, was attended with no advantageous result; and also by a movement from the right wing of the French, by Marshal Davoust, whose attack however did not take place, and eventually proved the circumstance most propitious to the French.

The 6th corps, agreeably to orders, had retired slowly at the proper time; and was not much annoyed during its retreat.—Having reached the point where the post-house is situated at Stammersdorf, it found there the 3d corps, which had proceeded thither from Hagenbrunn. The reserve of grenadiers, which had witnessed the retreat of the 6th corps through Gernsdorf, having received no orders in the conrse of the day, followed its movement and fell back upon Sayring. The 5th corps retained its position near the village of Stammersdorf. The reserve cavalry, after calling in their advanced detachments, took post between Wagram and Sayring, and thus established the communication between the right wing of the army and the 1st, 2d, and 4th corps, which had remained in their old positions:—a part of this cavalry, however, continued behind the left wing. The Austrians advanced posts were pushed from the right wing as far as Jedlersdorf on the Spitz and Gernsdorf. The French placed those of their left wing at Süssenbrum and Leopoldau; those of their right wing remained at some little distance from the Russbach.

About ten in the evening the fire had ceased on the whole line. The extent of the Austrian position, from the post-house at Stammersdorf, through Sayring, Wagram, and as far as Neusiedel, was nearly four leagues. This day, the loss in men on both sides had been very great; but that of the French, in consequence of the unsuccessful attack on the centre of the Austrian position, was more considerable, particularly in wounded and prisoners. The Austrians had lost two small cannon in the castle of Sachsengang, and some of their pieces had been dismounted, particularly during the retreat of General Nordmann; but in the evening they had taken some eagles, and therefore the trophies were balanced. Upon the whole this day had produced nothing decisive. (9) Prince Rosenberg, who commanded the 4th corps, expressed, so early as on the evening of this day, great anxiety for the left wing,

which was much en l'air and a very vulnerable point of the position; but this uneasiness appeared not to be shared at head-quarters,—where, on the other hand, it was determined to make an attack from both flanks the next day, according to the following disposition. (10) The 4th corps, and that of General Nordmann, received orders to cross to the left bank of the Russbach, and to take possession of the villages Pysdorf and Groshoven:—it was calculated that by this movement a communication would be established with the Archduke John, who was expected to move in the night from Marcheck to Obersiebenbrunn. It was intended that this movement of the left wing should be combined with the operations of the centre and right wing; consequently the 1st corps was to defile through Wagram, and to re-possess itself of Aderkla, the salient angle of the French position, which the Prince of Ponte Corvo occupied, during the night, with the Saxons: this corps was afterwards to leave the village on its right, and to advance in the direction of Raschdorf. The reserve of grenadiers, supported by the reserve of cavalry of the centre, was to proceed through Sussenbrunn to Aderkla, and leaving the village on its left, to take up its allignements on the 1st corps. The 3d corps was to march through Gernsdorf, so as to have Breitenlehe on its left flank, and then to form in a line with the 1st corps. The 6th corps was to advance through Leopoldau upon Hirchstetten and Aspern. The object of these dispositions was by an attack *en echéllon* from the right wing to the centre, and, if possible, to cut off the communication of the French with the Danube. It was, however, presumed, that the attack of the left wing would produce a junction with the Archduke John, and give sufficient occupation to the right wing of the French. In the mean time the 2nd corps was to remain in the centre behind the Russbach, in order to meet the event, and to give support with its artillery, wherever it might be most necessary; it was also, according to circumstances, to cross the Russbach, and to take advantage of every opportunity that might favor its co-operation.

The execution of this plan was, however, in general, much impeded by the following circumstances:—first and foremost, the Austrian army was weaker by 40,000 men than the enemy. The latter had 25,000 cavalry at the least; the Austrians not more than 9 or 10,000. The French were superior also in artillery, as that of

the Austrians had received no augmentation since the 22d of May. At the commencement of the battle there were, at most, 40 twelve-pounders in play, the remainder being six-pounders. The second impediment was not less essential. The dispositions for the attack were not completed till midnight, and the interval was too short to admit of distant corps receiving their orders in sufficient time for the due execution. The distance between head-quarters and Neusiedel, where the 4th corps was posted, was not more than one league and a half, and this corps had been stationary on the preceding day. On the other hand the right wing, including the reserve of cavalry, had been engaged in various movements. The night was dark, and rendered it difficult, in some instances, to ascertain the situation of corps, while the communication required the assistance of patroles. The French patroles swept the plain of Süssenbrunn. Finally, the posthouse of Stammersdorf, where the head-quarters of the 6th and the 3d corps were established, was distant three leagues by the direct road, from the general head-quarters. On this account the orders issued in consequence of the disposition, did not reach this point till two or half past two o'clock. As the 3d corps encamped on the right of the 6th, a countermarch therefore became necessary, in order to give each corps of the army its prescribed direction. It was nearly four o'clock before the formation of the columns could be completed; besides which, the troops had two leagues to march before they could close with the enemy; it was therefore not possible for these corps to attack, at break of day, agreeably to orders. The 4th corps, which, on the other hand, had received orders in sufficient time, and therefore could carry them into execution, attacked before the right wing had completed the formation of its columns.

No accounts being received of the approach of the Archduke John, and as there was no indication of it, the great danger to which the 4th corps had been exposed, began to be sensibly felt. To remedy this fault, orders were sent to Prince Rosenberg to fall back, after his corps had been pushed forward alone and unsupported to Groshoven. But the French pressed upon its rear, and though they were not able to molest it seriously in its retreat to Neusiedel, this retrograde movement made no good impression upon the feelings of that portion of the army which was soon to be exposed to the most violent attacks.

At all events, the 4th corps having attacked in front the position of Marshal Davoust, and having crossed and re-crossed the Russbach, under a most severe fire, lost from 2 to 3,000 men in killed and wounded, and had above 20 of its cannon dismounted. The first corps, which, at day-break, had debouched through Wagram, found Aderkla evacuated, and a part of the regiment of Klenau was pushed forwards to reconnoitre. The French again took possession of the village of Aderkla, but were soon obliged to abandon it. For a long time, however, it was the bone of contention, being repeatedly taken and lost by both parties, till it at length remained in the hands of the Austrians. On this occasion General Slutterheim greatly distinguished himself. In the mean time, the columns of the 3d and 6th corps slowly approached to the scene of action, the progress of the infantry being retarded by the necessity of marching through corn fields. The grenadiers, however, arrived in sufficient time to take a share in the contest for the possession of Aderkla.

The Austrian line had at length succeeded in forming in front of this village. The first corps on the left of it; the grenadiers on the right—and the whole were drawn up in two lines *en echéqüier*. The artillery was brought forwards, and placed in a line with the 3d corps, which soon after advanced to the front, and took post on the right wing of the grenadiers. All the corps united their fire with that of the batteries, which had remained behind the Russbach, and indeed it was concentrated with tremendous effect on the enemy's centre, which began to fall back upon Raschdorf. During this time the 6th corps, which had moved through Hirchstetten, found the village of Aspern, and the wood along the Danube, occupied by the division of Boudet; but as the right wing of his division* was separated at too great an interval from the centre of the French, some tirailleurs belonging to that division, and some infantry insulated at Breitenlehe, were taken by the hussars of Lichtenstein, which were between the 3d and the 6th corps. When these hussars had passed the village of Breitenlehe, they found that 12 cannon of Boudet's division had been placed in battery to the right of Aspern, which kept up a violent fire on the Austrian columns of the 6th corps, which were deploying near Hirschstetten. These guns being too far

* Or rather from the other divisions of the corps of Massena, to which that of Boudet belonged.

separated from the infantry, and unsupported by the cavalry, were thrown into some disorder, by the appearance of the tirailleurs of the hussars on their flanks, and some divisions having made a vigorous charge, by which General Count Wallmoden Gimborn distinguished himself, the artillery had scarcely time to fire two rounds on the hussars. Nine cannon fell into their hands, and a howitzer was afterwards taken by the infantry, so that two pieces only escaped. The fire of the enemy being too far distant, could not save the rest.

This event determined General Boudet to make an immediate retreat, which he hastily effected through Aspern, and the wood on the banks of the Danube. The 6th corps now advanced through Aspern and Eslingen, and, by its tirailleurs, cleared the wood, which was but feebly defended by the French, as they confined their efforts to maintaining the tête-de-pont,which had been occupied by them in the battle of Aspern. The light troops of the 6th corps penetrated to this point.

After the retreat of their centre, the enemy, with a numerous artillery, formed one line appuyè on the left to Enzersdorf, and continued behind a gentle curtain to Neuwirtshaus, a solitary farmhouse situated in front of Raschdorf.

From this point the line was retired, and kept at some distance from the Russbach, opposite to the village of Baumersdorf, which lay before the 2d corps, and formed a tête-de-pont on that river.

About nine in the morning a violent and incessant fire was opened along the whole line of these respective positions, from the enemy's centre to his left wing; and from the centre and right wing of the Austrians, without an inch of ground being lost on either side. All the Austrian reserves were in the line; the cavalry of the centre being too much weakened by detachments sent to the 4th corps on the left wing, could not take advantage of the disorder which evidently appeared to prevail among the enemy, when their centre was compelled to retreat. For whole hours there was a complete suspension of movement in these lines; but, in the mean time, reinforcements of every arm were seen arriving at the left wing of the French. On the other hand, events had taken an unfavourable turn in the Austrian left wing, and great advantage had been given to the enemy by recalling the order for attack given to the 4th corps, and by the consequences of that charge. Soon after the Austrians had

re-crossed the Russbach, their left wing was turned by the enemy's cavalry, which had advanced opposite to Ober-Siebenbrunn. The detachment of the Austrian reserve cavalry was inferior in strength and much too weak to make an effectual resistance; as was every where the case on this day, when cavalry were opposed to cavalry. Some sharp and even brilliant affairs however took place, honourable to both sides; and while the regiment of Blankenstein was completely broken by the French cavalry, the dragoons of Reisch, and the cuirassiers of Hohenzollern obtained some advantages over them, and took 12 pieces of cannon; but, being too weak, they were neither able to carry them off, nor to follow up these advantages with effect. All these events occurred on the left of Neusiedel, and even behind that place, between it and a wood, on the road to Schönkirchen, called Stolze Fehre. The French artillery on the right wing had also caused the 4th corps to feel, very materially, its great superiority. No where in the whole line, was the disproportion of strength so visible as in this point, by far the most important for the Austrians. After a tremendous cannonade, during which one half of the Austrian artillery was dismounted, the infantry of Marshal Davoust formed themselves for the attack on Neusiedel. The regiment of Ferdinand, and the hussars of Hesse Homburg, made indeed some charges on this infantry; but they were attended with no advantage, while the retreat of the infantry of the 4th corps became the more indispensable, as it had been long outflanked. This retreat, however, was effected by battalions, and in good order, in the direction of Bockflies, across an immense plain, which did not present any maintainable ground.

During these occurrences, the left wing (or the 4th corps of the army,) had been supported only by some brigades of infantry, detached from the 2d corps. The action was exceedingly warm, particularly at Neusiedel, which was defended for a considerable time, and where an Hungarian brigade, consisting of Hiller and Sztaray's regiments, commanded by the Prince of Hesse Homburg, made a long resistance. The progress made by the right wing of the French, and the loss of the village of Neusiedel, soon exposed the left wing, and even the rear of the 2d corps, to no small danger. Besides this, it had continued engaged in a violent cannonade on the Russbach, and therefore found itself obliged, as the enemy advanced, to cause its left wing to fall back, and to form with it an angle, in order to

oppose the movements of the right wing of the enemy; for in proportion as the enemy followed the 4th corps, it got farther in the rear of the position of the 2d corps, whose change of front was effected, like the retreat of the 4th corps, in perfect order; and the French prosecuted their advantages slowly, and always under a heavy fire of cannon. Towards one in the afternoon, the position of both armies was exceedingly singular. The Austrian army rested its right wing upon Eslingen, whence the line was bent back in the direction of Aderkla; crossed the Russbach at no great distance from that place; extended on this rivulet to Baumersdorf, and, after the loss of Neusiedel, formed thence a flank in the direction of Bockflies. The French line, which rested its left wing on the Danube, extended in a direction parallel to the Austrians, at the distance of a cannon shot. The left wing of the Austrians was, at this time, in full retreat. The centre, however, and the right wing, remained firm, and maintained, uninterruptedly, a brisk cannonade. But the farther the left wing retired, the more did the 2d corps necessarily partake of this movement, while, at the same time, it was still engaged in the cannonade on the Russbach. The result was, that between two and three in the afternoon, the army formed in a line perpendicular to the Danube. The right wing, resting on the Danube, extended from Eslingen to Aspern; the centre stood at Wagram, and the left wing towards Bockflies.

At this period, the retrograde movement of the left wing began to be communicated, by degrees, to the army, and the whole line moved back in masses of battalions, *en exchéquier*, towards the road from Vienna to Brünn; the French followed slowly, and with intervals. The left wing of the French army, strengthened by cavalry, defiled in column along the Danube, with an apparent intention of turning the right wing of the Austrian, which was certainly exposed to this danger, as it had maintained itself longest in the positions which it occupied. It, however, confined itself to a demonstration; for though only one regiment of hussars was attached to this wing, it was not attacked by the French very superior cavalry. The intrenchments between Aspern and Eslingen, which had been again occupied with artillery, were evacuated, as on the 5th, without the smallest loss. The troops retired to Leopoldau, and this retrograde movement continued until towards six in the afternoon step by step, when the army made a kind of halt. At this time the

right wing was at Leopoldau, the centre at Gernsdorf, and the left wing, now formed by the 2d corps, was at Sayring. The 4th corps was entirely separated from the army, as it had received orders to gain the road to Brünn, farther on towards a hill called Hohenleitern, in order, under any event, to cover Olmutz. After halting half an hour, the Austrian army resumed its retreat, although not without loss; for a battalion of the Hungarian regiment of Duka, having protracted its movement, when the right wing quitted Leopoldau, was attacked by the French cavalry, and lost one half of its men. Previous to this, when they retired from the heights of Wagram, the Austrians had been obliged to leave some dismounted pieces of cannon. Another battery was taken by the French cavalry as they defiled through Aderkla; but it was almost immediately retaken by Rosenberg's regiment of light horse. The cavalry reserve of the centre found itself, for a moment, opposite to, and at a very small distance from, a much stronger column of the enemy's cavalry, but as they were separated by a ditch, nothing of consequence took place. It was here that General La Salle was killed by a cannon shot. The Polish light horse afterwards attacked some squadrons of the regiments of Klenau and Schwarzenberg, behind Gernsdorf, but they were beaten back.

In regard, however, to the main object, all these petty affairs produced nothing decisive. Both sides continued to cannonade each other, and the right wing gradually drew off from the Danube, by moving towards Stammersdorf, where the 5th corps of the army at length also became engaged, after having remained the whole day inactive in its position. The Archduke Charles's regiments of Hulans, with some artillery, maintained its ground on the road to Prague, and in that point kept the enemy in check. Towards evening the defiles of Lang-Enzersdorf were occupied by the 5th corps. The 6th formed, on the heights near the Post-house of Stammersdorf, the right wing of the army. The 3d corps, the grenadiers, and the reserve cavalry of the centre, which had again united with that of the right wing, formed the centre; the 1st and 2d corps were placed in the line on the heights of Bisamberg, a cannon-shot behind the high road from Vienna to Brünn, and formed the left wing. The French line extended from Spitz to Leopoldau, Gernsdorf, and towards Sayring. The 4th corps of the Austrian army covered the road to Brünn; and, in part, was posted on the hill of Hohenleiten, behind Wolkersdorf. About nine o'clock the fire

ceased, and the troops remained till midnight in the position above described.

In maintaining the action with their left wing, the Austrians had continued to rest their hopes on the arrival of the Archduke John, and the diversion which would thus be occasioned. His movement was, however, executed too late to be of any use—he halted at Marchek until eleven in the forenoon; he then continued his march, and therefore did not reach Obersiebenbrunn until between six and seven in the evening, where, having heard of the retreat of the army, he immediately determined upon retrograding to Marchek. His hussars forming the advance had penetrated as far as Neusiedel, where they not only took some prisoners, but even gave a momentary alarm to the French reserve, with which the Emperor Napoleon had remained at Raschdorf.

In calculating what might have been done by the Archduke John it should be observed, that even if he had arrived after a forced march, on the evening of the 5th, he would probably, according to the then state of things, have found himself so situated, that he could maintain only an unconnected engagement with fatigued troops, and at too great a distance from the main army, from which he must infallibly have suffered very seriously; for the Emperor Napoleon had it very much in his power, when informed of his approach, to send against him a detachment which he could not have been able to oppose. It would have been necessary for him to march during the night between the 5th and the 6th, which would have been attended with a double advantage—he could have concealed his strength as well as his movements, which, in that open plain, was impracticable in the day-time.

At all events, this would have secured his arriving at day-break, and there was every probability that he would have found means to unite himself to the left wing. It was, however, under any contingency, dangerous to place implicit reliance on his arrival, and there can be no doubt that it would have been much safer to have given him orders to march on the 3d, as he could then have joined the army on the 4th, would not have been exposed to any of the before-mentioned dangers, and, on the other hand, might have taken a share in the battle with refreshed troops*. In the morning of the 6th, the Archduke Charles,

* The Archduke John had received orders on the 2d and 3d to make a diversion across the Danube, and in the night of the 4th, had sent over a considerable body

having dispatched one of his Aides-de-Camp, in order to hasten the march of his brother, this officer unexpectedly fell in with the rear of Grouchy's division, which was on the point of making a movement on the left flank of the Austrians, and he owed his escape to the fleetness of his horse.

The foregoing is a correct statement of the circumstances which marked the important and decisive action of the 5th and 6th of July. Both days were bloody, but particularly the last, and they proved so more especially for the infantry engaged in the centre, at Aderkla and at Neusiedel—the rest of the battle was cannonade. The artillery, however, was numerous; it was served with great vivacity on both sides, and its fire was so well kept up, that it may possibly be questioned whether, upon any occasion since the introduction of this arm, it ever was employed in the field in so terrible a manner. The Austrian army displayed much bravery and great perseverance in its efforts, and its eagerness to engage had not been less remarkable. The artillery surpassed itself, and its loss in men was very considerable. The movements of the French displayed greater boldness on the 5th than on the sixth, when their conduct conveyed an impression, that to maintain the ground they had gained was more their object than a decided victory. The Austrian army lost in killed, (among whom were 4 generals) wounded, and prisoners, 20,000 men. The number of the prisoners might be about 5 or 6,000. The French lost, on the 5th, from 3 to 4,000 men on the heights of Russbach. The loss in men, upon the whole, was pretty nearly equal; and the case was the same in regard to trophies. The Austrians lost, on both days, from 11 to 12 cannon; the French, on the other hand, lost 10 on the morning of the 6th, and had about 20,000 men killed and wounded.

CONCLUSION BY THE EDITOR.

It is evident that neglect of the necessary means of precaution which might have been adopted, by fortifying the position of Neusiedel, was peculiarly hurtful to the cause of the Austrians; for if it

of troops, which, when he received counter orders on the 5th, he was not able to withdraw until night, as the enemy could fire upon the flying bridges. He began his march therefore about five in the evening, and at six, on the following morning, arrived with his troops much fatigued, at Marchek. Had he been able to continue his march, without halting, he might have arrived early enough in the forenoon to have made a diversion, which, however, would have been attended with no small risk to his own corps.

was not intended to oppose with more vigour the enemy's passage of the Danube, it was needless to expose the army to the loss of so many men. Towards the evening of the 5th the Austrians were too confident, a circumstance which might have cost them exceedingly dear. For supposing the attack made by the enemy on the centre to have been successful, the three corps of the army therefore, which occupied the position behind the Russbach, might have been penetrated and beaten, without its being possible for the 3d and 6th corps, which had been left out of play, to take any share in the action—and the fate of the army was thus compromised. If on that day, when the 6th corps was withdrawn towards Gernsdorf, the other corps of the right wing and centre had been ordered to advance to its support, the left wing of the enemy would, at the same time, have been threatened; the movement which the 6th corps made alone, on that day, produced the disadvantage of removing that corps far from the point on which it was destined to act upon the following day. Had it remained nearer to the rest of the army in the evening, the enemy perhaps might have been surprized by a general attack on his whole extent of line at day-break. The divisions of Schusteck and Sommaviva on the Upper Danube, and the 5th corps, which might in part have been employed in the action, took no share in it. Without entering into further discussion on the plan of this battle, I shall only observe, that it offered no possibility of connection, as the right wing could not reach the point of attack in sufficient time. Further, the disposition prescribed merely the march, and the point to which the troops ought to move; and subsequently there was no appearance afterwards, either of concert, decision, or of unity of action. When the critical moment arrived, it appeared as if the Austrian commanders then sought to avoid a decisive action: at any rate, nothing seemed to manifest their intention of engaging. Had not the Austrians been too cautious, the centre of the enemy would not have found it an easy matter to unite itself to the left wing; and this junction might have been defeated by a vigorous effort made towards nine o'clock, when the Austrians should have pressed forward towards Raschdorf and Enzersdorf. The disposition of the Austrian army was every thing that could be wished, in order to insure success to such a blow. Officers and soldiers bore with impatience their inactivity during a murderous cannonade; they would therefore have rejoiced to advance, and even loudly requested orders for that purpose.

The centre, and the right wing, having once got into the line, and reached the point prescribed by the disposition, different corps were obliged to wait for superior orders, of which the delivery, in so extensive a line, was necessarily progressive, the movements consequently wanted the necessary union and co-operation. The manœuvres were retarded, because no corps could act alone, although afterwards their movements became subordinate to the impulse of the moment, and to the circumstances which succeeded each other. The retreat of the left wing produced by degrees that of the whole, and no manœuvre was attempted which might remedy this evil. It might have been easily foreseen that the left wing, which stood completely exposed, must be turned and beaten, because, in fact, it was too weak, and the various movements which it had been ordered to make in the morning, were exceedingly prejudicial to it. When the evil became manifest in its effects, an attempt was made to check its progress, but this attempt was partial, and confined to the left, instead of marching any considerable or sufficient reinforcement to the weak points, or directing powerful diversions in other quarters. The only means of restoring confidence to troops who have begun to waver, is to afford to them the facility of assembling, and of deriving support from others. The fate of the left wing decided that of the day. The battle was lost; and had it not been for the inexplicable caution of the enemy, who, in following up his victory on this occasion, shewed a want of exertion very unusual in his operations, and had not the Emperor Napoleon remained 36 hours inactive at Workersdorf, (11) every exertion, and the exemplary and persevering bravery of the Austrians, would scarcely have prevented the consequences from being much more disastrous. For as the Austrian army, after the battle, was obliged, in presence of the enemy, formed in a line parallel to its front, to march off from the left, and not only to mask this march, but to contract itself more towards the right wing, in order that it might better concentrate a mass of strength for its support, it must be admitted a fortunate circumstance, that time was allowed by the enemy for the execution of so dangerous a manœuvre.

To describe the various actions that occurred on the following days, including that near Zraim, which was succeeded by the armistice, would exceed the intended limits of this narrative. These events were the natural results of the battles of the 5th and 6th. The latter only are the objects of special attention, but enough will be said in

the notes (12) to give a general idea of the whole; from which a just estimate may be formed of the spirit by which the Austrian troops were animated to the last moment.

OBSERVATIONS.

(1) This diversion seems to have made no impression on the main body of the Austrian army, for it remained motionless in the camp at Marchfelde. Could not the enemy have been threatened by some demonstration, or occupied in some other quarter?

(2) It was, therefore, the unanimous opinion of the Austrians, that a passage would be effected at Lobau, and if the motives for not taking any measures to fortify the defensive positions between Wagram and Neusiedel, was their being considered useless in the the event of the enemy crossing at any other point, it became equally clear that these measures were necessary from the moment that the point at which the enemy would effect a passage ceased to be doubtful.

(3) The following anecdote deserves a place here, because it shews how much accident contributes to a favourable result in war. In the affair at Raab the Hungarian cavalry was drawn up behind an eminence. The French, who had advanced with a design to attack them, finding them far stronger than they expected, hesitated,—and this hesitation produced confusion, from which they could not be extricated without some difficulty. A cloud of dust having arisen from this circumstance, the newly-raised and inexperienced Hungarian cavalry fancied the dust to be produced by the French cavalry advancing to the charge,—they in their turn fell into disorder, and as the French, from longer practice in war, were sooner able to recover themselves, the affair ended to the disadvantage of the Hungarians.

(4) Was there not reason to expect that the Austrian army would on its part have also concentrated itself? that the troops would have been withdrawn from the Upper Danube, or at any rate that the corps of Prince Reuss would have been strengthened by the division of Schustick? that the Archduke John would have been ordered to form immediately, and that precise orders would have been given to the corps of Gen. Chasteler and Giulay to act offensively? All this might reasonably be expected; but it was not done. The division of General Sommaviva, under these circum-

stances, would have been sufficient to observe the Danube from Linz to Stockerau;—the division of Schusteck united to that of Prince Reuss, was sufficient, not only to occupy the posts from Stockerau to Jedlersdorf on the Spitz, but also to have furnished for the right wing a reserve of 14,000 men and 30 pieces of cannon; had the Archduke John received orders on the 3d he would have been able on the 4th to strengthen the left wing with from 12 to 13,000 men, and 40 pieces of cannon:—the army would thus have had a considerable accession of force, and above 2000 more cavalry, without weakening or leaving uncovered any one essential point.

(5) It would appear, from this movement, that it had been determined, at the Austrian head-quarters, to dispute the passage of the river with the enemy, and to engage on the banks of the Danube. All the passages were observed, and the army now formed, in some measure, a line of circumvallation around the island of Lobau; why was this plan abandoned? or rather why was the attempt made, as the circumstances, which rendered this position untenable, must have been known? Had the plan been conceived on the mere supposition that the French would pass the river on the 2d?

(6) It would almost seem that doubts still prevailed on this day at the Austrian head-quarters, that a serious attack was intended; and that it was considered improbable that the passage of the Danube would be so closely connected with an offensive movement to be executed at so great a distance from its banks. In proof of this accusation may be adduced the late hour at which the 1st, 2d, and 4th corps of the army were ordered under arms on the 4th; that the 3d corps at Hagenbrunn, and the 5th at Stammersdorf, received no orders whatever on that day, and that, on the morning of the 5th, the 6th received no other orders than not to commit itself, but if attacked to fall back on the heights of Stammersdorf, which order was not subsequently modified in reference to other circumstances which might, or did occur. A further proof that any operation, on the part of the enemy, which might change the direction of the corps, had not been calculated upon.

(7) Why was this work not thought of till the present moment, when six whole weeks might have been employed in planning it and carrying it into execution?

(8) Although the French had effected a passage across the Danube, the result of the next day's action alone determined whether they

could maintain themselves on the left bank of that river; their situation was such as to reduce them to the necessity of fighting for this object. What advantages might not the Austrians have derived at this time from a well-intrenched position! it would have enabled them calmly to await renewed attacks on their centre and left wing;—and had they been so fortunate as to repel these, the operations of their right wing would then indeed have become formidable to the enemy. They would have cut them off from their bridges, and might have embarrassed them extremely.

(9) This attack, made from both wings, had a double view:—the first was the hope of effecting a junction of the left wing with the Archduke John;—the second, on the other hand, was to take advantage of the unsuccessful attack made the preceding day on the Austrian centre, and to surprize the enemy by an offensive movement. The first object would have been easily accomplished had the Archduke received orders in due time, and had he begun this march sufficiently early:—the second might have been attained on the preceding evening, before the French columns of attack had recovered from the disorder into which they had been thrown; but when undertaken it was too late, and very hazardous, considering the enemy's superiority of numbers, and his unquestioned ability. Had the troops been sufficiently protected by redoubts behind the Russbach, they might then have quietly waited for the attack, which must have resulted from the Emperor Napoleon's desire to derive advantage from his passage of the Danube, as has been mentioned in the 8th remark. Why had not works been thrown up also at Stammersdorf, which would have afforded a point d'appui to the right wing, and might have been exceedingly useful if the enemy should attempt a passage farther up the Danube above Vienna? It was indeed most unjust to reproach Prince Rosenberg (as was afterwards done) for not representing the impossibility of his making a partial attack on the right wing of the French position: how could he know that the Archduke John would not arrive, and that no junction would be effected? at least how can a subordinate General make such representations, when the time for so doing is too short, as in this instance was the case?

(10) It appears that on the 7th, namely, on the day after the battle, the Emperor Napoleon was led into error by false reports respecting the retreat of the Austrian army; for the greater part

of his troops halted at Wolkersdorf. It was not until towards noon that the corps of Massena put itself into motion by Lang-Enzersdorf. Marshal Davoust, however, followed the 4th corps, under Prince Rosenberg, as far as Brünn.

(11) The Austrians, that is to say the 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, and 6th corps, with the reserve, had moved, without being followed, from the position which they occupied, during the night, on the Bisamberg, and at Hagenbrunn, Lang-Enzersdorf, Königsbrunn, and Stetten, towards Kornneuburg and the heights of Krewzenstein. The 5th corps alone retired in the night, marched through Lang-Enzersdorf, on the road to Prague, and took post on this side of Spillern.

The 6th corps, destined to form the rear-guard, marched last, about break of day, from the heights near Stammersdorf, and arrived about six o'clock in the morning at Kornneuberg, behind which place it took post; the rear-guard of this corps, under General Count Wallmoden, which consisted of a part of the Vienna volunteers, and the Hussar regiment of Lichtenstein, remaining in front of, and in the town, which is enclosed by walls; General Spleny commanded in it, and had with him the regiment of that name. The Austrian official report describes the position of each corps of the army; on this and the following days they were always posted in several echelons behind the 6th. The 2d corps marched on the left of the road toPrague, through the Rohrwald (Rohs forest) and covered the left flank of the army. About ten o'clock on the morning of the 7th, French patroles shewed themselves partly in front of the defile of Lang-Enzersdorf, and partly beyond the Bisamberg. The 3d corps had its advanced posts on the brow of the heights of Krewzerstein. Those of the 6th were distributed along the ravine, (called the ditch of the Danube) which runs from Stetten towards that river: with the latter some skirmishing took place, yet there was no reason to expect a serious attack before three or four in the afternoon, about which time cavalry and artillery advanced from Lang-Enzersdorf:—these immediately began to drive the advanced posts from the above-named ravine, and to open their fire on the rear-guard. Sub-detachments of the corps under Marshal Massena shewed themselves also on the Bisamberg, this being the only corps which followed the Austrians on the road leading to Prague; the rest of the army having continued stationary at Wolkersdorf.

The Viceroy was ordered to move with some troops towards the Marche, in order to observe the Archduke John. The advance-guard of Marshal Massena, which had with it some of the troops of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden, began about five o'clock to engage with the rear-guard of the 6th corps, in front of Korn-Neuberg.—The enemy brought forward a greater number of cannon than could be here opposed to him; but the 6th corps having advanced a few batteries, the cannonade was maintained on both sides with great vivacity for more than an hour.

The Vienna volunteers were engaged also in a serious affair along the bushy banks of the Danube, and for several hours disputed every inch of the ground with the enemy's light infantry: but when the rear divisions of the enemy began to move through the defile of Spillern, the 6th corps received orders to retreat, and was closely pursued by the enemy.—On this occasion, two or three hundred men of the regiment of Spleny were taken at Korn-Neuberg.—They had lined the wall, and were not made acquainted in sufficient time with the retreat.—The rest of the rear-guard moved back under a heavy cannonade towards Spillern, and at night-fall took post half-way between that place and Korn-Neuberg, where they remained undisturbed till about two in the morning.—The rear-guard now followed the 6th corps, and brought up again near Stockau, while the 6th corps occupied the heights between Hauzenbach and Sterendorf. On the 8th the army was disposed again in echelons, formed of the different corps. About six in the morning the enemy again attacked the out-posts of the rear-guard at Spillern.—Stockerau, being weakly occupied, was given up after a slight skirmish, and the rear-guard retreated to the 6th corps, and fell back upon the heights between the Prague road and the defile which runs from Hauzenbach towards Stockerau and the Danube. In this movement it was followed at a considerable interval by the cavalry of Marshal Massena.—During the whole day the fire of tiralleurs was kept up along the entire front, and in the defiles on the left; and occasionally a few cannon-shot were fired: but the lines remained stationary on the ground which they had respectively occupied. It is probable that Marshal Massena, deceived by the resistance which he had experienced the preceding evening, imagined that he was opposed by a far greater portion of the army, and it was afterwards learnt that the grand French army

did not begin its movement from Wolkersdorf towards Zraim until the 8th. In the night between the 8th and the 9th, the 6th corps of the army, with its rear-guard, followed the retrograde movements of the army, the head-quarters of which were established at Guntersdorf, three miles from Zraim. The 6th corps occupied the heights behind Hollabrunn, and the rear-guard remained near Gollersdorf, where, towards seven o'clock in the morning, it was again attacked by the advanced-guard of Marshal Massena.—The rear-guard retired, constantly fighting, across the ground which had now become more inclosed, to Hollabrunn, which it reached about four in the afternoon without any loss. The hussars of Lichstentein, and a part of the regiment of Blankenstien, which had been detached from the reserve to the support of the rear-guard, was however here drawn into action, being hard pressed by the enemy's cavalry, and the contest would have been much to their disadvantage, had they not derived protection from some infantry battalions of the 6th corps, namely those of Benjowsky and Spleny, posted in the village of Hollabrunn, which saved them. Hollabrunn was now very sharply attacked by Le Grand's division, but without effect.—The Austrians having maintained that post until night, the loss was considerable on both sides, as a sharp cannonade took place on this occasion between the 6th corps and the advanced guard of the French.—In the night the Austrians adandoned the position they had occupied. The 5th corps now relieved the 6th corps, which was much exhausted by five days continual fighting, although, excepting the capture of a few hundreds of prisoners at Korn-Neuberg, the enemy had not to boast of any trophies.

Intelligence of the approach of the French grand army from Laab towards Zraim, had reached head-quarters so early as the afternoon of the 9th, and in the night the grenadier and cavalry reserves were ordered to proceed thither.—They arrived about ten in the morning, just at the moment when General Marmont with his corps, and a reserve of cavalry, had already crossed the Taya, and was making movements in the rear of Zraim, towards the Prague road. These movements were kept in check until the whole army had gradually crossed the Taya about mid-day of the 10th, and had taken post before Zraim, and on the left of that place. The French army having in the meantime also advanced, the action became more and more serious, but still remained inde-

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cisive. In the morning Mashal Massena had again attacked near Schoü-Graben, the rear-guard, which moved on the road from Vienna, and which continued its retrogade movement to the Taya, where it occupied the bridge over that river at Zraim. In this retreat of three miles, in part over extensive plains, this corps, although constantly engaged, sustained no loss but in killed and wounded, and towards the afternoon it formed a junction with the army.—On the 11th the contest was renewed at all points, and without any advantages to the enemy.—The armistice on the evening of that day put an end to all hostile operations.

During these events Marshal Davoust followed the 4th corps, under Prince Rosenberg, towards Brünn; but nothing deserving notice took place even here, excepting a few trifling skirmishes at Gaunersdorf and Pohrlitz.—In the whole retreat the Austrians did not lose a single cannon or ammunition waggon, no baggage, nor any mass of prisoners.—Including the prisoners in the battles of the 5th and 6th, the whole number taken by the enemy did not amount to 8,000, and of these one-third were wounded.

In the whole of these operations the Austrian army had sustained a loss of about 30,000 men. The cannon were so much injured by frequent firing, that it was found necessary to re-bore all the touch-holes.—The artillery had expended above 100,000 rounds.

EXPLANATION OF THE PLANS.

PLAN I.

A A—The island of Lobau, where the French army assembled.

B B—The Division of Le Grand, which crossed the river on the 30th of June under protection of the batteries, and entrenched itself in the wood.

---*—Passage and landing of 1500 volunteers, who embarked at ten o'clock on the evening of July 4th, at Ebersdorf, under protection of 10 gun-boats; drove back an Austrian picquet of 100 chasseurs and 2 cannon, and occupied the wood at Muhlleitern.

a a—Bridges constructed after the wood of Muhlleitern had been occupied, and over which the French army crossed in the night.

c c—Position of the French army in the night, and at break of day of July 5th.

g n—Camp of General Nordmann's corps, which occupied the town of Enzersdorf.

‖ ‖—Austrian redoubts between Aspern and Enzersdorf.

6 6—Camp of the 6th corps of the Austrian army, which occupied the banks of the Danube.

C R—Camp of the reserve of the Austrian cavalry.

G r—Camp of the Austrian grenadiers, consisting of 16 battalions, at Gerasdorf.

3—Camp of the 3d corps of the army till the 1st of July.

D D—Advance and position of the French army on the 5th, after the 6th corps had been driven back towards Gerasdorf and Stammersdorf, and the corps of General Nordmann from Enzersdorf towards Neusiedel, and when the division of the reserve cavalry had moved back into the line.

E E—Position of the Austrian army on the evening of July 5th.

b b—Attack of the French columns under Bernadotte, Oudinot, and the Viceroy of Italy, which were beaten back at nine in the evening.

Plan II.—July 6th.

A A—Position taken up by the French army in the night between the 5th and 6th of July.
B B—Position from which the Austrian corps of the right wing and the cavalry marched to engage.
b b—Insulated attack of the 4th Austrian corps upon Grosshoven at four o'clock in the morning.
C C—Position of the Austrian army about ten in the morning, after driving back the French left wing and the centre.
c c—The position of the French left wing and centre about the same time.
D D—Position of the French right wing after the passage of the Russbach, first in X X and then in O, after the engagement of the cavalry at X.
E E—Retreat of the Austrian left wing after the attack made by the French right wing under Davoust, in C C—and movement of the French cavalry to turn it.
z z
F F—Further retreat of this wing.
g g—Advance of the French right wing at two in the afternoon.
H H—Position of the Austrian army between four and five in the afternoon, after the centre and the right wing had moved back to the same alignement as the left.
I I—Position of the French army at five in the afternoon.
K K—Position of the Austrian army at nine in the evening.
L L—Position of the French army about the same time.

MILITARY FORCE OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE.

To the Editor of the Military Panorama.

Sir,

AS the Russian army at present attracts the attention, while it excites the admiration of those who wish well to the liberty and independence of mankind, I flatter myself that the following sketch of its origin and progress will afford gratification to many of your readers.

W. J.

The organization of the Russian troops, till the end of the 15th and beginning of the 16th century, had a great resemblance to that of militia. They consisted of persons of five different classes: 1st. Nobility, who possessed estates, and were not obliged to serve, themselves, but to fit out against the enemy, in the time of war, a certain proportion of foot and horse soldiers, according to the number of their boors. 2d. The boyar's children, as they were called, who in time of peace formed a kind of horse militia: they were paid in lands, and were bound to perform service like the preceding class. 3d. The town nobility, who were under the commanders of those towns in the district of which they resided: they served in war against the enemy, and in the time of peace were employed in different civil occupations. 4th. The Mosco nobility, who, besides forming the garrison of that city, were obliged to appear in the field when required. 5th. Baschkires, Tartars, and foreigners settled in Russia, and, in general, all those who possessed no lands: these were ob-

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liged to take the field when their service was necessary; but, in the time of war, they received a certain pay, together with subsistence; and to distinguish them from those who served without pay, they were called *Kormovoie Veisko*, fed or paid troops. The general weapons were guns, sabres, pikes, and halberts. The order of battle, when the troops were drawn up against the enemy, had some similarity to that adopted at present in Europe. The army consisted of six divisions: *Bolschoi polk*, the grand division, or *corps d'armée*; *Paredovoi polk*, the front division, or van-guard; *Polk pravoi niki*, the right hand division, or right wing; *Polk levoi niki*, the left hand division, or left wing; *Storoshevoi polk*, the division of defence, or *corps de reserve*; and the *Ertaulnoi polk*, the Ertaul division, which consisted of light cavalry. The troops were under arms only in the time of war, and when peace was concluded, they returned to their homes and their civil occupations; so that, except a small number of paid guards, *streltzy*, and the proper militia, who performed in turns, without pay, the necessary duty of keeping guard, there was no regular or standing army in Russia.

The first mention of standing or regular troops being established occurs about the year 1554, when the Tzar Ivan Vassilievitsch Grosnoi, during the siege of Kasan, formed from the vassals of the boyars a few regular *rotni*, or companies of infantry. They were distinguished by the name of *streltzy*, or sharp-shooters, and were maintained during peace as well as in the time of war. About this period also artillery was introduced into Russia; for, at the same siege, the Tzar had in his service a foreign officer of artillery, to whom the Russians, on account of his new art, gave the name of *Rosmysl*, the speculator. The Tzar Michailo Feodorovitsch added to the above troops a certain number of standing cavalry; but his successor, the Tzar Alexei Michailovitsch not only made a considerable addition to the standing troops, but invited into the kingdom several foreign officers, in order that his army might be taught the European discipline; and at the same time he caused several military works to be translated into the Russian language. His exertions to improve the state of his army were attended with considerable success; for, at the siege of Smolensk, he had among his troops seven regiments established on the European footing, the greater part of the officers of which were natives of England or of Scotland. Under the reign of the Tzar Feodor Alexeivitsch the army fell into a state of decline;

and during the period of turbulence and anarchy which afterwards ensued, it was entirely neglected, till Peter the Great, with the assistance of his favourite Lefort, formed, in the course of a few years, an army which, under his direction, obtained glorious victories, not only over the effeminate Asiatics, but over the experienced veterans of Charles XII. In the year 1682, when Peter was still a boy of ten years old, he exercised himself with a few young nobility of the same age, in the first principles of the art of war, and afterwards formed them into a particular company, which was distinguished by the appellation of *Potischnaia**. This company being afterwards considerably augmented, under the command of Lefort, and disciplined in the European manner, the Emperor himself served in it in the capacity of drummer. In the year 1687, two regular regiments, one called the regiment of Lefort, and the other that of Butyr, were formed from the old sharp-shooters; and in the year 1690 there were 5,000 regular troops besides, under the command of General Gordon, a native of Scotland. In 1692 the first barracks for the troops were built at Mosco, not far from the German slobode; and in 1695 there were formed from the *puteschnii*, now considerably augmented, two regiments of life-guards, which, from two imperial palaces not far distant from Mosco, obtained the names of Preobrashenski and Semenof. To the former was added a company of bombadiers, in which the Emperor assumed the title of captain. The first colonel of the Preobrashenski guards was General Artamon Golovin; that of the Semenof, an Englishman named Chambers. The discipline and good order introduced into these, and the other regular troops of the Russian army, gave them such a decided superiority, during the campaign at Azof in the year 1696, over the old irregular troops, and proved in so evident a manner, the advantage of the new establishment, that the Tzar, in the year 1699, resolved to place entirely on the European footing twenty-nine regiments, both infantry and cavalry, of the 32,000 men which were then ordered to be raised. These regiments were divided into three bodies, the commanders of which were Generals Golovin, Weide, and Prince Repnin. In 1700, twenty of these new regiments, together with the former regiment of Lefort, and a fifth part of the old sharp-shooters, were present at the siege of Narva; and, at the end of the same year, twelve regiments of dragoons were formed by Prince Boris Golizyn.

* For amusement.

In 1703, Prince Mentzikof raised a regiment of infantry, composed of tall handsome men, which at first was distinguished by the name of its founder, but afterwards by that of the Ingermanland regiment, and which received pay equal to that of the guards. At the same time the Emperor gave orders, that instead of the usual recruiting among the boors, every seventh man should be taken from the class of tradesmen and noblemens' servants, and every fifth from the idle and dissolute; by which means the army, besides an increase of soldiers, was provided with a considerable number of tradesmen and mechanics. According to a general list made out at Kief, in 1706, the whole regular army, without including the guards, consisted of fifty-five regiments of infantry and cavalry. The first formal regulation, in regard to the army, appeared in 1710, after the battle of Poltowa, according to which it was to consist of twenty-four regiments of cavalry, and thirty-three regiments of infantry; of these, 58,000 men were destined to garrison the different fortresses, and a distinct corps of 15,000, mostly foreigners and Livonians, to cover the frontiers in Livonia and Esthonia. By this regulation, permanent names were given to the regiments from towns or provinces, instead of variable names from their commanders. These permanent names were attended with this advantage, that those regiments which had distinguished themselves under any fixed name, combined with it afterwards a certain pride, which excited in them a desire of maintaining the glory they had acquired, and of preserving the reputation of the regiment pure and unsullied. Each regiment also, in the time of peace, was quartered in the town or province after which it was named, and where it, in some measure, found a home; in the time of war, the wives and children of the soldiers remained there in safety, and the latter being educated in the garrison schools, the army obtained a valuable addition of good subaltern officers. In the year 1712, the state of the army was augmented, the number of the cavalry regiments being fixed at thirty-three, and that of the infantry regiments at forty-two*. The last regulation under Peter I. published in the year 1724, fixed the whole number of the regular troops, with the militia of the Ukraine, and the Servian corps of hussars, at 108,350 men; in which estimation the life-guards, and the chevalier guards established at the coronation of the Empress Catherine I.

* Each regiment of cavalry consisted of 1,304 men, and each regiment of infantry of 1,489, both including officers.

were not included. The army, a few trifling variations excepted, continued in this state till the year 1730, at which time it was augmented by the Empress Ann with a regiment of body dragoons and four new regiments of militia, besides two regiments of guards*.

In the year 1732 several changes took place in the army. The most essential were an improvement in the artillery, a branch of the military establishment of Russia which, since that period, has been more cultivated than any other; and the new regulation by which the pay of the native officers, which had been much lower than that of the foreigners in the Russian service, was raised and made equal to that of the latter. About this period also the army was placed on the same footing as the other troops of Europe in regard to uniforms and dress.

In the year 1747 fifty battalions of infantry, each consisting of 695 men, were new formed, and the army then stood as follows:

	Men.
6 Regiments of cuirassiers - - -	5,670
6 Do. horse grenadiers - - - -	5,760
18 Do. dragoons - - - - - - -	20,520
4 Do. foot grenadiers - - - -	10,004
46 Do. musketeers - - - - - - -	120,796
Total of the regular troops - -	162,750

But besides these there were some regiments of militia and two regiments of dragoons which did not belong to the regular establishment, as they never took the field, but were used as garrisons in the interior and distant provinces of the empire.

The most important period in the history of the Russian army is no doubt the reign of the late empress Catherine II. The number of the troops is now more than quadrupled; the artillery and corps of engineers are on the full establishment; the state of the officers and common soldiers is much improved by successive additions to their pay, and proper provision is made for them when they quit the service. The army in general is so well disciplined in every respect, that, as is proved by the example of late years, it has given numerous instances of courage and perseverance, and has obtained victories over the oldest and most formidable armies of Europe.

A particular account of the gradual increase of the Russian army, and of all the changes introduced during the last three reigns, would neither be interesting to the reader nor suited to the object of this

* The regiment of Ismailof and the horse guards.

journal: it will therefore be sufficient to give a general view of its real state, and of the essential changes which took place in it during the reigns of Catherine II. Paul I. and the present Emperor Alexander.

Under the reign of Catherine II. the army acquired an entirely different form. Many regiments were new-modelled, and many of the hussar and regular Cossack regiments were converted into light cavalry. But the regulation, most beneficial to common soldiers, was that in regard to their clothing, introduced by Field-Marshal Prince Potemkin. Instead of a useless cocked hat, each soldier received a neat and commodious helmet-cap, which was made in such a manner as to cover the neck and the ears, to secure them from the cold and the rain. Instead of the close coat, he was provided with a *kurtka*, the edges of which buttoned wide over each other, and allowed him to put on below it a warm vest; coloured and wide Hungarian pantaloons, which reached down to the ankles, were substituted for the dirty white breeches,—and half-boots instead of the incommodious jack-boots which were used before. A regulation no less beneficial to the soldier was the abolishing stiff-dressed hair, and introducing the practice of having the hair cut short and unpowdered. The life-guards only, who, agreeably to the nature of their service, were obliged to pay more attention to ornament, retained their former uniforms, but made in a more elegant style, and had their hair dressed and powdered in the usual manner. In the year 1764 the pay of the army was augmented, in consequence of which every staff and superior officer received the addition of a seventh. In a musketeer regiment the pay of a Colonel was 691 roubles, of a Lieutenant-Colonel 419, of a Major 359, of a Captain 205, of a First-Lieutenant 124, and of a Second-Lieutenant and Ensign 104

According to a state of the army, published in 1771, the whole of the regular troops, besides the four regiments of life-guards and the artillery, consisted of

		Men.
6	Regiments of cuirassiers, each, 942 men	5,652
20	Do. carabineers, each 942 - - - -	18,840
16	Do. dragoons, each of 1,140 - - -	18,240
8	Do. hussars, each 1,034 - - - -	8,272
4	Do. grenadiers, each 2,154 - - -	8,616
59	Do. musketeers, each 2,153 - - -	127,027
2	Legions - - - - - - - - - - -	11,550
	Total - - - - - - - - - - -	198,197

In the year 1777 the Chasseur companies attached to each regiment of musketeers were separated from them, and converted into six distinct battalions of Chasseurs. In 1785 the college of war received orders by an imperial ukase to add to the army, besides the general augmentation already begun, 40,000 infantry. According to this regulation the grenadier regiments were made to consist of four battalions of four companies each, six musketeer regiments were raised to grenadier regiments, and a new grenadier regiment was formed from the convent and church boors. The same year the army was augmented by some new musketeer regiments and a corps of chasseurs, each consisting of four battalions. In the year 1786 the pay of the army was again raised, so that the annual addition in a musketeer regiment was—to the Colonel 98 roubles, the Lieutenant-Colonel 64, the Major 65, Captain 50, First-Lieutenant 41, Second-Lieutenant and Ensign 30. According to the list of this year the army consisted of 260,891 cavalry and infantry, and 2,764 regular Cossacks. In the year 1777 the Empress began to convert gradually the old as well as the new-raised regiments of hussars into light cavalry, so that in 1794 there were in the whole army only two regiments and two squadrons of hussars. In the year 1794 the state of the Russian army was as follows:

	Men.
Cavalry - - - - - - - - - - -	81,168
Infantry - - - - - - - - - - -	203,902
Artillery - - - - - - - - - - -	27,715
Total of the regular troops of the line	312,785
Garrisons and invalids - - - - - -	60,000
Irregular Cossacks, Bashkires, &c. -	69,216
Total of the army - - - - - - -	442,001

The same year Count, afterwards Prince Plato Subof, master of the ordnance, established, by order of the Empress, five companies of horse artillery, the officers being taken from the artillery and bombardier battalions. Each company consisted of 219 men, consequently the whole corps of 1,095, besides officers, subalterns, drivers, and attendants. The first formation of this corps cost 234,954 roubles, and the annual maintenance of a company, comprehending the pay, cannon, and horses, about 23,110.

By an ukase of the year 1795 the pay of the superior officers

was again raised, so that the Captain of a musketeer regiment and the First-Lieutenant obtained 39 roubles, and a Second-Lieutenant and Ensign 41 roubles annual addition.

Under the reign of Paul I. many things in the organization of the army were changed and placed on their former footing. The regiments were again named after their commanders; the light cavalry regiments were, for the most part, re-converted into hussars, and all the carabiniers partly into cuirassiers and partly into dragoons: the horse grenadiers and chasseurs, as well as the Ekatherinaslaf and Ukrain cavalry, were entirely suppressed and drafted into other regiments. The former mode of dress, in regard to fashion, &c. was likewise introduced. On the whole the army was much improved under this reign, both in discipline and regularity of exercise. In the year 1795 orders were issued for a general augmentation of the pay of the army, in consequence of which the Colonel of a musketeer regiment received an annual addition of 111 roubles, a Lieutenant-Colonel 117, a Major 36, a Captain 46, and a Second-Lieutenant and Ensign 28. Under this reign the state of the Russian army was as follows:

	Men.
Infantry - - - - - - - - - - -	217,536
Cavalry - - - - - - - - - - -	33,506
Artillery - - - - - - - - - - -	17,673
Total - - - - - - - - - -	268,715

To which if we add 70,000 irregular troops, the whole number will be 338,715.

Such was the state of the army when Alexander ascended the throne in the year 1802. This prince has made many important changes in the military establishment, but they have been introduced only by degrees. In the first year of his reign an augmentation was made to the pay of the troops, in consequence of which the Colonel of a musketeer regiment obtained an annual addition of 140 roubles, a Lieutenant-Colonel 90, a Major 70, a Captain 60, a Lieutenant 45, and a Second-Lieutenant and Ensign 36. The former permanent names were given to the regiments. The uniforms of the soldiers also were in many things changed and restored to the old establishment; but consistently with the principles of good economy, these changes were not made abruptly.

One of the most important improvements in the organization of the Russian army is the establishment of squadrons of reserve in the cavalry, which in some measure may be called schools for the formation of soldiers. Each regiment of cavalry, besides the proper number of squadrons, has attached to it a squadron of reserve, the exclusive destination of which is to receive and exercise the recruits of the regiment and to break the new horses; it must take care also of the sick and wounded, and supply their place with an equal number of effective men.

The method of forming new regiments, and distributing recruits through the army in general, is worthy of remark, as neither new-formed regiments nor those completed receive more than one company of recruits*; so that about twelve recruits only are added to every hundred of old soldiers. For this purpose, when a new regiment is formed, a company of old soldiers is taken from each of eleven old regiments, and a like number of recruits is given to them in return: by these means the new regiment is exactly similar to the old ones, as it consists of eleven companies of veterans and one of recruits. The great advantage of this method is, that when the army is augmented with a levy of 60,000 men, the difference between the raw and the experienced soldiers can scarcely be distinguished, as the former, in consequence of that turn for imitation which is peculiar to the Russians, form themselves after their comrades, and, in the course of a very short time, become excellent soldiers.

In order also to make up for the decrease in the infantry regiments occasioned by the absence of the sick and wounded, and that each may always have, as nearly as possible, the full number of soldiers in front, it has been established that each regiment which takes the field in war time, shall receive for each company from the regiments which remain in garrison 24 men, making 288 men in all, and in place of these the garrisons receive a like number of recruits to be trained and exercised for service.

* A company consists of 141 men.

State of the Russian Army, both Regular and Irregular Troops, on the 31st of December, 1803.

Regular Troops.	Regts.	Batts.	Staff and other Officers.	Auditors, Priests, Surgeons, &c.	Privates.	
LIFE GUARDS.						
CAVALRY.						
Chevalier Guards .	1	—	40	5	936	
Horse Guards . .	1	—	40	5	936	
Body Hussars . .	1	—	40	5	926	
Body Cossacks . .	1	—	20	3	422	
Uralian Ditto . .	—	—	4	—	96	3,316
INFANTRY.						
Grenadiers . .	3	—	206	19	7,193	
Chasseurs . .	—	1	17	2	541	
Artillery . . .	—	1	34	3	1,060	
Garrisons . .	—	1	18	1	511	9,305
FIELD REGIMENTS						
CAVALRY.						
Cuirassiers . .	6	—	240	30	5,520	
Dragoons . .	26	—	1040	130	24,024	
Hussars and one Hulan Regiment .	10	—	670	72	16,660	
Tschuguyef Cossacks .	1	—	50	4	1,308	
Lithuanian Tartars .	1	—	51	4	1,113	
Polish Horse . .	1	—	51	4	1,113	49,738
INFANTRY.						
Grenadiers . .	13	—	780	78	27,222	
Musketeers . .	77	—	4,620	498	161,253	
Chasseurs . .	20	—	900	120	30,650	219,125
GARRISONS.						
On the Field State .	15	27	1,303	109	55,710	
On the Land State .	4	11	424	36	15,174	70,884
ARTILLERY.						
Besieging Artillery .	—	3				
Field Artillery . .	—	10	} 574	46	24,039	
Horse Artillery .	—	2				
Garrison Artillery .	—	—	269	—	11,164	
Pioneers . . .	2	—	112	8	4,594	
Pontonniers . .	—	—	14	—	2,098	
Corps of Engineers .	—	—	105	5	1,024	42,919
TOTAL OF THE REGULAR TROOPS .			11,662	1,187	395,287	
INVALIDS.						
In Garrison			140	—	3,120	
In different Towns			730	—	3,255	
Supernumeraries after forming the Garrison Regiments			280	—	6,395	
TOTAL OF INVALIDS .			1,150		12,770	
IRREGULAR TROOPS.						
Cossacks of the Don; Tschernomorski, Uralian, and Siberian Ditto;—Tepterski and Grebenski Tartars; Baschkirians; Calmucks, &c. . .			2,189	—	98,211	
Greek Field Battalion . . .			73	—	461	98,672
Total Troops Regular and Irregular			13,034	1,187		493,959*

* It is to be observed that in this number the Invalids are not included.

CAMPAIGNS IN THE PENINSULA.

Continued from page 366.

AT the hour appointed, on the 23d of December, the whole force was under arms; the right column had begun its march, and the rest were in high spirits expecting the word of command: just at this time came a letter from the Marquis de la Romana, with intelligence that the French were advancing from Madrid, either to Valladolid or Salamanca; and information to the same purport was received by other messengers; and also, that considerable reinforcements had arrived at Carrion from Palencia. Orders were immediately issued, that the troops should go back to their quarters, and by day-break next morning, be again under arms;—"In my life," says one who heard the order, "I never witnessed such an instantaneously-withering effect upon any body of living creatures! a few murmurs only were heard, but every countenance was changed, and they who, the minute before, were full of that confidence which ensures victory, were at once deprived of all heart and hope." The next morning, General Hope fell back to Majorga, on the road to Benevento, with his own division and General Fraser's. Sir David Baird was ordered to pass the river at Valencia; and, on Christmas day, the Commander-in-Chief followed General Hope, with the reserve and the light brigades; and the cavalry, under Lord Paget, followed the reserve on the 26th. Sir John Moore had made up his mind to lose some of his baggage, and not to fight, if he could avoid it. Astorga was to be his rallying point: there he informed Romana he should stand, as his retreat from thence, if necessary, would be secure, and he should be in the way to receive the supplies, and the reinforcements which he expected from England. At the worst he could defend himself, and, with Romana's aid, defend Galicia. "You may rest assured," he added, "that I shall not retreat a foot beyond what is necessary to secure my supplies from being intercepted." But his dispatches from Benevente, on the 28th, show that this intention, even if it had ever been seriously entertained, was abandoned. His force, he said, when he reached Astorga, would be about 27,000: Romana could not have above 8,000. The troops moving against him, he estimated at not less than 50,000; and it was said that Buonaparte himself was coming with 10,000 of his guards. His intention was not to stop longer at Astorga than to secure the stores, and then retreat to Villa Franca, where he had been told

there was a position. Romana had intimated to him, some time ago, his intention of retiring into Galicia by this route, but Sir John begged it might be left open to the British, as being the only communication they had for their retreat or supplies.

From the 22d to the 24th, Soult received such reinforcements as made his army superior to the British. Junôt had advanced to Palencia, and threatened their right flank. Buonaparte was hastening on in person from Madrid, with his imperial cavalry, and also the disposable force in that quarter. The force under Lefebvre (Duke of Dantzic) was counter-ordered from the road to Badajos, and directed towards Salamanca. Of the numbers that were advancing against him, Sir John Moore was not informed; and so little idea was there of flying, when he began his retreat, that it was determined to carry off the prisoners which had been taken, and they were accordingly stowed in covered waggons. A thaw came on the day when they first fell back, and on the following it rained heavily, without intermission; the soil in that part of the country is a heavy loam, and the roads were about a foot deep in clay. The proclamation of the French travelled faster than the British army; these were, as usual, full of promises which would not be fulfilled, and menaces which would. They were come, they said, to deliver Spain; to emancipate the people from the yoke of a tyrannical nobility, and a fanatic priesthood. All persons who remained quiet in their houses, or who, having forsaken them, speedily returned, should receive no injury; but otherwise, all that belonged to them should be confiscated.

Unhappily, the conduct of our people now began to give effect to these hand-bills. The soldiers were indignant with the Spaniards for their apparent supineness; they were exasperated by the conduct of some poor wretches, whose carts had been pressed to carry the sick and wounded, and who, as many of them as could, had taken their mules, and run away in the night; partly from natural selfishness, still more because the movements of a retreating army exposed themselves to imminent danger, and their beasts to certain destruction. Weary and disheartened—in want of rest and of food—disappointed of their confident hopes of victory, and indignant at turning their backs upon an enemy, whom they would so eagerly have met in the field, it was a relief to the soldiers to give vent to these feelings, in the shape of anger, upon the only objects within their reach.

(To be continued.)

THE VISION OF DON RODERICK.

[Continued from page 332.]

Rearing their crests amid the cloudless skies,
And darkly clustering in the pale moonlight,
Toledo's holy towers and spires arise,
As from a trembling lake of silver white.
Their mingled shadows intercept the sight
Of the broad burial-ground outstretched below,
And nought disturbs the silence of the night:
All sleeps in sullen shade, or silver glow,
All, save the heavy swell of Teio's ceaseless flow.

All, save the rushing swell of Teio's tide,
Or, distant heard, a courser's neigh or tramp;
Their changing rounds as watchful horsemen ride,
To guard the limits of King Roderick's camp.
For, through the river's night-fog rolling damp,
Was many a proud pavilion dimly seen,
Which glimmer'd back, against the moon's fair lamp,
Tissues of silk and silver twisted sheen,
And standards proudly pitch'd, and warders armed between.

But of their Monarch's person keeping ward,
Since last the deep-mouth'd bell of vespers toll'd,
The chosen soldiers of the royal guard
Their post beneath the proud Cathedral hold:
A band unlike their Gothic sires of old,
Who, for the cap of steel and iron mace,
Bear slender darts, and casques bedeck'd with gold,
While silver-studded belts their shoulders grace,
Where ivory quivers ring in the broad falchion's place.

In the light language of an idle court,
They murmur'd at their master's long delay,
And held his lengthen'd orisons in sport:
"What! will Don Roderick here till morning stay,
To wear in shrift and prayer the night away?
And are his hours in such dull penance past
For fair Florinda's plunder'd charms to pay?"
Then to the East their weary eyes they cast,
And wish'd the lingering dawn would glimmer forth at last.

But, far within, Toledo's prelate lent
An ear of fearful wonder to the King;
The silver lamp a fitful lustre sent,
So long that sad confession witnessing:

For Roderick told of many a hidden thing,
Such as are lothly uttered to the air,
When Fear, Remorse, and Shame, the bosom wring,
And Guilt his secret burthen cannot bear,
And Conscience seeks in speech a respite from Despair.

Full on the Prelate's face, and silver hair,
The stream of failing light was feebly roll'd;
But Roderick's visage, though his head was bare,
Was shadow'd by his hand and mantle's fold.
While of his hidden soul the sins he told,
Proud Alaric's descendant could not brook,
That mortal man his bearing should behold,
Or boast that he had seen, when conscience shook,
Fear tame a monarch's brow, remorse a warrior's look.

The old man's faded cheek waxed yet more pale,
As many a secret sad the king bewray'd;
And sign and glance eked out the unfinished tale,
When in the midst his faultering whisper staid.
"Thus royal Witiza* was slain,---he said;
"Yet, holy father, deem not it was I."
Thus still Ambition strives her crimes to shade---
"Oh rather deem 'twas stern necessity!
Self-preservation bade, and I must kill or die.

"And, if Florinda's shrieks alarm'd the air,
If she invoked her absent sire in vain,
And on her knees implored that I would spare,
Yet, reverend priest, thy sentence rash refrain!---
All is not as it seems---the female train
Know by their bearing to disguise their mood:"---
But Conscience here, as if in high disdain,
Sent to the Monarch's cheek the burning blood---
He stay'd his speech abrupt—and up the Prelate stood.

"O harden'd offspring of an iron race!
What of thy crimes, Don Roderick, shall I say?
What alms, or prayers, or penance can efface
Murder's dark spot, wash treason's stain away!
For the foul ravisher how shall I pray,
Who, scarce repentant, makes his crime his boast?
How hope Almighty vengeance shall delay,
Unless, in mercy to yon Christian host,
He spare the shepherd, lest the guiltless sheep be lost."---

* The predecessor of Roderick upon the Spanish throne, and slain by his connivance, as is affirmed by Rodriguez of Toledo, the father of Spanish history.

Then kindled the dark Tyrant in his mood,
And to his brow returned its dauntless gloom:
"And welcome then," he cried, "be blood for blood,
For treason treachery, for dishonour doom!
Yet will I know whence come they, or by whom.
Shew, for thou canst—give forth the fatal key,
And guide me, Priest, to that mysterious room,
Where, if aught true in old tradition be,
His nation's future fates a Spanish King shall see."—

"Ill-fated prince! recal the desperate word,
Or pause ere yet the omen thou obey!
Bethink, yon spell-bound portal would afford
Never to former Monarch entrance-way;
Nor shall it ever ope, old records say,
Save to a king, the last of all his line,
What time his empire totters to decay,
And treason digs beneath her fatal mine,
And, high above, impends avenging wrath divine."—

—"Prelate! a Monarch's fate brooks no delay;
Lead on!"—The ponderous key the old man took,
And held the winking lamp, and led the way,
By winding stair, dark aisle, and secret nook,
Then on an ancient gate-way bent his look;
And, as the key the desperate King essay'd,
Low-mutter'd thunders the Cathedral shook,
And twice he stopp'd, and twice new effort made,
Till the huge bolts roll'd back, and the loud hinges bray'd.

Long, large, and lofty, was that vaulted hall;
Roof, walls, and floor, were all of marble stone,
Of polished marble, black as funeral pall,
Carved o'er with signs and characters unknown.
A paly light, as of the dawning, shone
Through the sad bounds, but whence they could not spy;
For window to the upper air was none:
Yet, by that light, Don Roderick could descry
Wonders that ne'er till then were seen by mortal eye.

Grim centinels, against the upper wall,
Of molten bronze, two statues held their place;
Massive their naked limbs, their stature tall,
Their frowning foreheads golden circles grace,
Moulded they seem'd for kings of giant race,
That lived and sinned before the avenging flood;
This grasped a scythe, that rested on a mace;
This spread his wings for flight, that pondering stood,
Each stubborn seemed and stern, immutable of mood.

Fixed was the right-hand Giant's brazen look
Upon his brother's glass of shifting sand,
As if its ebb he measured by a book,
Whose iron volume loaded his huge hand;
In which was wrote of many a falling land,
Of empires lost, and kings to exile driven;
And o'er that pair their names in scroll expand---
"Lo, DESTINY and TIME! to whom, by Heaven,
The guidance of the earth is for a season given."---

Even while they read, the sand-glass wastes away;
And, as the last and lagging grains did creep,
That right-hand Giant 'gan his club upsway,
As one that startles from a heavy sleep.
Full on the upper wall the mace's sweep
At once descended with the force of thunder,
And hurtling down at once, in crumbled heap,
The marble boundary was rent asunder,
And gave to Roderick's view new sights of fear and wonder.

For they might spy, beyond that mighty breach,
Realms as of Spain in visioned prospect laid,
Castles and towers, in due proportion each,
As by some skilful artist's hand pourtray'd:
Here, crossed by many a wild Sierra's shade,
And boundless plains that tire the traveller's eye:
There, rich with vineyard and with olive glade,
Or deep-embrowned by forests huge and high,
Or washed by mighty streams, that slowly murmured by.

And here, as erst upon the antique stage
Passed forth the bands of masquers trimly led,
In various forms, and various equipage,
While fitting strains the hearer's fancy fed;
So, to sad Roderick's eye in order spread,
Successive pageants filled that mystic scene,
Shewing the fate of battles ere they bled,
And issue of events that had not been;
And ever and anon strange sounds were heard between.

First shrilled an unrepeated female shriek!
It seemed as if Don Roderick knew the call,
For the bold blood was blanching in his cheek.—
Then answered kettle-drum and atabal,
Gong-peal and cymbal-clank the ear appal;
The Tecbir war-cry, and the Lelies yell,
Ring wildly dissonant along the hall.
Needs not to Roderick their dread import tell—
"The Moor! he cried, "the Moor!---ring out the Tocsin bell!

(To be continued.)

MILITARY OBSERVATIONS.

No. 3.

OFFICERS OF VETERAN BATTALIONS.

To Field-Marshal His Royal Highness the Duke of York, K.G. K.B. &c. &c. &c.

Sir,

TO your fostering care, the army owes countless comforts, and all its advantages; the various improvements which the GENIUS of the United Kingdom, through your medium, has suggested and introduced, endear you, emphatically, to the thinking and worthy part of the nation, while only the dregs of the people, what the Greeks called the *ochlacrathy*, or rascally portion of mankind, presume to asperse your general conduct, and heap censure where the most unequivocal commendation is due, and which a more grateful posterity will gladly pay.

Your Royal Highness has been pleased to recommend, among many other salutary objects, a Military Institution for the Sons of Officers, which holds out the best hopes to the nation at large, and another of the same description "*mutatis mutandis*" for the forlorn offspring of non-commissioned officers and privates, which promises equally beneficial effects; but, as it would be an operose task to enumerate all you have achieved for the army in every point of view, I shall, to-day, confine myself to an establishment, which owes its existence to Your Royal Highness. Your intentions were, no doubt, Sir, of the purest nature, when you first conceived the plan of forming VETERAN BATTALIONS; but, like all human institutions, the original and wise system on which you proceeded, was soon departed from, through the manœuvres of others; so that, perhaps, at the present moment, there is not a salutary clause of your's which has not been removed, in order to answer some sinister ends, and to slope the way for other and innumerable abuses, to the great prejudice of the service, and in open violation and contempt of Your Royal Highness's beneficent and paternal intentions.

When Your Royal Highness instituted the Royal Veteran Battalions, you did not intend them as an asylum for infantry officers, *chiefly raised from the ranks,* to the prejudice and almost total exclusion of *Gentlemen,* who have served in the *foot,* and who entered the army in the capacity of *Ensigns*; nor to the *utter* exclusion of *Cavalry Officers,* who, though they may glitter like all the stars in the galaxy, wage interminable war with the Mint, but who are, no doubt, as deserving of a comfortable refuge, and of royal liberality, as those who were once *enlisted soldiers,* and become *officers* through some fortunate, and often unexpected occurrence.

As things now are, however, Your Royal Highness cannot but know, that the greatest partiality exists in veteran battalions; that the officers, with, unfortunately, but very few exceptions, (the Lieutenant-Colonel and the Major,) have been taken from the ranks; so that when, by chance, an officer of another description becomes a member of one of those battalions, he

finds himself just as much in his element, as a live salmon would be while floundering on Salisbury Plain; he is among persons, of whose names he never heard before; with whose habits he is unacquainted, and who, in a great measure, consider him as an exotic intruder—an invader of their peculiar province. Thence arise feuds, contentions, courts-martial, military heresy, schism, and memorials without end to Your Royal Highness, on the part of the *exotics*, praying to be removed to a regiment in which they can live; thence does it proceed that, since the establishment of royal veteran battalions, Your Royal Highness has had more trouble with each one of them, than with a dozen regiments of the line.

The superb cavalry of England is greatly worthy of notice, and the institution of two or three *mounted* regiments to be officered by *gentlemen* not over-rich, but such as had never been serjeants, corporals, or trumpeters in the army, is a desideratum in the service, which would tend infinitely to its advantage, and add, in an extraordinary manner, to the comforts of Officers who have spent their best days in fighting the battles of the country, and in securing to Britons the continuation of every social and political blessing. Those regiments would prove excellent and ready substitutes for the more regular cavalry, in case of any popular ebullition, to which all free states are more or less liable; they would be no strangers to their duty, and, when placed upon the *retired list*, as a remuneration for their faithful services, they would, with grateful hearts, exclaim, speaking of your Royal Highness,—"what a godlike man is this! to him do we owe our comforts and our ease!"

"*Deus nobis hæc otia fecit.*"

8th December, 1812. A VETERAN.

REGIMENTAL MEDICINE, AND TRAVELLING EXPENCES TO WITNESSES ATTENDING COURTS-MARTIAL, &c.

IT is a prevailing opinion, that a British Officer, who falls *sick*, while with his regiment, or who has been, more or less, dangerously *wounded* in action, is not intitled to resort to the regimental medicine-chest for the drugs, which may be necessary to effect a cure, nor to apply to the talents of the regimental surgeons without paying for *both*, though there be not a word in the articles of war susceptible of being tortured into that sense. If a military surgeon, however, be questioned on that subject, his answer will be generally *equivocal*, or rather of no meaning at all.

It would be a *desideratum*, that such an important work as "THE MILITARY PANORAMA," should have, among its Correspondents, a gentleman well-versed in the interior economy of a regiment; a kind of *Judge-Martial*, capable of expounding military questions; an *Oracle* ever at hand, and ready to solve difficulties, and unravel knotty points. Might not, for instance, his decision relative to the above case, be solicited for the general good, and the matter thus be for ever put to rest?

The following strange case came to the knowledge of the writer of this article; it will prove *meanness* in the extreme on one part, if the existence

of the abuse can be made to appear; and, on the other part, it will exhibit an instance of *infamy*, which never had a precedent, except, perhaps, in *Buonaparte's Legion of Honour*.

An officer, at his own solicitation, was to be tried. Conscious that an officer, serving in another regiment, had it in his power completely to invalidate the leading charge, on which all the others hinged, as on a *pivot*; he caused him to be subpœned on his trial, perfectly at his ease respecting the result. The important day came, when an over-officious friend of the prosecutor's *whispered* the following words, at least in substance, to the officer, as he was about taking the oath—"*Recollect, Government only pays the travelling expences of those who give evidence in behalf of the prosecution.*" This hint operated as the head of Medusa; it *petrified* the travelling witness, and of course *hardened* his conscience. The evidence he gave was diametrically the reverse of that which he had previously determined to give. The writer is not physically sure that he received the wages of prostituted honour, though he has learned there is nothing more certain; but he knows that the guiltless officer lost his commission in consequence of the infamous evidence which his former friend had delivered, as taken down by the acting Deputy Judge-Advocate!—

Is it possible that Government can countenance such a palpable dereliction of principle and of justice? What then is become of the famed British axiom—"Every man is reputed innocent until his guilt be proved?" If any advantage be intended, is it not more congenial with the British character to bestow it on the more *helpless* side? This question is well worth an explicit answer.

What is the difference between being "*cashiered*" and being "*dismissed*" the army? Answer the above—"*Eteris mihi magnus Apollo.*"

THE BAD ACCOMMODATION OF SOLDIERS BILLETTED ON INNS.

HOW happens it, Mr. Editor, that our British Soldiers are uniformly treated with great disrespect in their own country, and that, on the Continent, nay, in the enemy's territory, the same men are universally liked by foreigners, and said by them to be the best kind of people in the world,—mild, gentle, and inoffensive with the *disarmed*? In effect, there is nothing so dismal as to see how our soldiers and non-commissioned are received and treated at the inns, at which they are billeted on a march. They are looked upon by the landlord and his imperious, ignorant wife, with the most pointed contempt; the meal, which is scantily prepared for them, and for which they dearly pay, is of the worst kind, and dressed in the worst manner: the bed, in which they are to *sleep*,—*nolentes, volentes*,—is an antidote against rest,—so filthy and so hard; and the room is seldom so good as where the hens are sentenced to roost; but the looks, with which they are *favoured* by BONIFACE and his wife, are such as beggar all description, repulsive, uninviting, forbidding.—"*Tip us a smile, sweet landlady*," said a

Sligo Militia-man the other day to his hostess, "and charge the novelty in the bill to-morrow." The British Soldier, though not unfriendly to a good hot dinner and its accompanyments, will always prefer decent behaviour towards him to the most comfortable meal. If our English inn-keepers were a little accustomed to have French, Austrian, or Cossack troops billetted upon them, they would soon act differently, and deeply regret the absence of their civilized countrymen; for, when our soldiers are compared with those who constitute the belligerent armies, they are as the lamb and the tiger, the dove and the hawk, the protector and the despoiler.

Now this is a subject which is deserving of parliamentary investigation, and which demands the interference of a certain *Chipinporridge Baronet*, who is ever dwelling on the hardships and deprivations of our military defenders; who thinks that "*Magna Charta*" is rent to pieces if a disorderly soldier receives the punishment due to his insubordination,—and if, in order to keep up an efficient army formed to beat our enemies in every quarter, a severe, but just discipline is maintained in our military system; yes, it would prove a praise-worthy and a salutary act to provide for all the comforts with which a British Soldier should be accommodated on a march, and the inn-keepers found to have been deficient in any part of the duty which he owes to the men billetted upon him, and for which he is but too well paid, should not only be liable to, but receive the chastisement to which his delinquency intitles him,—to be fined, for instance, or ultimately to be deprived of his licence. On more mature consideration, however, the Westminster-Knight, who is deservedly considered a parliamentary Marplot, is not of sufficient consequence in the senate to be intrusted with the defence and interest of our soldiery, as he is so notorious for having introduced complaints before parliament, which, primâ facia, were pronounced unfounded, frivolous, and vexatious; but let such a man as "Mr. Sheridan," the steady friend of England and of her rights,—the orator, in whose bosom glows the hallowed flame of well-ordered liberty,—the advocate of the injured; let a Sheridan revolve this question in his mind, and urge it with a portion of his astonishing powers in the grand council of the nation, and our soldiers will soon experience the excellent effects of his pre-eminent interference.

AN OLD SOLDIER.

LETTERS OF INSTRUCTION TO OFFICERS, CIVIL AND MILITARY, GOING OUT TO LISBON, OR ON FOREIGN SERVICE.

[Continued from page 369.]

LETTER VII.

Off the Lizard, May 4, 1812.

BEING at this moment sailing with a fair wind and smooth sea, although about half-way between Ushant and Cape Finistere, and enjoying all the advantages of a well-regulated society; I cannot resist a wish to describe the source from which we derive these comforts, for the advantage of all who may hereafter find themselves in a similar situation.

Our party consists of officers, surgeons, and commissaries. By a mutual inclination to accommodate each other, the four and twenty hours are so regulated that every thing passes as in a family:—we rise at seven,—breakfast at eight,—dine at two,—drink tea at six,—sup at nine, and retire to bed at ten. A time is allowed for washing out the cabin, and arranging the births,—and, although we have two separate messes, yet the general anxiety for mutual accommodation prevents that confusion which would otherwise occur. Cards, back-gammon, and books amuse us alternately, and as the two former are confined to very small stakes, there is nothing but an adverse wind and bad weather that can obstruct our harmony.

I subjoin a scale of ship allowances, &c. and a list of such articles of provisions it seems necessary an individual should take on board.

Sea stock for one person, calculating the voyage at fourteen days, exclusive of the ship allowance:—fresh meat 10lb. 3 couple of fowls, 1lb. of tea, 4lb. of sugar, 3 gallons of potatoes. In regard to wine and liquors, as the ship's allowance of spirits is ample, any provision of that quality must be left to choice. Annexed is the ship's allowance; it being understood that officers draw exactly the same allowance as the private soldiers.

Six soldiers allowance for every day in the week.

	Bread. lbs.	Beer. Gallons or half pints of spirits or pints of wine.	Beef. pieces of 8 lbs.	Pork. pieces of 4 lbs.	Peas. pints	Oat-meal. pints	But-ter. lbs.	Cheese. lbs.	Vinegar.	Water.
Sunday . .	4	4		1	2				One quart.	A sufficient quantity for the time they may be on board.
Monday . .	4	4				4	half	1		
Tuesday. .	4	4	1 or 6lbs of flour, half a lb of suet, &1 lb. of raisins.							
Wednesday	4	4			2	4	half	1		
Thursday .	4	4		1	2					
Friday . .	4	4			2	4	half	1		
Saturday. .	4	4	1 or as above.							

The above articles are in general good of their kind. I recommend a supply of soda water and chocolate to be laid in.

The candles they allow on board for the officers are twelve to the lb. but they are generally broken and filthy; as for candlestick, unless the passengers have one, an old bottle must be the substitute. One inch of candle per night is all that is allowed for each passenger to drink his tea, eat his supper, and turn into his birth,—this requires no comment. I will give you a further idea of the liberality with which unfortunate passengers are treated.

Our master, like many other boisterous bullying heroes, is a married man,—and as the lady rules the roast, her commands, when she is present, are indisputable. We have on board three surgeons and two commissaries, and, neither of them having a man-servant, they were much inconvenienced; this, I conceive, was a

matter of delight to the woman, and, when parting from her literally better half, she strictly and clamorously enjoined his two cabin boys, "on no account whatever to do any one thing for the cabin passengers." But the boisterous Son of the Elements did fortunately consider, that as she was not present, there existed no immediate necessity for obeying her orders, and having some faint sparks of humanity in his composition, winked at the little claims now and then made on the good temper of the boys; indeed I will do the man the justice to say, and I am supported by the general sentiment of those on board, that the woman seems to have taken with her the greatest share of the family ferocity. But I must observe that the Officers of government can possess but little feeling, when in giving gentlemen an order for a passage in a transport they launch them into a situation uncomfortable, cheerless, disgusting, and totally dependent on the rough and savage urbanity of a master of a transport,—a fellow who unfortunately has it in his power to make every thing uncomfortable, and who certainly never loses sight of that power. The man who is master of this ship, for instance, was civilly solicited by the senior officer in the cabin, on account of a lady being one of the passengers, to lend a couple of flags or colours to be hung before the birth:—he at first acquiesced, but, repenting soon after, came into the cabin, and, with great roughness and insolence, took one away;—the consequence of which is, that the lady, an invalid, is confined to a hole, called a state room,—hot, noisome, close, and unwholesome.

Government should consider that, as officers are not overburthened with money, every possible allowance should be made for their convenience. How much it is otherwise the following narrative willl disclose.

An officer having embarked at Portsmouth, and purchased the utensils he unavoidably required, which, on his arrival at Lisbon, he found too cumbersome to take with him, was obliged to leave them at that place. After marching in the country for some time he was reimbarked at another port, and had no alternative than either to supply himself with a fresh stock of utensils, or submit to the inconvenience and difficulties the want of them would subject him to. His finances would not admit of the former, and, in taking possession of his scanty and uncomfortable birth, the master of the ship described the mattress and blanket to have been often previously occupied by persons who had fallen victims to diseases of various kinds, and gave it as his opinion, that the officer run a great risk in sleeping on bedding which he had often reported as unwholesome, and should have been thrown into the sea.

Why should not government transport the troops in ships of war, and study a little the comforts of those who are to fight her battles? I assert as a fact, that masters are frequently put into these vessels who know not how to keep a reckoning, and who are very unfit persons to entrust the lives of our brave soldiers with.

What can be said of the fellow who last November, coming from Lisbon under convoy, with near 400 soldiers on board, quitted the convoy,—and, ignorant where he was, cast anchor within a quarter of a mile at the back of the Isle of Wight,—and when fortunately getting a pilot on board, could hardly be persuaded he was not close to the Lizard; he could not believe he was in the channel;—and finally acknowledged that he had never in his life sailed there.

If the Transport Board would be more particular on this subject, and less indifferent to the accommodation of passengers, it would be more creditable to them.

Conceive the forlorn situation of two young lads going out clerks to the Commissariat: I had the following information from their own mouths. They got an order for

a passage on board this ship, and came on board with their baggage about eight o'clock in the morning. The master, in the first instance, refused to let a sailor aid in taking their trunks on board;—the soldiers, however, good humouredly assisted them. As these young men were perfectly ignorant of the usage and comforts of transports, and had conceived every thing would have been furnished them, it was a matter of very great disappointment to find not one article of provision was given them, nor did any means offer for their obtaining any until eight o'clock in the evening, when with difficulty they procured some biscuit from the steward: indeed the same savage disregard to the situation of these young men was manifested in every thing. The miserable poverty-struck mattress and blanket were withheld until asked for; in short, one cannot but feel disgust that gentlemen should be subject to such brutality.

All the ship allowances should be detailed on a sheet of paper, fixed in the cabin, and as little left as possible to the urbanity of a master of a transport;—I might almost as well say the humanity of a wild hog. One fire-place is allowed for the soldiers, which is so placed, and so occupied, that a passenger has little chance of ever boiling a kettle. In boisterous weather it is impracticable, and, whether male or female, must go without a dressed dinner, &c. &c.

I would wish to call the attention of the worthy gentlemen presiding at the Transport Board, to the situations of females, who, from affection, interest, or some other cause, are fated to be passengers on board a transport. A case in point will best explain.

Two ladies, wives to officers, were accommodated with the state cabin, which obliged them to go through the great cabin whenever they wished to go on deck for fresh air. As some passengers were sick it was not always consistent with delicacy that the ladies should pass through the cabin:—to remedy this inconvenience, it was requested as a favour that a sort of curtain might be put up before the birth,—this was refused; but will you credit that a woman, a wife, and a mother should have refused the use of a bucket to convey the slops from the state rooms, for the convenience of these ladies. Such, however, was the case:—the woman, wife to the master of the ship, actually refused this request,—and, when she quitted the vessel, her husband pursued the same line of conduct. I wish those gentlemen who regulate the transports, would enquire into these matters, and, for the sake of humanity, place things on a better footing.

Another, and a most unpleasant evil, arises from the indiscriminate manner of packing people together in these transports. One would hope that every man, who has received a liberal education, and who is found competent to fill a station in a profession which introduces a young man into good society, would understand that difference of manners which draws the line between the society of gentlemen and vulgar people. I found myself much disappointed in this particular instance in the little community on board the Mariner, by overhearing the following conversation between a young gentleman in the Commissariat, and a surgeon or hospital-mate. There was a lively, good-humoured freedom in the Commissary, that at once indicated his wish to render himself agreeable. It appeared that the hospital-mate had got up in the night, and was fumbling in the dark at the cupboard; this gave rise to some little good-tempered jokes from the other young men, and amongst the rest the Commissary observed that Mr. ——— was certainly taking a quiet sup;—to which the other replied "*it was a damned lie.*"—The Commissary, I have no doubt, felt a proper resentment at this vulgar, rude insult, but satisfied himself with

observing that no gentleman would make use of such low language, and as he could not consider him but as a vulgar brûte, he should treat him with the contempt he deserved.

Now, worthy Captain Paten, permit me to recommend your attention to the point of selecting the company for the different transports; consider that the passengers in each are to be associated for some time, and when even the most mild disposition may be ruffled by the disgusting treatment on board the vessels, added to which, perhaps, a long, rough, and boisterous passage; do, my dear Sir, let us at least be only subject to the hasty expressions of gentlemanlike language, and as it is very practicable to discern the gentleman from a man's appearance, conduct, or character; and particularly in a profession where education, we must suppose, is easily to be discovered, there can be no difficulty in classing the different ranks, and disposing them in separate vessels—and not subject gentlemen to have their ears offended by language disgraceful to the lowest dregs of society. Allow me further to remark, that as many of the officers of Government, employed in this service, are so perfectly careless in regard to the convenience of the officers in the army, &c. it behoves you, and each gentleman in like employments, to do all in your power to smooth the difficulties, and lighten the distresses of those whom you may have to dispose of in transports.

With regard to the embarkation of detachments of cavalry, I will point out what appears to me a very great error, and which may be done by my detailing the particular transactions of the little fleet in which I am a passenger. It is now scarcely one month since the horses of a detachment of cavalry were embarked. A convoy was appointed a few days after the embarkation had taken place, but the fleet did not sail for three weeks after. Having at length got into the Channel, it was found that different other vessels were in the convoy, traders, &c. and it so happened that most of the trading-vessels were bad sailers; the consequence was, to protect them the fleet was inconceivably delayed on the voyage, and many of the horses died. Surely it would be a better plan to send the detachments of cavalry together, under a separate convoy; and, the moment after being embarked, take advantage of the first fair wind, and, without delay, proceed to their destination. It is evident, in this particular instance, the cavalry ships have been delayed more than fourteen days unnecessarily.

Masters of transports make much difficulty in delivering out the rations to the passengers, and, in consequence, not half the allowance on a voyage is drawn by them. That which is undrawn goes into the pockets of these men: it amounts to a large quantity, and is a robbery on the Government.

I should recommend that the passenger, on leaving the ship, should give the master a receipt for what rations he has drawn, who should be obliged to account for the residue. The masters certainly merit no sort of advantage, for they take all they can on every occasion.—Adieu.

To the Editor of the Military Panorama.

Deptford, Dec. 10, 1812.

Sir,—In your publication for November, I perceive a sensible letter, which remains unanswered in your Number for the present month, and which, from the importance of its subject, increased by its locality, I should be sorry to see entirely pass observation. It is dated from Abrantes, and addressed to the Judge Advocate General, (the Right Hon. Charles Manners Sutton,) and points out some of those

anomalies of military law, to which I have been endeavouring, for the last seven years, not entirely without success, to elicit the necessary attention. As any public explanation, on the part of the minister addressed, is not very probable, and as the military code is, to a certain degree, impugned by every charge of its maladministration, if you will accept some observations from so much meaner an authority as my own, I will proceed to examine, in the order he has chosen, the positions of your Correspondent.

Nothing can be more just than his remark on the increasing importance of militry jurisprudence, to the force of Great-Britain; but that which follows is to be received with some slight qualification. For he states, " that at this moment there is not one regular authorized form established for our guidance in the proceedings of a General Court Martial; but every process is directed by the arbitrary power of a President, and the ignorance of a casual Judge Advocate." That the temper of a President, as well as that of any other man, placed by accident, perhaps, in a situation for which he may be but little fitted by nature or education, may be arbitrary, and a person *casually acting* as Judge Advocate, ignorant*, is quite possible; but it is, at the same time, equally certain, that these officers form but a small part of a General Court-Martial; and that the latter, in yielding his information to the Court, almost always exercises the whole of his power, since he is now rarely called on to prosecute for the King, and was never permitted to vote with the members. So that the prejudices of the one, or the ignorance of the other, need never essentially affect the decision; although the presumed information of the Judge Advocate, and, at all events, the seniority and official character of the President, must naturally always create a complimentary deference to their opinions. But should these opinions violate established forms, necessary to the case of either prosecutor or prisoner, there can be, I hope, no doubt that the intelligence of the members, who are, in their own persons, judges as well as *jurors*, would be sufficient, and sufficiently active, to rule that they should be respected at their own tribunal.

This brings me to the assertion, " that there is not one regular authorized form established;" a general assertion, which will equally apply, not only to the whole of our military, but, I fear, almost the whole of our municipal law. As military law, however, has some advantages in this respect; and these observations should be confined to military courts, I am only to remark, that as to the forms of procedure on Courts-Martial, the 16th section of the Articles of War, and the first forty sections of the Mutiny Act, are full of them: and these being, with a very few regulations, issued under his majesty's sign manual, on the ground of certain old statutes, the whole of the *statutary* law on the subject, recourse must be had to what may be called *the common* law of the army, the *usages* or " customs of war." These are to be found, like the practice of all other courts in a variety of authorities, whose chief principles having been long admitted, become of equal force to, unless interrupted by, the injunctions of statute law. Such are the compositions of Bruce, Adye, Sulivan, Williamson, Tytler†, M'Arthur, and the incidental labours of Hale, Coke,

* As, for instance, where this officer may be devoted to a very opposite profession, or distracted by other occupations. On investigating a case arising out of an ill-conducted Court-Martial, I lately found, that the Deputy Judge-Advocate, who attended under a General Warrant, singularly obtained, was, in spite of the law respecting paymasters, a paymaster in one county, magistrate in another, clerk to a commission in another, deputy-lieutenant, commissioner of sewers, dealer in porter, judge-advocate, a commissioned officer, and a general merchant!! Nor was this all.

† Of this author, being quoted by your Correspondent, it may be proper to ob-

Blackstone, Grose, and Lord Loughborough, (Earl Rosslyn,) not to mention the volume in which, nearly three years since, I attempted to digest "for the general use of the army," *the whole* of these, so composing "the Military law of England," and "Practice of Courts Martial." If a due attention be paid to the spirit of this body of law, and the letter of its forms, which are there duly given, there can be no want of an authorized guide; and if such attention be not paid, whether in the person of President, or Judge Advocate; the want of it is now nothing less than a most serious breach of duty, subject to condign punishment at every committal; since it is a positive General Order of the present year, that every officer shall acquaint himself with a competent knowledge of "Military Law," and the "Practice of Courts-Martial." "What is Military Usage in one court," then, can never be properly "rejected in another."

That the prosecutor, as your Correspondent states to be the case at some Courts-Martial in England, is permitted to read his opening deposition, to cross-examine the evidence for the prisoner, and to reply to any new matter occurring in the defence; or, in fact, close the proceedings, is perfectly correct, and practised this moment at the Head Quarters of the British empire, in the capital, and in the presence of the Right Honourable the Judge Advocate-General. And moreover it is absolutely necessary to the ancient character of summary proceeding of Military Courts, that both the preliminary deposition of the prosecutor, and the defence of the prisoner should be read, since the written document so read, *verbatim et literatim*, must be delivered into Court, and attached to the proceedings. If, therefore, a contrary practice prevails at Lisbon, or any where else, it is radically wrong. As your Correspondent, however, has not mentioned the nature of the "cross-questioning" to which he alludes, it may be right to add, that the prosecutor, for obvious reasons, may not cross-examine his own witnesses; nor even those for the prisoner, as to extraneous matter; for nothing in the least extraneous, or irrelevant to the question at issue, can be admitted on either side, or in any way. As to the members being "worn out," from having been long assembled, I should rather think, that the experience obtained from practice would promote the regular administration of justice. If not, *misera est servitus ubi jus est vagum aut incognitum*, it ought to be instantly represented to that benign Commander-in-Chief at home, who receives no prudent representation in vain.

The case stated by your Correspondent, sir, in the fourth paragraph of your 161st page, is undoubtedly difficult to a certain degree; yet the decision seems to argue on the side of mercy; and it might be argued, that frequency of arrest on foreign service, may be usefully superseded by judicious consideration: and if, indeed, a case of insuperable difficulty occurred, which may be very possible, even in the present constitution of the British army; if the cause be clear, and he be urged to prosecute, I would advise the officer to resign the task of prosecution into the official hands of the Judge Advocate, agreeably to ancient ordination; and to confine himself to whatever evidence he could personally furnish on the occasion. The prevarication of evidence, I sincerely regret to add, is a common evil in military cases, arising obviously from the jarring interests, and peculiar influence which must constantly affect the investigations of military jurisprudence. But, as to the validity of finding a prisoner guilty of charges, in part, your Correspondent may be assured

serve, that he is the most incorrect of the whole, though himself a Judge-Advocate, and now a Lord of Session; and that he has even suffered the most palpable errors to pass into a second edition. This arises from his want of practice in the *economy* of the military profession.

that there is no principle more valuable in the whole administration of Military Law. Were it not for this, we should have every military man of genius, from Lord Wellington downwards, who presumed to represent, with due respect, the expediency or justice of a measure which was inaccessible to the treble-cased dulness of an accidental superior, possibly shot for mutiny! or one who had preserved the respectability of a peculiar corps, for a dubious act of supposed contumacy towards the most despicable of individuals, dismissed the service! What, Sir, would your Correspondent, or your other Correspondents have said, if he had been tried "for neglect of duty," and "resisting his commanding officers' authority," for that whereas he did not stand on some certain point, for half an hour, two or three times a day, on tiptoe; and, did submissively represent, that it would have rendered, not only himself, but the service ridiculous! Had these charges been haply couched under some trite clause, by some military, or militia, or malicious Martinet, and backed by an ignorant and officious Deputy Adjutant-General, and thus even driven your correspondent only into a retirement of the most ignominious kind, by way of mercy; would he not, would you not have thought some intermediate grade of decision might have been found to have protected the common sense of the individual, compatibly with the discipline of the army.

The final clause of your Correspondent's letter alone remains for observation, and of this chiefly the assertion that "all depends frequently *abroad* on interest," for the preceding ones are already considered. That interest will prevail to a certain degree in some shape or other, either abroad or at home, is not to be doubted, within the compass of human affairs, whether military or civil. But, that it should materially interfere with the administration of military courts, must, in my opinion —an opinion which might easily have been contrarywise affected by decisions in my own person, depend very much on the spirit and conduct of the individual implicated before a Court-Martial*. For, Sir, the man who, with a mind pure and firm, whatever his hopes or fears, approaches a Court-Martial in the character of complainant or defendant can never suffer himself to experience a positive intimidation from any exertion of such influence whatever; since he must know and feel that, however it may for a while embarrass him, it is too feeble to withstand the perseverance of rectitude; its principles of action shrink from the force of truth; let him therefore maintain, with proper decision and decorum, the justice of his cause, and he will overcome the power of venal interest, if such shall be found to exist. *Magna est veritas et prævalebit.*—I have the honor to be, sir, your very obedient servant, ROBERT SCOTT, Lieutenant.

Correspondence from the Theatre of War in the Peninsula.

MOVEMENTS OF GENERAL HILL'S CORPS DURING THE RETREAT.

Coria, 9th December 1812.

HAVING escaped all the dangers and fatigues of our late advance to and retreat from Madrid, I hasten to tell my friends of my good fortune.—Our advance not being out of the common course of moving, namely, at the usual rate of four or five leagues a day, and generally arriving in quarters late at night, little opportu-

* That there have been some very extraordinary decisions, and excess of jurisdiction at Lisbon, it is not meant to dispute, such as that on Lieut M'Arthur, 3d Regiment or Buffs, on which I have already observed in another place.

nity offered for remarks, and indeed the only thing worthy of notice was the enthusiastic manner in which we were received in all the towns and villages as we passed along beyond Talavera.—At Toledo every man, woman, and child was either in the streets, or at their windows, calling out "Viva Inglesse."—At night the town was most beautifully illuminated, and General Hill gave a ball, to which all the officers were invited, as well as the respectable part of the inhabitants.—At Yepès and Aranjuez our corps remained quiet until Marshal Soult began to approach: on the 24th of October his advance drove in our cavalry, and although far inferior in number, contrived to make some prisoners from the 9th light dragoons.

We crossed the Tagus by a bridge just finished at Aranjuez, and on the 26th, having got all over, the bridge was burned: it was, however, soon repaired by the enemy, who crossed, and we retired beyond the Arrama.—The bridge over this river was charged by the enemy's cavalry, who were repulsed with loss by the 47th regiment, and the bridge being blown up, gave us time to retire on the road to Madrid. With their usual activity they surmounted this obstacle, and were soon close at our heels.—The baggage, excepting one mule per company, was ordered away, and our confusion and irregularities commenced; many prisoners were made, particularly from the 4th division, in consequence of the soldiers falling in the rear plundering and getting drunk.—On the morning of the 31st of October, having marched all night, we found ourselves at Madrid; the Vivas were no longer to be heard, all was gloom and despair, confusion and misery.—Many of us were of opinion that Madrid would not be given up without a battle, and the whole of General Hill's corps, the 3d, 4th, and light divisions, together with Colonel Skerret's force, being then on the spot, made it look likely, yet it appears the contrary was the plan, for we left the Capital with such haste, that our stores of bread, &c. were destroyed at a moment the soldiers were badly supplied with that article, and away we went helter skelter over the passes of the Guadarama. We now could foresee that nothing was to be done until we joined his Lordship's part of the army, which we did on the 7th of November.—Our march was long and fatiguing, our clothing very bad, and the army in general scantily supplied with bread.—Having crossed the river Tormes, we halted, and on the 9th the enemy shewed some of his columns in the neighbourhood of Alba de Tormes, which was occupied by the 50th, 71st, and 92d regiments.—The enemy having brought his guns to bear on the 12th, obliged these regiments to evacuate the town with some loss: they then crossed the river, and on the 14th the whole of the army occupied the ground on which the French were beaten on the 22d of July.—General Hill's corps, with the commander of the forces at our head, were about taking possession of the commanding ground of the Arapiles, when of a sudden an order was received to fix bayonets, and to load on the march; this looked as if we were to be at it instantly, although, being in rear of the hill, we could see nothing of them.—Our artillery commenced firing, and I am told did great execution on a body of the enemy's cavalry who were advancing: at night we were ordered into the wood, and at two, A. M. the French drums began making a noise; at five o'clock we went to our position, and every thing looked as if that morning was to decide the fate of the country—every man at his post, waiting with the greatest anxiety for the dawn of day, and we were not a little disappointed on its arrival to find not one Frenchman in sight.—Our situation was far too favorable for so knowing an old Fox as Soult to attack us; he therefore moved to his left, which obliged his Lordship to quit his position, in order to secure his retreat to Rodrigo, for which purpose we moved off at ten o'clock, in tremen-

dous rain and bad roads: this commenced our downright misery, having to bear every description of misfortune that can happen soldiers, except that of being beaten by the enemy.—We had constant heavy rains, excessive cold and high winds, deep and bad roads, our march impeded by baggage and artillery, want of supplies, and pressed by the enemy, whose cavalry were kept in check by the guns almost every evening on our halting to bivouac, until we passed Rodrigo on the 20th.—We remained six days in miserable villages in the mountains, covered with snow, and at length proceeded to this place across the Sierra de Gatta, and here we are, not knowing when we move, or where we go next.—After all I have said I fear you will rate me amongst the croakers; I shall be sorry if you do, for I really am not one; I have every confidence in the talent and judgment of Lord Wellington; what the soldiers suffered, was not, I am sure, his fault, yet some people under him deserved little less than hanging; only think of men on the march, and such marches, being six days without an ounce of bread; a pound of white flour per man has been often issued instead of bread.—What is a poor fellow to do with it? Some of our Commissaries and General Officers, who suffer them to neglect their duty, should be brought to trial, for the soldiers have suffered in the late retreat (particularly some brigades) more than was ever known before.—What is now to be done, I have not the slightest idea.—We hear that 7,000 men on their march from France have returned, and that Soult is gone with his troops in the direction of Burgos, some say, to evacuate Spain. It appears rather strange, when all the troops in Spain fly before him, that he should take himself off quietly: I know one thing, let them call the late action a manœuvre, or give it whatever name they please, it has cost dear; the number of prisoners taken I understand amounts to 3,000, and our cavalry is now so much reduced that they cannot be fit for any active service for months to come; the heavy regiments, in particular, are very bad—no wonder, they have been three weeks without an ounce of corn, or any thing better than cut straw, and, at times, little of that.

MOVEMENTS OF THE FIRST DIVISION, COMMANDED BY SIR E. PAGET, ON THE LATE RETREAT.

Mongualde, 2d December, 1812.

THE troops employed in the siege of Burgos having received orders on the morning of the 19th of October, to be in readiness to move at a moment's warning, on the 20th at four, A. M. the whole (except Colonel Stirling's Highland, and General Pack's Portuguese brigades, which were left to blockade the castle,) marched under the walls before dawn, and proceeded to some heights about two leagues in front of Burgos; here we halted and cooked; towards evening, the enemy advancing, stood to our arms, and marched to the plain below: the first division being in advance, we formed line, the Guards in front, the Germans the centre, and a Spanish brigade in the rear.—Thus each line advanced about 100 paces from each other for about two miles, when our great guns coming within range of the enemy, gave them two or three shots—they retired—we halted, and received orders to return to our former ground on the heights.—On the 21st, at seven, P. M. we were ordered to retire, and as the 1st division had to pass the bridge at Burgos, which is completely commanded by the castle, the strictest silence was to be observed.—We arrived at Burgos about eleven, and crossed the bridge by single files without being discovered, and proceeded to Bonlier, five leagues, where we arrived about five, A. M. on the 22d:—having bivouac'd about four hours, we proceeded to Aledad a

Cima, two leagues.—Our troops left in blockade of the castle retired at day-break on the 22d, and the gallant defenders regained their liberty.—On the 23d we marched to Torquemada, 8 leagues.—On the 24th, destroying the bridge over the river Pisuerga, we marched to Duenas, four leagues, and the 1st battalion 1st guards joined the division.—On the 25th, destroying another bridge over the same river, but which is considerably increased by the Carrion and Alarcon, which empty themselves into it near this place, the 5th, 6th, and 7th divisions, and a division of Spaniards were posted on the bank, and the 1st division ascended the hills which run in line with the river: the enemy passed the river in force at a ford, but were driven back with great loss by the 6th and Spanish divisions, who charged and bayonetted many mid-deep in the river; indeed the 15th French regiment of infantry was in a manner annihilated.—The 1st division manœuvred all day on the left flank, and returned to Duenas at night.—On the 26th, marched, and again crossed the Pisuerga to Cabecon, three leagues, fortified the bridge, and halted on the 27th and 28th. During the time we halted here the enemy remained in force on the opposite bank of the river, throwing forward his advance to Valladolid; but the bridge in rear of that city being destroyed, the French contented themselves with throwing a few shots and shells into it, still pushing forward their advance on the right bank towards Tordesillas, which the enemy occupied.—Halted till the 6th of November, and marched to Castrejon, seven leagues.—On the 7th to Pituagua, six leagues.—8th to Los Villiaris, three leagues, about a league from Salamanca.—Here we again put our heads into a house (for the first time since the 10th of September) and halted till the 13th, turning out every morning at day-break, and marching to the heights the army occupied on the 20th of June.—On the 14th we marched to Salamanca, where the 3d battalion 1st guards joined from General Hill's corps; lay on our arms all day outside the city; a sharp cannonading was heard from about Los Huertes, where the enemy were crossing their old ford of the Tormes: we took up quarters in the city at night, and I had just laid down when we were ordered under arms; crossed the bridge, and proceeded to the heights we held on the 21st of July.—We had a great expectation of being engaged next morning, *viz.* 15th, but it turned out otherwise, for we retired to Munillia, two leagues.—On 16th to La Boveda, five leagues.—17th to San Monias, 4 leagues.—On the 18th to Sanctus Spiritus, five leagues.—19th to Cuidad Rodriga, four leagues.—20th to Espeja, two leagues.—Here we again got under cover, and halted while arrangements were making for winter cantonments.—I forgot to mention that General Hill's corps, the 3d division from Madrid, and the 4th from the Escurial, joined us at Salamanca.

To speak of this retreat in its true light is past my ability; it rained day and night—roads knee-deep in mud and water all the way—an enemy close to our heels, dead men, horses, mules, asses, oxen, broken-down cars, and sick without number. Lieutenant-General Sir E. Paget, who commanded our division, was taken prisoner on the 16th while reconnoitring.—The brigade of guns, commanded by Captain Chapman, attached to the 5th division, and an immense quantity of baggage, fell into the enemy's hands on the same day.

Montgaul, 6th December, 1812.

THE dismal and harassed march has ceased, and the divisions are settling themselves in their winter quarters: our friends in England, it is likely, have little idea how much we have to do when once our particular quarter is allotted to us.—A good lodging, comfortably furnished, generally receives us when going into winter

quarters at home; here how great the difference; a brigade is huddled into a Portuguese village, of which it is not possible to convey any idea to our friends at home; but I will explain what I have to do, ere I can reach a sensation bordering on what is called comfort:—in order to have light, without sharing the inclemency of the weather, I have a frame made to a window; this frame is divided by string into squares, to which is attached oiled paper—a clumsy imitation of what we sometimes observe in carpenters' shops—this is my window:—the floor of my apartment is fortunately without holes; but that must be scraped and washed, an operation it never before has experienced.—I have next to stop up the holes in the walls of my room, and, if I can procure a little white-wash, give a similarity of appearance to what never had changed from the first formation, except by the effect of damp, and the filthy customs of the natives: plaster or white-wash is very seldom found here: the roof must remain, as it serves not only to keep out the rain, but also to let out the smoke—the labor of man cannot wash the blackamoor white:—conceive now my apartment, in some degree cleared from its native filth and dungeon-like appearance; a bundle of clean straw, nicely disposed of in one corner, with two blankets, composes my bed; a rough heavy table, and a ricketty stool, finishes the catalogue of my furniture; a dirty tin lamp, with oil, lights me to bed.—In regard to any other comforts, as the Portuguese have scarcely an idea beyond the brute creation, you may conceive their astonishment when they beheld me raising a little fabric in a corner of the yard; it was totally beyond their comprehension.—Now, my friends, here I am settled for winter-quarters, master of just sufficient philosophy to save a rope the trouble of ending a life at this moment of less importance to me than ever: the weather is fine and warm; should it change, and oblige me to keep within doors, without books, without any resource, but what my fancy raises, and you will allow a man's imagination must be prolific, who can, under such circumstances, form any thing like a lively sentiment; what a prospect! but we have one consolation, and that must serve to feed any pleasurable ideas we may endeavour to cherish, that those dear to us, are far removed from the bloody devastation of war, and enjoy the blessings it has pleased a gracious Providence to bestow on our favored country.

Mongaulde, 9th December, 1812.

WE are now in quiet cantonments, recovering from our fatigue, and must therefore look to friends at home for novelty: hutted as we are, at a miserable village, in wretched hamlets, on the side of rocky mountains, there is nothing left for us to create variety but the most welcome letters from friends.—Books we cannot have, our poor worn-down mules had enough to carry; and even pen, ink, and paper are scarce articles.—We form little societies amongst ourselves; yet it requires an unusual flow of animal spirits to carry us through the day: some officers amuse themselves in shooting, there being plenty of woodcocks, partridges, hares, and rabbits; but rather a scarcity of powder and shot: to the officer who is not a sportsman, as the country around is a continuation of steep ascent and descent, and that by the most rugged roads, dangerous to the rider and unpleasant to those who walk, the pleasure arising from exercise is denied; in short, my friend, it is a deep monotonous round of insipidity, and, in defiance of the fatigues and distresses arising from our tinkering campaigns, I question whether the greater part of us would not prefer daily marches to this unmeaning banishment.

A letter has been issued in orders from the Commander of the Forces directed to the General Officers commanding divisions, containing much complaint on the re-

laxation from discipline prevalent in this army, finding great fault with both officers and soldiers—no doubt it always happens so with retreating armies—and it is a most desirable object, as much as possible, to preserve the strictest attention to discipline on such trying occasions; but I cannot help thinking much of this cause for reprehension arises from the ignorance of some General Officers; nor can it be otherwise when the greater part of these gentlemen, from the rapid strides they made to obtain rank in the service, had not time to get any insight into the duties of the different gradations of rank:—there are men who never saw service, until they came flourishing out to this country as Brigadiers and Major-Generals; many who never passed through the duties of a battalion; who never even mounted a captain's guard—and are these the men to oppose to the French Generals, or to be put in competition with men, whose military merit alone has placed them at the head of regiments, brigades, and divisions? and thus, I fear, the Marquis of Wellington's letter will create great disgust; and that troops who have cheerfully encountered a campaign of uncommon duration; who have been instrumental in gaining laurels for the brow of their Chief; who have given proofs of courage, patience, and perseverance, exceeding the most sanguine expectations, will think themselves but ill-requited in receiving so general, and so heavy a censure:—much may be advanced in favor of the army, and I have no doubt much will be urged in opposing censures, which are generally felt as unmerited:—the soldier will say "I have done my part—I have marched hundreds of miles—I have endured hunger, thirst, cold, wet, heat, fatigue, and nakedness—I have encountered the enemy in the field and attacked him in his strong fortresses; and where it was possible to conquer him by courage and resolution I have done it."—To whom then does attach this censure if our endeavours are not crowned with success? Not to the soldier, for he is a ready and obedient instrument, even in the hands of those on whom he places no confidence:—nor can the officer be blamed—for the old and experienced officer is neglected and ill-used, and insulted by the promotion of striplings;—rash, head-strong, ignorant, presuming boys; and surely you cannot censure the latter; they may excite pity—all this may be urged with justice.—Very young men, and of course mighty young soldiers, come out to this country, and obtain high situations, nor do I fear contradiction when I assert they are incompetent to do the duty expected from them; when I assert that many General Officers are not competent to the duty of a regimental Captain:—and I beg to know what confidence can be placed in them by men who are hourly witnesses of their imbecility.

Circular Letter issued by the Marquis of Wellington to his Army, after the Retreat into Portugal, alluded to in the preceding Letters of our Correspondents.

Sir,—I have ordered the army into cantonments, in which I hope that circumstances will enable me to keep them for some time, during which the troops will receive their clothing, necessaries, &c. which are already in progress, by different lines of communication, to the several divisions and brigades. But, besides these objects, I must draw your attention, in a very particular manner, to the state of discipline of the troops. The discipline of every army, after a long and active campaign, becomes in some degree relaxed, and requires the utmost attention on the part of the General and other Officers, to bring it back to the state in which it ought to be for service; but I am concerned to have to observe, that the army under my com-

mand has fallen off, in this respect, in the late campaign, to a greater degree than any army with which I have ever served, or of which I have ever read. Yet this army has met with no disaster; it has suffered no privations, which but trifling attention on the part of the Officers could not have prevented, and for which there existed no reason whatever in the nature of the service; nor has it suffered any hardships, excepting those resulting from the necessity of being exposed to the inclemencies of the weather, at a moment when they were most severe. It must be obvious, however, to every officer, that from the moment the troops commenced their retreat from the neighbourhood of Burgos on the one hand, and from Madrid on the other, the officers lost all command over their men. Irregularities and outrages of all descriptions were committed with impunity; and losses have been sustained which ought never to have occurred. Yet the necessity for retreat existing, none was ever made in which the troops made such short marches; none on which they made such long and repeated halts; and none on which the retreating armies were so little pressed on their rear by the enemy. We must look, therefore, for the existing evils, and for the situation in which we now find the army, to some cause besides those resulting from the operations in which we have been engaged. I have no hesitation in attributing these evils to the habitual inattention of the Officers of the regiments to their duty, as prescribed by the standing regulations of the service, and by the orders of this army. I am far from questioning the zeal, still less the gallantry and spirit of the Officers of the army; and I am quite certain, that as their minds can be convinced of the necessity of minute and constant attention to understand, recollect, and carry into execution the orders which have been issued for the performance of their duty, and that the strict performance of this duty is necessary to enable the army to serve the country as it ought to be served, they will, in future, give their attention to these points. Unfortunately, the inexperience of the Officers of the army has induced many to conceive, that the period during which an army is on service, is one of relaxation from all rule, instead of being, as it is, the period during which, of all others, every rule for the regulation and control of the conduct of the soldier, for the inspection and care of his arms, ammunition, accoutrements, necessaries, and field equipments, and his horse and horse appointments, for the receipt and issue and care of his provisions, and the regulation of all that belongs to his food, and the forage for his horse, must be most strictly attended to by the Officer of his company or troop, if it is intended that an army, a British army in particular, shall be brought into the field of battle, in a state of efficiency to meet the enemy on the day of trial. These are the points, then, to which I most earnestly intreat you to turn your attention, and the attention of the Officers of the regiments under your command, Portuguese as well as English, during the period in which it may be in my power to leave the troops in their cantonments. The Commanding Officers of regiments must enforce the orders of the army, regarding the constant inspection and superintendance of the Officers over the conduct of the men of their companies in their cantonments; and they must endeavour to inspire the Non-commissioned Officers with a sense of their situation and authority; and the Non-commissioned Officers must be forced to do their duty, by being constantly under the view and superintendence of the Officers. By these means, the frequent and discreditable recourse to the authority of the Provost, and to punishments by the sentence of Courts-Martial, will be prevented: and the soldiers will not dare to commit the offences and outrages, of which there are too many complaints, when they know that their Officers and their Non-commissioned

Officers have their eyes and attention turned towards them. The Commanding Officers of regiments must likewise enforce the orders of the army, regarding the constant, real inspection of the soldiers' arms, ammunition, accoutrements, and necessaries; in order to prevent, at all times, the shameful waste of ammunition, and the sale of that article, and of the soldiers' necessaries. With this view both should be inspected daily. In regard to the food of the soldier, I have frequently observed and lamented, in the late campaign, the facility and celerity with which the French soldiers cooked, in comparison with those of our army. The cause of this disadvantage is the same with that of every other description,—the want of attention of the Officers to the Orders of the Army, and to the conduct of their men; and their consequent want of authority over their conduct. Certain men of each company should be appointed to cut and bring in wood, others to fetch water, and others to get the meat, &c. to be cooked; and it would soon be found, if this practice were daily enforced, and a particular hour for seeing the dinners, and for the men dining, named as it ought to be equally as for the parade, that cooking would no longer require the inconvenient length of time which it has lately been found to take, and that the soldiers would not be exposed to the privation of their food, at the moment at which the army may be engaged in operations with the enemy. You will, of course, give your attention to the field exercise and discipline of the troops. It is very desirable that the soldiers should not lose the habits of marching; and the division should march 10 or 12 miles twice in each week, if the weather should permit, and the roads in the neighbourhood of the cantonments of the divisions should be dry. But I repeat, that the great object of the attention of the General and Field-Officers must be, to get the Captains and Subalterns of the regiments to understand, and to perform the duties required from them, as the only mode by which the discipline and efficiency of the army can be restored and maintained during the next campaign.

I have the honor to be, &c. WELLINGTON.

Freneyda, Nov. 28, 1812.

To ——, or the Officer commanding the ——

COURTS-MARTIAL.

Horse-Guards, 3d of August, 1812.

At a General Court-Martial held at Hythe, on the 23d of March, 1812, and continued by adjournments to the 13th of April following, Lieutenant Lewis Appelius, of the 85th Regiment of Foot, was arraigned upon the under-mentioned Charges, viz:

1st.—" For scandalous and infamous conduct unbecoming the character of an officer and a gentleman, in falsely and maliciously asserting to Captain Hylton, of the 85th regiment, at Belem in Portugal, on or about the 1st of June, 1811, that he, Lieutenant Appelius, had pulled Major Mein, of the same regiment, by the nose, and taken his, Lieutenant Appelius's, feet from the Hudibrastic seat of honor, or words to that effect; and if Major Mein had added that to the Charge which he had given in against him, Lieutenant Appelius, on or about December last, meaning 1810, it would have been nothing but the truth."

2d.—" In falsely and maliciously propagating and asserting between the 12th and 24th of June, 1811, to the officers of the 85th regiment, then serving in Portugal, that he, Lieutenant Appelius, had pulled Major Mein by the nose, and taken his, Lieutenant Appelius's, feet from the Hudibrastic seat of honor, or

words to that effect; and further falsely and maliciously propagating and re-asserting the same calumny between the 8th of August and 7th of September, 1811, to several of the officers of the five companies of the 85th regiment, then under the command of Major Mein, at the regimental depôt at Hailsham or Silverhill; the above expressions and assertions being absolutely false, and greatly to the prejudice and dishonor of Major Mein's character, both as an officer and a gentleman, and highly subversive of good order and military discipline, and in breach of the Articles of War."

Upon which Charges the Court came to the following decision:

The Court having maturely and attentively weighed and considered the evidence adduced in support of the prosecution, together with what the prisoner, Lieutenant Lewis Appelius, has offered in his defence, is of opinion relative to the first Charge, that the prisoner is Guilty of the same.

With regard to the second Charge, the Court is of opinion that the prisoner is Not Guilty of the whole or either part thereof, and doth therefore acquit him of the same.

The Court, in consideration of having found the prisoner Guilty of the scandalous and infamous conduct, as contained in the first Charge, such being a breach of the Articles of War, doth therefore sentence him to be dismissed His Majesty's Service.

The Court, at the same time that it acquits the prisoner of the second Charge, deems it a duty in justice to Major Mein's character, to state, that in the course of the trial several circumstances have transpired fully sufficient, in the opinion of the Court, to exonerate Major Mein from any imputation of being actuated by an illiberal or improper motive in preferring the second Charge.

The Court is induced to notice, as a mark of its approbation, the firm and clear manner in which Captain Glew delivered his evidence, on a subject to him of the utmost delicacy, and which the Court with reluctance found necessary to investigate.

The Court further feels itself bound to express its severest animadversion on the evasive and reluctant manner in which the testimony of Captain Hylton was given, and the difficulty the Court experienced in extorting from Captain Hylton that information, which the Court had such strong presumption for supposing him in possession of, and which it was too evident his desire and endeavour to withhold.

His Royal Highness the Prince Regent has been pleased, in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, to approve and confirm the finding and sentence of the Court; and the Commander-in-Chief directs that the foregoing Charges preferred against Lieutenant Appelius, of the 85th Regiment of Foot, together with the finding and sentence of the Court, shall be read at the head of every corps, and entered in the General Order Book. HARRY CALVERT, Adjutant-Gen.

Horse-Guards, 22*nd August*, 1812.

At a General Court-Martial held at Halifax, on the 27th of May, 1812, and on subsequent days, Captain George Shore, commanding a detachment of the 104th regiment, was arraigned upon the undermentioned charges preferred against him by order of his excellency, Joseph Frederick Desbarres, Colonel in the Army, and Lieutenant-Governor commanding His Majesty's forces in Prince Edward Island, viz.

1st. "That Captain Shore did take upon himself, without the knowledge of the

said Lieutenant-Governor commanding, to remove the sentry from the important post of George's battery, the principal work of defence for the protection of the said town and garrison, thereby evidently exposing the same, and the king's magazine, together with the lives and properties of his subjects, to the malice of any evil inclined, or disaffected individual, in direct disobedience of a Standing Garrison Order, dated 22d of June, 1809."

2d. "That the said Captain Shore, in disobedience of a Standing General Order, dated head-quarters, Halifax, 3d October, 1804, and of a Garrison Order, dated 9th of July, 1809, did persist to allow men of the detachment under his command, to work for divers inhabitants in this island, thereby wantonly encouraging the irregularities arising from that cause, and so shamefully prevalent in this garrison, to the progress, existence, and consequence of which it was the evident intention of the said orders, by dutiful observance thereof, to put an effectual termination."

3d. "That the said Captain Shore did absolutely disobey an order of this garrison, dated 14th of May, 1811."

4th. "That upon a Garrison Order of the 17th of July last, requiring Commanding Officers of Detachments, composing the strength of this garrison, to give in daily reports of the distribution of the troops, under their respective commands, specifically stating therein such men as were employed, and if so, whether for public or private purposes, how and where, the said Captain Shore in his reports given, in consequence thereof, having stated the employment of the men of his said Detachment, in no other than the king's works, while on the contrary it appears that men were at work with his permission, for inhabitants of the town, the said Captain Shore has thereby knowingly made false reports to his Commanding Officer."

5th. "That the said Captain Shore did contrive to frame, and send to the Officer commanding the 104th regiment, a statement bearing date the 30th May, 1811, an extract of which with the copy of a letter from the said Officer thereon, has, by command of the present Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in British North America, been transmitted to the said Lieutenant-Governor Desbarres for his information, containing a wild fabrication of mischievous falsehoods and vile perversions, seemingly calculated to deceive the said officer, who appears to have been led thereby into injurious misconception relative to proceedings wickedly represented by the said Captain Shore, and preposterously pretended to have taken place in Prince Edward Island."

6th. "That the said Captain Shore, in this statement of 30th May last, wantonly and falsely made use of sundry unjustifiable and unbecoming expressions, tending to defame the character of His Majesty's representative in this government."

7th. "That in the course of an investigation, directed by the said Lieutenant-Governor Desbarres, to be made for the purpose of elucidating, and placing in a just point of view, the several matters grossly misrepresented in the before-mentioned statement, Ceptain Shore did exhibit a contumelious disposition, to frustrate the object thereof."

8th. "That Captain Shore's endeavours to frustrate the objects of an inquiry, directed by the said Lieutenant-Governor to be made, and his (the said Captain Shore's) declared approbation of the insolent behaviour of Acting-Serjeant Major Smith, and others on the 27th day of September last, at a sitting of the said enquiry, evince his propensity to disseminate and foster the seeds of a dangerous insubordination and mutiny, and such propensity is furthermore exhibited by his boasting to have treated the letters of the said Lieutenant-Governor's Secretary, written to him

on the subject of his statement of 30th May, 1811, by command of His Excellency, with contumelious scurrility, and to have transmitted the same with remarks thereupon, and received answers from head-quarters, expressive of the approbation of the General Commanding of his conduct."

"All which conduct on the part of the said Captain Shore, tending to excite a spirit of mutiny and insubordination among the troops in the garrison, being unjustifiable to his character as an Officer, greatly injurious and derogatary to the honour, dignity, and welfare of His Majesty's service, prejudicial to good order and military discipline, and contrary to the articles of war."

Upon which charges the Court came to the following decision, viz:

"The Court-Martial, after the most attentive consideration of the evidence, applicable to the charges exhibited against Captain George Shore, of the 104th regiment, together with the prisoner's defence, and evidence adduced in support thereof; is of opinion that he is not guilty of the first charge."

"On the second charge, the Court is of opinion that the prisoner did disobey the Garrison Order of the 9th July, 1809, but as that Garrison Order is founded on a General Order, which does not exist, and as the prisoner did moreover receive instructions from the head-quarters of his regiment, which appeared to him fully to authorize his allowing men to work; and further as it has not been shewn that he wantonly encouraged, or that the irregularities did take place, as expressed in this charge; the Court does therefore acquit him."

"It is further of opinion on the third charge; he is not guilty."

"On the fourth charge; he is not guilty."

"On the fifth charge; he is not guilty."

"On the sixth charge; he is not guilty."

"On the seventh charge; he is not guilty."

"On the eighth charge; he is not guilty."

The Court does therefore most fully and honorably acquit the said Captain Shore, of the 104th regiment, of all and each of the charges exhibited against him.

The Commander-in-Chief directs, that the foregoing charges preferred against Captain George Shore, together with the finding of the Court, shall be read at the head of every corps, and entered in the General Order Book.

(Signed) HARRY CALVERT.

GAZETTES,—

Military Dispatches,—Promotions, &c. in the Army.

(Regularly continued from our last No.)

To be Captains of Companies.

40th Regiment of Foot—Captain Robert Morrow, from the 36th Foot, vice Smith, who exchanges.—Captain G. J. Call, from the 77th Foot, vice Queade, who exchanges.

To be Ensign.

Serjeant-Major Donald M'Donald, from the 1st Foot, vice Powell, deceased.

42d do.—Lieutenant Duncan M'Innes to be Captain of a Company, vice Williamson, dead of his wounds.

60th do.—Richard Aylmer Coates, Gent. to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Ring, who resigns.—Henry Biggs, Esq. to be Paymaster, vice Gilbert, deceased.

72d do.—Ensign Barton Tennison to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Bland, promoted.

73d do.—Sir Henry John Seton, Bart. to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Lunding, promoted.

74th do.—Ensign Robert Barker to be Lieutenant, vice Neven, deceased.

77th do.—Captain William Queade, from the 40th Foot, to be Captain of a Company, vice Gall, who exchanges.

92d do.—Ensign A. M'Pherson to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Hill, promoted in the 41st Foot.—Quarter-Master-Serjeant Ewen Cameron to be Ensign, vice M'Pherson.

95th do.—Lieutenant William Johnston to be Captain of a Company, vice Crampton, deceased.—Second Lieutenant David Fensham to be First Lieutenant, vice Johnston.—Dugald Macfarlane, Gent. to be Second Lieutenant, vice Fensham.

4th West India Regiment—Robert Ware, Gent. to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Garrett, who resigns.

2d Royal Veteran Battalion—Captain Thomas J. Baines, from the 2d Foot, to be Capt. of a Company, vice Vicary, appointed to the 12th Royal Veteran Battalion. Quarter-Master Thomas Medley, from the 36th Foot, to be Lieutenant, vice Bell, placed upon the Retired List.

12th do.—Captain John Vicary, from the 2d Royal Veteran Battalion, to be Captain of a Company, vice Hull, placed upon the Retired List.

Nova Scotia Fencibles—Lieutenant R. E. Armstrong to be Captain of a Company, vice Haly, promoted.—Lieutenant J. Marchington, from the 60th Foot, to be Lieutenant, vice Armstrong.

Meuron's Regiment—Major-General George Townsend Walker, from the 50th Foot, to be Colonel, vice Lieutenant-General De Meuron, who resigns.

The Duke of York's Greek Light Infantry Regiment—Ensign Matuo Ordioni to be Lieutenant.—Volunteer . . . . . Vlacopulo to be Ensign, vice Ordioni.

BREVET.

Captain William Hedderwick, of the 24th Foot, to be Major in the Army.

STAFF.—*To be Chaplains to the Forces,*

Joseph Langley Mills, M. A. vice Tringham.—Thomas Norris, Clerk.

To be Deputy Assistant-Commissary-General to the Forces,

John Edgcumbe Daniell, Gent.

Surgeon David Brownrigg, from the half-pay, to be Surgeon to the Forces, vice Thompson, placed upon half-pay.

To be Hospital-Mates for General Service.

Robert Renwick, Gent.—Samuel F. Crawford, Gent.

BARRACKS.

Edward West Phillips, Gent. to be an Assistant-Barrack-Master to the Forces in Great-Britain.

War-Office, November 3, 1812.

MEMORANDUM.

His Royal Highness the Prince Regent has been pleased, in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, to approve of the 70th (or Surry) Regiment of Foot, being in future styled the 70th (or Glasgow Lowland) Regiment.

2d Regiment of Life Guards—Thomas Drinkwater, Gent. to be Assistant-Surgeon.

3d do. Dragoons—Cornet and Adjutant George Crabtree to have the rank of Lieut.

7th do. Light Dragoons—Andrew Blake, Gent. to be Cornet without purchase, vice Norbury, who resigns.

9th do.—Captain Patrick Savage to be Major, by purchase, vice Morland, promoted in the 50th Foot.

16th do.—Cornet . . . . . . Pratt to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Van Hagen, who retires.—Edmund Burke, Gent. to be Cornet, without purchase.

19th do.—William Veredit Horton, Gent. to be Cornet, by purchase, vice Lee, who retires.

20th. do.—Cornet Thomas Irwin to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Leonard, appointed to the 1st Regiment of Life Guards.

21st do.—Cornet James Leeson to be Lieutenant, without purchase.—Cornet Martin French to be do.

1st Regiment of Foot Guards—Brevet Major Robert Clitherow to be Captain of a Company, by purchase, vice Wheatley, who retires.

9th Regiment of Foot—Ensign Hiram Cutler to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Luscombe, who resigns.—Volunteer . . . . . . Nash, from the 57th Foot, to be Ensign, vice Cutler.

10th do.—Hospital-Mate Thomas Rolston to be Assistant-Surgeon, vice Pearce, who resigns.

To be Lieutenants without purchase.

12th Regiment of Foot—Lieutenant Thomas Dun, from the 65th Foot.—Ensign James Barret, from the 24th Foot.

14th do.—Lieutenant A. Adamson, from the 80th Foot, to be Captain of a Company, vice Kennedy, killed in action.

18th do.—Captain John M'Neil to be Major, without purchase, vice Walker, promoted.—Lieutenant James Aitken to be Captain of a company, vice M'Neil.

24th do.—Thomas Kennedy, Gent. to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Barrett, promoted in the 12th Foot.

To be Captains of Companies.

28th Regiment of Foot.—Lieutenant William Vise Taylor, vice Johnson, killed in action.—Lieutenant W. Henry Hartman, vice Bean, placed upon half-pay.

30th do.—Ensign . . . . . . Hughes to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Eades, who resigns.—Volunteer . . . . . . Travers, from the 71st Foot, to be Ensign, vice Hughes.

41st do.—Lieutenant John Dardis, from the Louth Militia, to be Ensign, without purchase.

42d do.—Ensign William Gordon to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice M'Innes, promoted.—William Milne, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Gordon.

46th do.—Ensign D. L. Cox to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Straker, appointed to the 73d Foot.—Assistant-Surgeon William Roberts, from the 1st Foot, to be Surgeon, vice Beard, dismissed the service.

50th do.—Major Charles Morland, from the 9th Light Dragoons, to be Lieutenant-Colonel, by purchase.

55th do.—Lieutenant John Heard, from the North Cork Militia, to be Ensign, without purchase.

59th do.—Ensign Henry Fairclough to be Lieutenant, without purchase.—Robert Parke, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Fairclough.—Lieutenant James Chadwick to be Adjutant, vice Pittman, promoted.

60th do.—Ensign Henry Molloy to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Rind, who resigns.—John Armstrong, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Molloy.

66th do.—George Tolfrey, Gent. to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Hendley, promoted in the 3d Ceylon Regiment.

79th do.—Captain Duncan Cameron to be Major, vice Cocks, killed in action.—Lieutenant John M'Neil to be Captain of a Company, vice Cameron.—Ensign N. Carter to be Lieutenant, vice M'Neil.—Serjeant-Major . . . . . . Gowen, from the 48th Foot, to be Ensign, vice Carter.

80th do.—Ensign C. Anderson to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Adamson, promoted in the 14th Foot.—Joseph Stokes, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Anderson.

92d do.—James Patullo, Gent. to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Little, promoted.

104th do.—Ensign E. W. Solomon to be Lieutenant, without purchase.—Ensign F. H. Cumming, from half-pay of the 116th Foot, to be Ensign, vice Soloman.—Lieutenant George Jobling to be Adjutant, vice Jenkins, promoted in the Glengary Light Infantry Fencibles.

1st West India Regiment—Hospital-Mate David Wetherspoon to be Assistant-Surgeon, vice Aytoun, promoted in the Royal West-India Rangers.

4th do.—Hospital-Mate George Donaldson to be Assistant-Surgeon.

5th do.—Lieutenant P. G. Lewis, from the 6th Foot, to be Captain of a Company, without purchase, vice Woods, appointed to the 2d Royal Veteran Battalion.

8th do.—Hospital-Mate Thomas Bell to be Assistant-Surgeon.

1st Ceylon Regiment—Second Lieutenant R. Thomas to be First Lieutenant, vice Moffat, deceased.—H. Fleming, Gent. to be Second Lieutenant, vice Thomas.

2d do.—Lietenant Noah Perks, from the First Ceylon Regiment, to be Captain of a Company, vice Hardyman, deceased.
3d do.—Ensign H. E. Hendley, from the 66th Foot, to be First Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Ingham, promoted in the 4th Ceylon Regiment.
4th do.—Lieutenant George Ingham, from the 3d Ceylon Regiment, to be Captain of a Company, vice Clarke, deceased.
4th Royal Veteran Battalion—Serjeant-Major Henry Kenyon, from the 9th Foot, to be Ensign, vice Wilson, promoted.
5th do.—Garrison Serjeant-Major James Lock to be Ensign, vice Gilchrist, promoted in the 7th Royal Veteran Battalion.
7th do.—Ensign Richard Gilchrist, from the 5th Royal Veteran Battalion, to be Lieutenant, vice Walker, placed upon the retired list.—Troop Serjeant-Major Anthony Komareck, from the 20th Light Dragoons, to be Ensign, vice Curly, promoted.
Glengary Light Infantry Fencibles—Assistant-Surgeon Alexander Cunningham, from the Canadian Fencibles, to be Surgeon.—Hospital-Mate Robert C. Horne to be Assistant-Surgeon.
Royal York Rangers—Captain John Ewart, from the 52d Foot, to be Major, without purchase, vice Ward, whose appointment has not taken place.
Royal Waggon Train—Lieutenant Richard Outon, from the Sussex Militia, to be Cornet without purchase.
Cape Regiment—Adam Gordon, Gent. to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Macdonald, promoted in the 93d Foot.

BREVET.

Captain Ge Chardus Timœus, of the 2d Batt. of the Line, to be Major in the Army.

STAFF.

Major John Johnson, of the 86th Foot, to be Deputy-Adjutant-General to his Majesty's Forces serving in the East Indies, with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in the Army, vice Sir William Nicholson, Bart. who resigns.

HOSPITAL STAFF.

W. D. Fry, Gent. to be Hospital-Mate for General Service.

The King's German Legion.

1st Regiment of Dragoons—Lieutenant George Baron Issendorff to be Captain of a Troop, vice Dechen, dead of his wounds.—Cornet Charles von Assig to be Lieutenant, vice Issendorff.
2d do.—Captain Augustus Friedericks, from the 2d Light Dragoons, to be Major, vice Volger, deceased.
2d Regiment of Light Dragoons—Lieutenant William Baron Issendorff to be Captain of a Troop, vice Friedericks, promoted in the 2d Dragoons.—Cornet Frederick Roeders to be Lieutenant, vice Issendorff.
3d do.—Cornet Francis Power to be Lieutenant, vice Wersabe, who resigns.—Frederick James Horn, Gent. to be Cornet, vice Power.
2d Battalion of Light Infantry—Henry Prince Reuss, formerly Major in the Hanoverian service, to be Major with temporary rank, vice Gerber, deceased.
2d Battalion of the Line—Lieutenant Philip Majus to be Captain of a Company, vice Scharnost, killed in action.—Ensign Aug. Kathman to be Lieutenant, vice Majus.—Ensign George Frederick Pascal to be Lieutenant, vice Hansing, killed in action.
5th do.—Lieutenant William Rautenberg to be Captain of a Company, vice Hugo, deceased.—Lieutenant George Nötting to be ditto, vice Langrehr, dead of his wounds.—Ensign Henry Llewellyn to be Lieutenant, vice Rautenburg.—Ensign Jacob Wünning to be Lieutenant, vice Nötting.—Edmund Wheatley, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Winckler, promoted.—Quarter-Master-Serjeant Lewis Schuck to be Adjutant (with the rank of Ensign), vice Haneinman, promoted.
6th do.—Serjeant Christian Seelhorst to be Ensign.

Dillon's Regiment.—To be Lieutenants.

Ensign Joseph Gatty, vice Duboulet, promoted.—Ensign Toussaint Pozzodi Borgo.—Ensign . . . . . . Primat.—Ensign Samuel Hayward Budd.

To be Ensigns.

Cyprien Le Camus de Pontcarré, Gent. vice Gatty.—Robert Macbeath, Gent. vice Pozzodi Borgo.—Charles Brumby, Gent. vice Primat.

To be Quarter-Master.

Serjeant . . . . . . Beckmann, from the 3d Battalion of the Line of the King's German Legion, vice De Couz, superseded.

De Roll's Regiment.

Lieutenant Francis Glutz to be Captain of a Company, without purchase, vice Charles Sury, who resigns.

Meuron's Regiment.

Ensign G. A. Fauche to be Lieutenant, without purchase.—Lewis Verstrum, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Brewer, promoted.—Charles Cæsar de Meuron, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Robins, promoted.—August de Loriol, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Schoulte, promoted.

Bourbon Regiment.

Second Lieutenant Johnstone Martin to be First Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Hewett, appointed to the 33d Foot.—Serjeant . . . . . . Quin, from the 87th Foot, to be Second Lieutenant, vice Martin.—Assistant-Surgeon John Hodson, from the 22d Foot, to be Surgeon.—Hospital-Mate Maurice Owen to be Assistant-Surgeon.

MEMORANDUM.

The undermentioned appointments, as stated in the Gazettes of the 31st of March last, and 27th ultimo, have not taken place, viz.—

2d Light Infantry Battalion King's German Legion—Ensign Antonio de Younge Bleek to be Lieutenant.

HOSPITAL STAFF.

Samuel Crawford, Gent. to be Hospital-Mate for General Service.

2d Regiment of Bedfordshire Local Militia—Charles Green, Gent. to be Lieutenant. Dated May 25, 1812.

Admiralty-Office, November 3, 1812.

The following is a copy of a Bulletin of the operations of the Russian forces under General Winzingerode and General Essen, transmitted to John Wilson Croker, Esq. by Vice-Admiral Sir James Saumarez.

"Adjutant-General Baron Winzingerode to His Imperial Majesty, 28th September, from the village of Dawydowka, as follows.

"Without leaving the Twer road, I still occupy this village with the greatest part of my detachment, daily making reconnoisances with small parties on the roads to Woldomir, Yaroslaff, and Dimitroff, and even to Moskrekensk, and the neighbourhood of Moskaisk. Every thing is well at the advanced posts, and the enemy has shewn no disposition to advance.

"The detachment on the Wolodimir road, reported to me on the 25th of September, that the enemy had appeared at Nowaja that day, twenty-four wersts from Moscow, but they had retired, and the Cossack Patroles had reconnoitred on the Moscow road as far as the village of Jwanoff. The French picquets were five wersts from us; on the 27th of September nothing new had occurred.

"On the Yarisloff and Dimitroff roads, the enemy had made no movement on the 27th of September, and our Cossacks maintained their posts, nor had the enemy moved on the St. Petersburgh road. Colonel Ilowaisky (12), who commands my advanced guard, requested my permission to attack the French advanced posts, on the 26th, which he did at the village of Chimka, repulsed them, and pursued them one werst, taking one officer, and two hundred and seventy men, prisoners; their loss in killed was heavy, but on our side the loss is not worth naming.

"Colonel Benkendorf, who is stationed with a detachment between Wolokalamar and Muskaisk, pushed his patroles right and left on the road to Smolensk, and has sent in about one hundred prisoners."

General Essen reports, on the 30th of September, from Mittau, as follows:

"The enemy had resolved to decline opposing our attack on Mittau, and withdrew, retreating twelve hours through Wurzaw and Bouske, pursued by our cavalry; fifty men were taken prisoners, and the enemy abandoned one hundred and ninety men in the hospital.—Four battering cannon, a considerable quantity of provisions, and a magazine of fur coats which had been collected by a requisition in Courland, fell into our hands."

Office of Ordnance, November 4, 1812.

Corps of Royal Engineers.

Brevet Major Philip Hughes to be Lieutenant-Colonel, vice Hayter, deceased. Dated May 14, 1812.—Second Captain Sir George Hoste to be Captain, vice Hughes, promoted. Dated May 21, 1812.—First Lieutenant John Grant to be Second Captain, vice Hoste, promoted. Dated as above.—First Lieutenant William F. Dawson to be ditto, vice Williams, killed before the Castle of Burgos. Dated September 25, 1812.

Foreign-Office, November 11, 1812.

A DISPATCH, of which the following is a copy, has been this day received from His Excellency General Viscount Cathcart, His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at the Court of Saint Petersburgh, addressed to Lord Viscount Castlereagh, one of his Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State.

St. Petersburgh, Oct. 27, 1812.

MY LORD,—I have the pleasure to acquaint your Lordship that the guns are now firing, and Te Deum is to be sung to-morrow in the cathedral, for a most brilliant affair on the 18th between the advanced guards of the French and Russian armies near Moscow, in which the former, under Murat, were defeated with great loss; and for the deliverance of Moscow by General Winzingerode on the 22d Oct.

The bulletin is not yet published, but I have the honour to enclose a copy of the note I have this morning received, by the Emperor's command.

I have also enclosed a translation of the official account of the defeat of Marshal St. Cyr by Count Wittgenstein, and of the storming of Polotzk on the 20th October, as also that of the repulse of Marshal Macdonald's corps by General Steinheil.

Lieutenant-General Count Wittgenstein has been promoted to the rank of General of cavalry, and Te Deum for his victory was sung yesterday.

It appears that Prince Schwartzenberg has retired to the westward, leaving some corps which have been cut off; that the province of Volhynia is entirely cleared of the enemy; and that Admiral Tchichagoff may probably have reached Minsk about or soon after the 21st October.—I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) CATHCART.

(Translation of First Enclosure.)

St. Petersburgh, October 27, 1812.

ON the 18th October, Marshal Kutusoff having learnt that the corps of Victor had quitted Smolensk to reinforce the Grand Army, resolved to attack the advanced-guard, under the orders of Murat, being 45,000 strong, in face of our troops, in order to defeat the same before the junction of Victor, and before Napoleon could support him with the main body of his army. The attack completely succeeded: thirty-eight pieces of cannon fell into our hands, as well as a standard of honour belonging to the first regiment of cuirassiers. We have made 1500 prisoners, amongst whom is a General. Two thousand men were left on the field of battle.—Our loss is inconsiderable.

On the 22d, the corps of General Winzingerode entered Moscow, and obliged the garrison which the enemy had left in it, to evacuate that capital in such haste, that the French hospitals remained in our power.

(Second Enclosure.)

Extract from the Report of General Count Wittgenstein to His Imperial Majesty, dated Polotzk, the 20th October, 1812.

AFTER a hard engagement for two days with the enemy, thanks to the Almighty, Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr is on the other side of the Dwina and I am in Polotzk, with the corps entrusted to my command.

On the 6th instant, I directed Lieutenant-General Prince Jaschevil to attack with his detachment the enemy on the side of the village Guravitchne, whilst Lieutenant-General Count Steinheil continued his march this way on the left bank of the Dwina.

The enemy's advanced guard received me at the village Guravitchne, from whence it was driven into the lines. The engagement was most bloody, it began at six in the morning and lasted till night. I kept my ground, and compelled the enemy to retreat within his intrenchments, whence he kept up a very heavy cannonade in all

directions. The following morning, the 7th, I did not undertake any thing, because I waited for the attack of Lieutenant-General Count Steinheil on the other side of the Dwina, which took place accordingly. He drove the enemy from the village Bolonia, and pursued him towards Polotzk. I received this intelligence a little before dark, and, in order to profit of the situation in which the enemy found himself, I attacked, on the evening of the 7th, at five o'clock, and drove him out of his strong entrenchments, to which success Lieutenant-General Count Steinheil's movement greatly contributed.

The enemy then threw himself into the town, which is surrounded by a double pallisade, where he maintained himself nearly the whole night, keeping up a constant fire of musketry on all sides from behind the pallisades, as well as out of the houses. I gave orders for my ordnance to fire upon them with round and grape, and at last directed my advanced guard to storm the place in two divisions, the first under the command of Major-Generals Platoff and Diebitch, and the other under the command of Colonel Riediger, of the Grodno regiment of hussars. Lieutenant-General Cazanove, as soon as he perceived that his troops were close before Polotzk, threw himself also upon the enemy, and was the first who marched with them into the town. In this manner, at three in the morning of the 8th, the place was carried.

The loss of the enemy must be extraordinarily great, for all the places of action are covered with dead bodies; and according to the report of the inhabitants, he was employed the whole of the preceding day in carrying wounded men to the other side. Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr is himself wounded in the leg.

We have taken prisoners forty-five Staff and superior officers, and two thousand rank and file: among the former there are two colonels. We have also taken one piece of cannon, and a considerable quantity of provisions in the magazine, which the enemy had not time to destroy.

The enemy's loss would have been much greater if the Lieutenant-General Count Steinheil had been able to follow him to Polotzk, but to his great mortification he was stopped by the intervention of superior force five versts from the town. Our loss is not inconsiderable; of the generals, are wounded Major-General Balk in the head, Prince Libirgkoi and Harman, who have slight contusions. Colonel Rote, of the 26th Jagers, severely wounded in the leg, and the gentleman of the Bedchamber, Mordvino, a commander in the first Petersburgh Militia, has lost his leg by a cannon shot.

I can say nothing further of your Imperial Majesty's troops, than that they have fought with the greatest possible valour; that the 1st Petersburgh militia, upon its arrival in my camp, was distributed in the different regiments, and to the delight of every body these warriors have fought with such good will and courage, that they could not be exceeded by their comrades, the old soldiers, and they have distinguished themselves in a particular manner in columns, with the bayonet, under the direction of their brave leader Senator Bibikoff. We have few killed, but many wounded, and the more from its having been almost impossible to keep the men back in column, from their eagerness to throw themselves into the enemy's batteries and lines.

There is also a report of the 21st October, by Lieutenant-General Count Steinheil, detailing the particulars of his engagement with the corps of Macdonald on the left bank of the Dwina, having fallen in with the enemy on the 7th near the river Utchatch. He drove them, in concert with Count Wittgenstein, within four versts of Polotzk, at the same time that Count Wittgenstein stormed that place.—The extreme darkness of the night prevented further proceedings. Without counting killed and wounded, General Steinheil made one colonel, one staff officer, thirty-seven other officers, and five hundred non-commissioned officers and privates, prisoners. The Lieutenant-General speaks in the highest terms of commendation of the assistance he derived from the able exertions of Major-General Phox.

War-Office, November 14, 1812.

In consequence of the distinguished conduct of the 1st Battalion of the 50th Regt. of Foot at the battle of Vimiera, on the 21st of April 1808, His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, in the name and on the behalf of His Majesty, has been pleased to approve of the word "*Vimiera*" being borne on the colours and appointments of the 50th Regt. in addition to any other badges or devices which may have hitherto been granted to that regiment.

Royal Regiment of Horse-Guards—George Smith Gent. to be Cornet, without purchase, vice Fitzroy, promoted.

5th Regiment of Dragoon Guards—Surgeon Henry Job, from the 44th Foot, to be Surgeon, vice Lindsay, promoted on the Staff.

9th Regiment of Light Dragoons—Lieutenant Francis Warren to be Captain of a Troop, by purchase, vice Savage, promoted.

10th do.—Lieutenant Joseph Smyth to be Captain of a Troop, by purchase, vice Goddard, who retires.

To be Lieutenants.

Cornet George Wombwell, without purchase, vice Giveen, promoted in the 1st Regiment of Life Guards.—Cornet Charles Wyndham, by purchase, vice Smyth.

14th do.—Surgeon A. Richardson, from the 95th Foot, to be Surgeon, vice Widmar, promoted on the Staff.

15th do.—Captain E. Griffith to be Major, by purchase, vice Belches, who retires.

23d do.—Lieutenant Jeremiah Easter, from the 24th Foot, to be Lieutenant, vice Quentin, who exchanges.

2d Regiment of Foot—Hospital-Mate J. F. Oakley to be Assistant-Surgeon, vice Batt, appointed to the 5th Royal Veteran Battalion.

3d do.—J. Tharpe Clarke, Gent. to be Ensign, by purchase, vice White, who retires.

4th do.—Hospital-Mate Duncan M'Gregor to be Assistant-Surgeon, vice Walsh, dismissed the service.

5th do.—Major-General William Wynyard, from the Royal West India Rangers, to be Colonel, vice Lieutenant-General England, deceased.

8th do.—Ensign Alexander Bourke to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Macpherson, promoted in the Glengary Light Infantry Fencibles.—George Campsie, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Bourke.

11th do.—Ensign Richard Long to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Turner, promoted.—Lieutenant A. H. Rowan, from the Royal North Down Militia, to be Ensign, without purchase.

14th do.—Lieut. James Roche to be Capt. of a Company, vice Wilkinson, deceased.

To be Lieutenants, without purchase.

Ensign James M'Dermott, vice Benn, deceased.—Ensign William Buckle, vice Coghlan, dead of his wounds.—Ensign Charles Chichester, vice Gillman, killed in action.—Ensign Vesey Temple, vice Roche.

To be Ensigns, without purchase.

Gentleman Cadet Patrick Mackie, from the Royal Military College, vice Buckle.—John Grant, Gent. vice Chichester.—James Charles O'Hara Dickens, Gent. vice Temple.

18th do.—Ensign Oliver St. George to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Aicken, promoted.

24th do.—Lieutenant Edward Quentin, from the 23d Light Dragoons, to be Lieut. vice Easter, who exchanges.

26th do.—Ensign John Kyle to be Lieutenant, vice Lowcay, superseded.—Alex. Fraser, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Kyle.

31st do.—Henry Brown, Gent. to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Elwyn, promoted.

32d do.—Hospital-Mate Hugh M'Clintock to be Assistant-Surgeon, vice Jones, promoted in the 38th Foot.

37th do.—Ensign George Sandes, from the Kerry Militia, to be Ensign, without purchase.

44th do.—John Charles Farmer, Gent. to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Sinclair, promoted.—Surgeon Griffith Jones, from the Sicilian Regiment, to be Surgeon, vice Miller, placed upon half-pay.

48th do.—Assistant-Surgeon Thomas Bulkely, from the 9th Foot, to be Surgeon, vice Baxter, promoted on the Staff.

55th do.—John Montgomery Russell, Gent. to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Boyfield, promoted.

58th do.—Captain Thomas Kenah to be Major, by purchase, vice Young, who retires.—Lieutenant E. Kingsly to be Captain of a Company, by purchase, vice Kenah.—Ensign Richard Burton to be Lieutenant, by purchase, vice Kingsley.

59th do.—Assistant-Surgeon to the Forces Peter Papps to be Surgeon, vice Browne, promoted on the Staff.

To be Ensigns.

62d do.—John Summers, Gent. by purchase, vice Holden, promoted in the 7th Foot.—Lieutenant John Hawkins, from the Oxfordshire Militia, without purchase.

63d do.—Lieutenant Pery Baylee to be Captain of a Company, vice Love, deceased.

68th do.—Assistant-Surgeon James Reid, from the 51st Foot, to be Surgeon, vice Cole, promoted on the Staff.

90th do.—Lieutenant William James to be Captain of a Company, vice Ferguson, placed upon half-pay.—William Macpherson, Gent. to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Phillips, who resigns.

92d do.—Hospital-Mate John Stewart to be Assistant-Surgeon, vice M'Robert, promoted in the 27th Foot.

95th do.—Assistant-Surgeon T. H. Ridgway to be Surgeon, vice Richardson, appointed to the 14th Light Dragoons.—Hospital-Mate Edmund Dolphin to be Assistant-Surgeon, vice Ridgway.

7th West India Regiment—Captain George Arthur, from the 35th Foot, to be Major, by purchase, vice Pakenham, promoted in the 26th Foot.

Royal West India Rangers—Major-General the Honourable William Lumley, from half-pay of the late 3d Garrison Battalion, to be Colonel, vice Major-General Wynyard, appointed to the command of the 5th Foot.

4th Garrison Battalion—Assistant-Surgeon D. Rossiter, from the 77th Foot, to be Assistant-Surgeon, vice Dyason, placed upon the Retired List.

1st Royal Veteran Battalion—Quarter-Master F. Blake, from the Cape Regiment, to be Ensign, vice Neil, placed on the Retired List.

2d do.—Ensign B. Jameson to be Lieutenant, vice Angus Cameron, deceased.—Quarter-Master-Serjeant John Niess to be Ensign, vice Jameson.

10th do.—John M'Lauchlan, Gent. to be Ensign, vice John, placed upon the Retired List.

Royal Waggon Train—Hospital-Mate Robert Scott to be Assistant-Surgeon, vice Hoye deceased.

STAFF.

Captain William Carroll, of the 69th Foot, to be Inspector of Colonial Troops in the islands of Bourbon, Mauritius, and Java, with the rank of Major in the Army.

HOSPITAL STAFF.

Staff-Surgeon James Forbes, M. D. to be Physician to the Forces.

To be Surgeons to the Forces.

Surgeon Richard Jebb Browne, from the 59th Foot, vice Forbes.—Surgeon Owen Lindsay, from the 5th Dragoon Guards, vice Bell, deceased.—Surgeon Christopher Widmer, from the 14th Light Dragoons.

To be Surgeon to the Forces in Portugal, under the Command of Lieutenant-General Sir W. C. Beresford only.

Assistant-Surgeon Lewis Evans, from the Staff of the Army Depôt, vice Griffiths, appointed to the 15th Light Dragoons.

To be Hospital-Mates for General Service.

Warrant-Hospital-Mate Robert Henderson, vice Dolphin, promoted.—Warrant-Hospital-Mate Richard N. Starr, vice M'Clintock, promoted.

The King's German Legion.

1st Battalion of Light Infantry—Lieutenant-Colonel Christian Baron Ompteda, from the Retired List, to be Lieutenant-Colonel, vice Leonhart, deceased.

2d do.—Benedetto Kienburg, Gent. to be Ensign.

1st Battalion of the Line—Lieutenant F. Heine to be Captain of a Company, vice Saffe, killed in action.—Ensign George Wichman to be Lieutenant, vice Heine.—....... Fellows, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Schroeder, promoted.

4th do.—Lieutenant F. Ludewig to be Captain of a Company, vice Pufendorff, placed upon half-pay.—Ensign Henry de Witte to be Lieutenant, vice Ludewig.

5th do.—Ensign Louis Giesmann to be Lieutenant, vice Winckler, killed in action.

Sicilian Regiment.

Assistant-Surgeon Alexander Broadfoot to be Surgeon, vice Jones, appointed to the 44th Foot.

Memorandum.

Quarter-Master Blake, of the Cape Regiment, who was superseded, as stated in the Gazette of 3d ultimo, is reinstated in his rank.—Hospital-Mate O'Reilly is superseded, being absent without leave.

ERRATUM in the Gazette of the 27th ultimo.

9th Regiment of Light Dragoons—for Assistant-Surgeon *Edward* Purdon, read Assistant-Surgeon *George* Purdon.

1st or Nottingham Regiment of Local Militia—Samuel Grundy, Esq. to be Captain, by Brevet. Dated April 15, 1812.

Royal Monmouth and Brecon Militia—Lieutenant James Kettleby to be Captain. Dated Sept. 18, 1812.—Ensign Joseph Cooke to be Lieutenant. Dated Sept. 25, 1812.—Egerton Isaacson, Gent. to be Ensign. Dated as above.

War-Office, November 17, 1812.

1st Regiment of Life Guards—John Haddy James, Gent. to be Assistant-Surgeon.

3d Regt. of Dragoons—Cornet Edward Adams, from the 1st Dragoons of the King's German Legion, to be Cornet, without purchase, vice Watson, promoted.

20th Regiment of Light Dragoons—The Hon. W. Massey, to be Cornet, without purchase, vice Irvin, promoted.

Coldstream Regiment of Foot Guards—Mark Beaufoy, Gent. to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Buckridge, killed in action.

1st Regiment of Foot—Hospital-Mate William Finnie, to be Assistant-Surgeon, vice Walters, promoted on the Staff.

4th do.—Ensign J. Birmingham, to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Belshes, promoted in the 59th Foot.

Frederic Field, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Birmingham.

21st do.—Lieut. Aldcroft Waller to be Captain of a Company, by purchase, vice Wright, who retires.

Second Lieutenant John Watts to be First Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Waller.

26th Regt. of Foot—John W. Graham, Gent. to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Wilkinson, promoted.

29th do.—Assistant-Surgeon James Lawder, from the Meath Militia, to be Assistant-Surgeon, vice Curby, appointed to the Staff.

33d do.—Hospital-Mate William D. Fry to be Assistant-Surgeon, vice Dow, appointed to the Staff.

34th do.—George Wilson, Gent. to be Ensign, by purchase, vice Murphy, promoted.

39th do.—Hospital-Mate James Knox to be Assistant-Surgeon.

43d do.—Assistant-Surgeon Archibald Hair, from the Forfar Militia, to be Assistant-Surgeon.

46th do.—Lieut.-Col. William Sorell, from the half-pay of Hompesch's Mounted Riflemen, to be Major, vice Payne, who exchanges.

79th do.—Lieut. Alexander Mac Intyre to be Captain of a Company, vice Charles Campbell, placed upon half-pay.

91st do.—Lieut. Hodson Gage, from the Londonderry Militia, to be Ensign, without purchase.

99th do.—Serjeant John Hutchinson, from the 1st Regiment of Foot Guards, to be Adjutant (with the rank of Ensign), vice Herring, who resigns the Adjutancy only.

100th do.—Ensign John Valentine, from the Londonderry Militia, to be Ensign, without purchase.

102d do.—Serjeant-Major . . . . . . Wilkely, from the 50th Foot, to be Adjutant (with the rank of Ensign), vice Minchin, promoted.

To be Lieutenants, without purchase.

1st West India Regiment—Ensign Robert Rose, from the 6th West India Regiment, vice Finucane, deceased.—Ensign Thomas Phelan, from the 6th West India Regiment.—Ensign Richard Story, from the 6th West India Regiment.

To be Assistant Surgeon.

Assistant-Surgeon D. P. Noble, from the 17th Light Dragoons, vice Kelly, appointed to the 25th Foot.

2d do.—Ensign Henry Nosworthy to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Reynolds, promoted in the 2d Ceylon Regiment.—Edward Hughes, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Nosworthy.

To be Lieutenants, without purchase.

3d do.—Ensign J. B. P. Boubers, vice Adamson, promoted in the 89th Foot.—Ensign John Bradshaw.—Ensign John Goode.

To be Ensigns, without purchase.

John Henderson, Gent. vice Boubers.—William Gorse, Gent, vice Bradshaw.—J. A. Gillmore, Gent. vice Goode.

To be Lieutenants, without purchase.

4th Regiment of Foot—Ensign James Croke.—Ensign G. B. O'Brien.

To be Ensigns, without purchase.

Thomas Jones, Gent. vice Croke—Joseph Pilkington, Gent. vice O'Brien.

6th do.—Ensign Alexander Knowles to be Lieutenant, without purchase.

To be Ensigns, without purchase.

Edward Maguire, Gent. vice Knowles—Charles Andrews, Gent. vice Phelan, promoted to the 1st West India Regiment. . . . . . Smith, Gent. vice Storey, promoted in the 1st West India Regiment.

To be Lieutenants, without purchase.

7th do.—Ensign William Nimmo, vice Edwards, appointed to the 54th Foot—Ensign Thomas Chadwick.

To be Ensigns, without purchase.

Thomas Parker, Gent. vice Nimmo—William Hammersley, Gent. vice Chadwick—John Bee Wollams, Gent.

To be Adjutant.

Ensign George Foskey, vice Noel, promoted.

Royal African Corps—Gunner James Walker, from the Royal Artillery, to be Ensign, without purchase, vice Hessey, appointed to Dillon's Regiment.

Royal York Rangers—Ensign P. M. Berthodierre to be Lieutenant, without purchase, vice Godfrey, appointed to the 11th Royal Veteran Battalion.—Colin Buchanan, Gent. to be Ensign, vice Berthodierre.

To be Lieutenants.

Royal West India Rangers—Ensign Langley, vice Hopwood, deceased.—Ensign T. H. Edwards, vice Meard, deceased.

To be Ensigns.

Clement Archer, Gent. vice Langley.—Matthew Harper Pilkington, Gent. vice Edwards.

1st Royal Veteran Battalion—Serjeant-Major Alexander Sutherland, from the 71st Foot, to be Ensign, vice M'Naughton, deceased.

8th do.—Captain John Blosset, from the 7th Royal Veteran Battalion, to be Captain of a Company, vice Pickering, placed upon the Retired List.

Dillon's Regiment—Ensign Thomas Hessey, from the Royal African Corps, to be Lieutenant, vice Budd, promoted.

STAFF.

Captain M. G. Blake, of the Cape Regiment, to be Deputy Adjutant-General to the Forces serving at the Cape of Good Hope (with the rank of Major in the Army), vice Sorrell, who resigns.

HOSPITAL STAFF.

Staff-Surgeon Summers Higgins to be Deputy Inspector of Hospitals, vice Lidderdale, deceased.

To be Assistant Surgeon to the Forces.

Edward Curby, from the 29th Foot.—Edward Dow, from the 33d Foot.—W. H. Booty, from the 97th Foot.—William Randall, from the 2d Dragoon Guards.—W. R. White from the 27th Foot.

To be Hospital-Mates for General Service.

John Pickering, Gent.—John Clarke, Gent.—David Rees, Gent.—Dennis Murray, Gent.—Hugh Kelly, Gent.—William Moon, Gent.—John Coghlan, Gent.

The undermentioned Officers are superseded, being absent without leave.

Lieutenant Medlicott, of the 28th Foot.—Ensign Johnson, of the 89th Foot.

Royal North Lincoln Militia—Roger Burnell, Gent. to be Lieutenant. Dated October 25, 1812.—Joshua Watson, Gent. to be ditto. Dated October 31, 1812.—Thomas Probart, Gent. to be Ensign. Dated as above.

Downing Street, November 17, 1812.

DISPATCHES, of which the following are extracts, have been this day received at Earl Bathurst's office, addressed to his Lordship by General the Marquis of Wellington, dated Cabecon, 26th and 28th Oct. Rueda, 31st Oct. and 3d Nov. 1812.

Cabecon, Oct. 26, 1812.—I have been so much occupied by the movements and operations of the army since the 18th instant, that I have not been able to write to your Lordship.

The operations of the Castle of Burgos continued nearly in the state in which they were when I addressed your Lordship on the 11th instant, till the 18th. Having at that time received a supply of musket ammunition from Santander, and having, while waiting for that necessary article, completed a mine under the church of St. Roman, which stood in an outwork of the second line, I determined that the breach which we had effected in the second line, should be stormed on that evening, at the moment this mine should explode; and that, at the same time, the line should be attacked by escalade.

The mine succeeded, and Lieut.-Col. Browne lodged a party of the 9th Cacadores, and a detachment of Spanish troops of the regiment of Asturias in the outwork. A detachment of the King's German Legion, under Major Wurmb, carried the breach, and a detachment of the Guards succeeded in escalading the line; but the enemy brought such a fire upon these two last detachments, from the third line, and the body of the castle itself, and they were attacked by numbers so superior, before they could receive the support allotted to them, that they were obliged to retire, suffering considerable loss. Major Wurmb was unfortunately killed.

It is impossible to represent, in adequate terms, my sense of the conduct of the Guards and German Legion upon this occasion; and I am quite satisfied, that if it had been possible to maintain the posts which they had gained with so much gallantry, these troops would have maintained them. Some of the men stormed even the third line, and one was killed in one of the embrasures of that line; and I had the satisfaction of seeing that if I could breach the wall of the Castle, we should carry the place.

Another mine was commenced under the second line from the Church of St. Roman, of which we remained in possession.

The enemy had, on the 13th, moved forward a considerable body of infantry, and six squadrons of cavalry, from Briviesca, to reconnoitre our out-posts at Monasterio. They attacked the picquet at the bridge in front of that town, but were repulsed by the fire of a detachment of the infantry of the Brunswick Legion. In this affair, Lieutenant-Colonel, the Honourable Frederick Ponsonby, who commanded at Monasterio, was wounded, but not severely, and I hope I shall soon again have the benefit of his assistance.

I had long had reports of the enemy's intention to advance for the relief of the castle of Burgos, with the army of Portugal, reinforced by troops recently arrived from France, and with that part of the army of the North which was disposable; and they did advance, in considerable force, against the post at Monasterio, on the evening of the 18th. The subaltern of the Brunswick Legion, who commanded a picquet in St. Olalla, disobeyed his orders in remaining in that village upon the approach of the enemy, and he was taken with his piquet. The enemy consequently obtained possession of the heights which command the town of Monasterio, and our outpost was obliged to retire, on the morning of the 19th, to the Burgos side of the town.

I assembled the troops, excepting those necessary for carrying on the operations of the siege, as soon as it appeared by the enemy's movement of the 18th, that they entertained serious intentions of endeavouring to raise it, and placed the allied army on the heights, having their right at Ibeas, on the Arlanzon, the centre at Rio Vena and Magaradas, and the left at Soto Pallacio. The enemy's army likewise assembled in the neighbourhood of Monasterio. They moved forward on the evening of the 20th, with about 10,000 men, to drive in our outpost at Quintana Palla and Olmos. The former withdrew by order, but the latter was maintained with great spirit by the Chasseurs Britanniques. Seeing a fair opportunity of striking a blow upon the enemy, I requested Lieut.-Gen. Sir Edward Paget to move with the 1st and 5th divisions upon the enemy's right flank, which movement having been well executed, drove them back upon Monasterio, and our posts were replaced in Quintana Palla.

On the morning of the 21st, I received a letter from Sir Rowland Hill, of the 17th, in which he acquainted me of the enemy's intention to move towards the Tagus, which was already fordable by individuals in many places, and was likely to become so by an army.

The castle of Chinchilla had surrendered on the 9th instant.

The enemy's force in Valencia was supposed to amount to not less than 70,000 men, a very large proportion of which, it was expected, would be disposable for service out of that kingdom.

I had desired Lieut.-Gen. Sir Rowland Hill to retire from his position on the Tagus, if he should find that he could not maintain himself in it with advantage; and it was necessary that I should be near him, in order that the corps under my command might not be insulated, in consequence of the movements which he should find himself under the necessity of making; I therefore raised the siege of Burgos on the night of the 20th, and moved the whole army back towards the Douro.

I felt severely the sacrifice I was thereby obliged to make. Your Lordship is aware that I was never very sanguine in my expectations of success in the siege of Burgos, notwithstanding that I considered success was attainable, even with the means in my power, within a reasonably limited period. If the attack made on the first line on the 22d or the 29th had succeeded, I believe we should have taken the place, notwithstanding the ability with which the Governor conducted the defence, and the gallantry with which it was executed by the garrison. Our means were limited; but it appeared to me, that if we should succeed, the advantage to the cause would be great, and the final success of the campaign would have been certain.

I had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the officers and troops during the siege of Burgos, particularly with the brigade of Guards.

During the latter part of the siege the weather was very unfavourable, and the troops suffered much from the rain. The officers at the head of the artillery and engineer departments—Lieut.-Col. Robe, and Lieut.-Col. Burgoyne, and Lieut.-Col. Dickson, who commands the reserve artillery, rendered me every assistance: and the failure of success is not to be attributed to them. By their activity we carried off every thing in the course of one night, excepting the three 18-pounders destroyed by the enemy's fire, and the eight pieces of cannon which we had taken from the enemy, on the night of the 19th ult. in the storm of the hornwork. Having sent our cattle to meet the equipment expected from Santander, we had not the means of moving the latter.

The enemy was not aware of our movement, and did not follow us till late on the 22d, when 10,000 men encamped on this side of Burgos.

The British army encamped at Celada del Camino and Hornillos, with the light cavalry at Estepan and Baniel. We continued our march on the following day, the right of the army to Torquemada, the left to Cordevilla, at which places we crossed the Pisuerga.

The enemy followed our movement with their whole army. Our rear guard consisted of two light battalions of the King's German Legion, under Col. Halkett, and of Major-Gen. Anson's brigade of cavalry; and Major-Gen. Bock's brigade was halted at the Venta del Pozo to give them support. The whole under the command of Lieut.-Gen. Sir Stapleton Cotton. Don Julian Sanchez marched on the left of the Arlanzon; and the party of Guerillas, heretofore commanded by the late Martinez, on the hills on the left of our rear guard.

Major-Gen. Anson's brigade charged twice with great success, in front of Celada del Camino, and the enemy was detained above three hours by the troops under Lieut.-Gen. Sir S. Cotton, in the passage of the Hormaza, in front of that village.

The rear guard continued to fall back in the best order, till the Guerillas on the left having been driven in, they rode towards the flank of the rear guard of Major-Gen. Anson's brigade, and four or five squadrons of the enemy mixed with them. These were mistaken for Spaniards, and they fell upon the flank and rear of our troops. We sustained some loss, and Lieut.-Col. Pelly, of the 16th dragoons, having had his horse shot, was taken prisoner.

The delay occasioned by this misfortune enabled the enemy to bring up a very superior body of cavalry, which was charged by Major-Gen. Bock's and Major-Gen. Anson's brigades, near the Venta del Pozo, but unsuccessfully, and our rear-guard was hardly pressed. The enemy made their charges on the two light battalions

of the King's German Legion, formed in squares, but were always repulsed with considerable loss, by the steadiness of these two battalions. They suffered no loss, and I cannot sufficiently applaud their conduct, and that of Col. Halkett who commanded them.

The exertions and conduct of Lieut.-Gen. Sir S. Cotton, and of the officers and staff attached to him throughout this day, were highly meritorious, and although the charge made by the cavalry was not successful, I had the satisfaction of observing great steadiness in their movements. Major Bull's troop of horse artillery, under Major Downman and Captain Ramsay, distinguished themselves.

The army continued its march on the 24th, and took up its ground on the Carrion, with its right at Duenas and its left at Villa Muriel, and the 1st battalion 1st Guards joined us from Corunna.

I halted here on the 25th, and the enemy attacked our left at Villa Muriel. They were repulsed, however, by the 5th division of infantry, under the command of Major-Gen. Oswald, in the absence of Lieut.-Gen. Leith, on account of indisposition.

I had directed the third battalion of the Royals to march to Palencia, to protect the destruction of the bridges over the Carrion at that place: but it appears that the enemy assembled in such force at that point, that Lieut.-Col. Campbell thought it necessary to retire upon Villa Muriel, and the enemy passed the Carrion at Palencia. This rendered it necessary to change our front, and I directed M. General Oswald to throw back our left, and the Spanish troops upon the heights, and to maintain the Carrion with the right of the 5th division. The bridge of Villa Muriel was destroyed; but the enemy discovered a ford, and passed over a considerable body of infantry and cavalry. I made M. General Pringle and M. General Barnes attack these troops under the orders of M. General Oswald; in which attack the Spanish troops co-operated, and they were driven across the river with considerable loss. The fire upon the left had been very severe throughout the day; from which we suffered a great deal; and M. General Don Miguel Alava was unfortunately wounded while urging on the Spanish infantry in the pursuit of the enemy.

I broke up this morning from the Carrion, and marched upon Cabecon del Campo, where I have crossed the Pisuerga.

The enemy appear to be moving in this direction from Duenas. I propose to halt here to-morrow.

P. S.—I have the honor to inclose returns of the killed and wounded.

Return of Killed and Wounded of the Army under the Command of His Excellency General the Marquis of Wellington, K.B. in the Siege of the Castle of Burgos, from the 11th to the 17th October 1812.

Royal British Artillery—5 rank and file killed; 7 rank and file wounded.
Royal Military Artificers—1 rank and file wounded.
Coldstream Guards, 1st Batt.—3 rank and file, killed; 1 rank and file, wounded.
3d Foot Guards, 1st Batt.—3 rank and file, killed; 3 rank and file, wounded.
1st Foot, 3d Batt.—1 lieutenant wounded.
2d Foot, or Queen's—10 rank and file wounded.
32d Foot, 1st Batt.—1 rank and file killed; 1 ensign, 2 serjeants, 1 rank and file wounded.
36th Foot, 1st Batt.—1 rank and file killed; 2 rank and file wounded.
42d Foot, 1st Batt.—3 rank and file wounded.
53d Foot, 2d Batt.—1 serjeant, 1 rank and file wounded.
58th Foot, 2d Batt.—1 rank and file, killed; 1 ensign wounded.
60th Foot, 2d Batt.—2 rank and file, killed; 1 rank and file, wounded.
61st Foot, 1st Batt.—1 rank and file wounded.
79th Foot, 1st Batt.—1 rank and file, killed; 1 rank and file, wounded.
1st Line Batt. King's German Legion—2 rank and file, killed; 2 rank and file, wounded.
2d do. do.—3 rank and file, killed; 2 rank and file, wounded.
5th do. do.—1 serjeant, 1 rank and file, killed; 3 rank and file, wounded.
Total British loss—1 serjeant, 23 rank and file killed; 1 lieutenant, 2 ensigns, 3 serjeants, 39 rank and file, wounded.
Total Portuguese loss—4 rank and file, killed; 1 captain, 27 rank and file wounded.

General Total—1 serjeant, 27 rank and file, killed; 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 2 ensigns, 3 serjeants, 66 rank and file, wounded.

S. A. GOODMAN, D. A. A. Gen.

Names of the Officers wounded, October 11, 1812.

32d Foot—Ensign Quill, severely.

October 16, 1812.

1st Foot—Lieutenant Rae, Acting Engineer, slightly.
58th Foot—Ensign Baylie, slightly.

PORTUGUESE.—*October* 15, 1812.

12th Regiment of the Line—Captain White, severely.

(Signed) S. A. GOODMAN, D. A. A. Gen.

Return of Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Army under the command of His Excellency General the Marquis of Wellington, K. B. in the Siege of the Castle of Burgos, from the 18th to the 21st of October, 1812, inclusive.

Royal Engineers—1 rank and file, killed; 1 rank and file wounded.
Royal British Artillery—1 rank and file, killed; 2 rank and file wounded.
Coldstream Guards, 1st Batt.—1 captain, 1 ensign, 1 serjeant, 22 rank and file, killed; 2 captains, 1 serjeant, 32 rank and file, wounded.
3d Foot Guards, 1st Batt.—8 rank and file, killed; 2 lieutenants, 15 rank and file, wounded.
11th Foot, 1st Batt.—1 rank and file, killed; 1 serjeant, 4 rank and file, wounded.
24th Foot, 2d Batt.—4 rank and file, killed; 3 rank and file, wounded.
42d Foot, 1st Batt.—8 rank and file, wounded.
53d Foot, 2d Batt.—1 rank and file, wounded.
58th Foot, 2d Batt.—1 serjeant, 6 rank and file, killed; 12 rank and file, wounded; 2 rank and file, missing.
60th Foot, 5th Batt.—2 rank and file, wounded.
61st Foot, 1st Batt.—2 rank and file, wounded.
79th Foot, 1st Batt.—1 rank and file, wounded.
1st Line Batt. King's German Legion—1 lieutenant, 1 serjeant, 24 rank and file, killed; 1 captain, 22 rank and file, wounded.
2d do. do.—1 major, 2 rank and file, killed; 2 lieutenants, 7 rank and file wounded.
5th do. do.—12 rank and file, killed; 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 7 rank and file, wounded.
Total British loss—1 major, 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 ensign, 3 serjeants, 81 rank and file, killed; 4 captains, 5 lieutenants, 2 serjeants, 119 rank and file, wounded; 2 rank and file missing.
Total Portuguese loss—8 rank and file, killed; 1 ensign, 2 serjeants, 41 rank and file, wounded; 2 rank and file, missing.
General Total—1 major, 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 ensign, 3 serjeants, 89 rank and file, killed; 4 captains, 5 lieutenants, 1 ensign, 4 serjeants, 160 rank and file, wounded; 4 rank and file, missing.

(Signed) S. A. GOOMAN, D. A. A. G.

Names of the Officers killed and wounded.

KILLED, *October* 18, 1812.

Coldstream Guards—Captain Harvey.

October 19, 1812.

Coldstream Guards—Ensign Burgess.
1st Line Batt. King's German Legion—Lieutenant Bothmer.
2d do. do.—Major Wurmb.

WOUNDED, *October* 18, 1812.

3d Foot Guards—Lieutenants Holborn and Knox, severely.
Coldstream Guards, 1st Batt.—Captain the Hon. W. G. Crofton, slightly; Captain the Hon. J. Walpole, severely.
1st Line Batt. King's German Legion—Captain Laroche, dangerously.
2d do. do.—Lieutenants Hesse and Quade, severely.
5th do. do.—Captain Backmeister, severely, right arm amputated; Lieut. Schlaeger, slightly.

(Signed) S. A. GOODMAN, D. A. A. Gen.